Yanbu Is Now a Single Point of Failure for Saudi Oil Exports

Ninety-two per cent. That is the share of Saudi Arabia’s seaborne crude exports that left the country through a single Red Sea terminal complex in June 2026, according to cargo-tracking firm Kpler [S1]. Yanbu oil exports are no longer a hedge against the Strait of Hormuz. For practical purposes they are the Saudi export system.

The concentration was deliberate, and at the time it looked like competence. When the war that began on 28 February 2026 shut the Strait of Hormuz, Aramco pushed the 1,200-kilometre East–West pipeline — the Petroline, the kingdom’s only Hormuz bypass — to a record 7 million barrels per day in March, moving crude from Abqaiq across the peninsula to the Red Sea [S1]. Roughly 1.9 million barrels per day of that feeds west-coast refineries [S3], leaving about 5 million for export. Yanbu’s terminals can load around 4.5 million barrels per day on paper, closer to 4 million in practice [S10].

Then, on 25 July 2026, Yemen’s Houthi movement struck Aramco facilities at Jazan and Yanbu with ballistic and cruise missiles and drones [S15]. The Jazan refinery burned. Two ballistic missiles aimed near Yanbu were intercepted by the Greek-operated Patriot battery stationed in the Kingdom since 2021 [S13]. Five days earlier, on 20 July, the same movement had declared a maritime embargo on Saudi shipping, effective immediately [S4]. Since that declaration, Saudi Arabia has loaded no crude at all for export through Bab al-Mandeb [S1]. Riyadh solved the Hormuz problem by building a Yanbu problem — and both ends of the Yanbu route were attacked inside a single week.

Last verified: 31 July 2026.

This page covers one question: the concentration of Saudi crude into a single loading complex, and what July 2026 did to it. For the pipeline mechanics and the wider Red Sea pivot as they stood in May 2026, see Saudi Arabia’s Hormuz bypass and Red Sea logistics strategy; for the city, port and industrial estate, see the Yanbu encyclopedia entry. Neither carries the July events, and this page does not restate their engineering.

How Much of Saudi Arabia’s Oil Is Exported Through Yanbu?

About 92% of seaborne crude, on Kpler’s June 2026 measurement — and the two most-cited trackers disagree on the level while agreeing entirely on the direction.

Kpler put Yanbu’s June loadings at 4.1 million barrels per day, roughly 64% of the Saudi crude that would normally have left through Hormuz [S3]. Loadings have averaged above 4 million barrels per day since June, against 973,000 barrels per day in the same period of 2025 [S5].

Wood Mackenzie’s series runs lower in absolute terms and higher in share terms: Yanbu loadings peaking at 4.07 million barrels per day in March and falling 41% to 2.39 million by June [S2]. On the same data, Yanbu’s share of Saudi crude liftings climbed month by month — 86.7% in March, 93.6% in April, 94.3% in May, 98.6% in June, when one cargo of about a million barrels left Ju’aymah on the Gulf and nothing else did [S17].

The two are not like-for-like. Kpler measures gross crude loadings at the Yanbu terminals; Wood Mackenzie’s headline series tracks Red Sea bypass volumes — crude displaced from the Gulf route, a subset. The share denominators differ too: Kpler’s 92% is of all Saudi seaborne crude exports, Wood Mackenzie’s 98.6% of counted cargo liftings. Neither disputes the concentration. On any measure, Yanbu oil exports in June 2026 were Saudi crude exports.

The wider Gulf picture explains why. Wood Mackenzie recorded Gulf crude exports across all producers collapsing from 18.8 million barrels per day in January (370 cargoes) to 3.4 million in June (71 cargoes), an 82% fall. Iraq, Kuwait and Qatar went to zero; only the UAE, loading at Fujairah outside the strait, held steady at about 560,000 barrels per day [S17]. Saudi Arabia’s oil production never stopped; its route to a buyer did.

Ian Solis, a data analyst at Wood Mackenzie, framed it bluntly: the market “treated Yanbu as the answer to Hormuz risk,” when in reality it was “a shift from one strategic bottleneck to another” [S2].

What Happened at Yanbu on 25 July 2026

On Saturday 25 July 2026, the Houthi movement claimed missile and drone operations against Aramco-affiliated facilities at Jazan and Yanbu, describing them as retaliation for Saudi coalition strikes on Hodeidah and Kamaran Island the previous day [S15].

At Jazan, home to a refinery of roughly 400,000 barrels per day [S9], fires took hold; satellite thermal-anomaly detections and open-source video corroborated the blaze. At Yanbu, the Hellenic force’s Patriot battery — in the Kingdom since 2021 under a bilateral defence agreement, manned by personnel from a NATO member state — reported intercepting two ballistic missiles at 07:15 local time, a 100% interception rate on the incoming pair [S13].

Aramco has confirmed nothing — no statement on damage, throughput or loadings, and none should be expected before the H1 2026 results on 4 August 2026 at 10:00 Riyadh time [S16]. That absence matters, because a quotation attributed to chief executive Amin Nasser — the reassuring “no injuries, no impact to supply” formulation — is circulating in coverage of these strikes. It does not belong to July 2026. The phrasing traces to the March 2022 attack on the Jeddah bulk plant, and Aramco held no earnings call after 25 July 2026.

What is documented is the market response. Brent, in the low $70s in the first week of July, broke $100 a barrel on 23 July as tankers turned back in the Red Sea, settled near $97 on 24 July and fell to roughly $90 by 27 July after the United States paused its strikes on Iran [S1] [S7]. That is a $30 round trip inside a fortnight, on a route question rather than a production question.

Why Can’t Saudi Arabia Export Oil Through the Gulf Right Now?

Because the Strait of Hormuz has been effectively closed since early March 2026, and the July data show it is not meaningfully reopening.

The strait’s normal significance is hard to overstate. The US Energy Information Administration’s chokepoint series recorded flows of 21 million barrels per day in 2018, about 21% of global petroleum liquids consumption [S11]; the pre-war 2026 baseline reported by The National was more than 100 vessels a day carrying roughly 20 million barrels per day of crude [S7]. Then the numbers fall off a cliff, and stay off it:

• 13–19 July 2026: 78 transits, against 174 in the week of 6–12 July [S6].
• Excluding Iran-linked shipping, Lloyd’s List Intelligence counted 25 transits that week against 108 the week before, with total traffic down roughly 90% year on year [S6].
• 25 July: 12 vessels. 26 July: 6 vessels. 27 July: 11 vessels [S7].
• Wood Mackenzie recorded large crude carrier movements at 6.3 per day in January–February, ceasing after 28 February and recovering only to 4.4 per day in early July, with zero outbound Suezmax transits [S17].

The defensible description of the Strait of Hormuz at the end of July 2026 is effectively closed, partially transiting. An unqualified “reopened” narrative — which circulated after the Islamabad Memorandum of 17 June provided for toll-free passage for 60 days, and underpinned some early-July market commentary — does not survive contact with the transit counts. The memorandum collapsed on 8 July; Iran suspended its commitments on 18 July. A trickle weighted towards Iran-linked tonnage is not a functioning export corridor.

That is the condition that made Yanbu load-bearing. It also renders the OPEC quota debate largely notional: a production entitlement is worth nothing without a berth.

What Is Yanbu’s Oil Loading Capacity?

About 4.5 million barrels per day nominally, and closer to 4 million in sustained practice.

The capability is split across two terminals: Yanbu North, the older facility, at roughly 1.5 million barrels per day, and the larger Yanbu South complex at about 3 million — seven berths in total, each theoretically able to turn around one very large crude carrier per day [S10]. Engineering analysis published by Engineering News-Record puts the operationally tested rate nearer 4 million barrels per day, and lower again in wartime once berthing friction, security procedures and scheduling disruption are applied [S10].

The gap between pipe and port is the whole story. The ceiling on Yanbu oil exports is not the pipeline Saudi Arabia spent decades building. It is the quay at the far end of it. Engineering News-Record’s framing — that this bypass infrastructure was sized for a short disruption, not a five-month one — is the correct engineering read.

The strain shows in the loading record. Shipments ran at 4.6 million barrels per day around 2 July, dropped to 3.36 million around 10 July, then spiked to 4.7 million around 13 July [S5]. That is not a smoothly running terminal; it is a facility oscillating around its ceiling. Trade reporting describes more than 30 tankers queuing at Yanbu at peak, waiting about five days before loading begins.

Homayoun Falakshahi, head of crude oil analysis at Kpler, put the constraint precisely: maintaining current export rates “would require materially higher terminal productivity, making logistics the key bottleneck” [S3]. Not reserves. Not spare capacity. Berths.

Does Saudi Arabia Have Another Export Route?

No — not at scale, and not one that avoids both chokepoints.

This is the structural asymmetry with the United Arab Emirates — the same asymmetry behind the UAE’s departure from OPEC, and one of the harder entries in the record of Saudi–Emirati divergence since December 2025. Abu Dhabi moves crude overland to Fujairah, on the Gulf of Oman outside the Strait of Hormuz, and loads into open water, which is why UAE exports held up while Iraqi, Kuwaiti and Qatari volumes went to zero [S17]. Saudi Arabia has no equivalent. Its Gulf terminals at Ras Tanura and Ju’aymah sit inside Hormuz; its Red Sea terminals sit inside Bab al-Mandeb. Jeddah Islamic Port handles containers and refined products, not crude export cargoes.

The rerouting is already visible. Suez-routed Saudi exports rose 106% to 1.06 million barrels per day in the week the embargo was declared [S1]. Bab al-Mandeb vessel traffic of all kinds fell 56%, from 34 crossings on 20 July to 15 on 27 July [S7]. Niels Rasmussen, chief shipping analyst at Bimco, described the mechanical consequence: the ships “will have to sail via the Suez Canal into the Mediterranean before proceeding to their final destination” [S9]. That sentence contains the cost.

What Rerouting Yanbu Oil Exports Now Costs

The economics are unusually legible, because the constraint is physical rather than commercial.

A fully laden very large crude carrier cannot transit the Suez Canal. Cargo must either be partly discharged into the SUMED pipeline and reloaded on the Mediterranean side, or moved on Suezmax tankers of roughly one million barrels instead of a VLCC’s two million [S3]. That means two vessels where one sufficed.

On 24 July 2026, VLCC rates stood at $382,397 per day and Suezmax rates at $103,500 per day [S1]. Two Suezmaxes at those rates, over a voyage more than twice as long, work out at roughly $2 million more per cargo than the single-VLCC Bab al-Mandeb alternative [S1]. Across a 4-million-barrel-per-day programme that is structural margin erosion on every Asian barrel — before any discount needed to keep the buyer.

Freight is not the only new charge. On 24 July 2026, leading marine war-risk underwriters in the Lloyd’s of London market notified brokers they would exclude vessels with any “Saudi touchpoints” from Red Sea war cover — Saudi-flagged ships, ships carrying Saudi cargo, and foreign-flagged vessels with a history of calling at Saudi ports [S14]. Business Insurance and the Financial Times both reported it; the underwriters’ circulars were not published, so this is credible trade reporting, not a primary document.

An exclusion is categorically different from a premium increase. A higher rate is a price a shipowner can pass on. An exclusion means the cover does not exist at any price, and a mortgaged tanker without war-risk cover generally cannot sail. Sumit Ritolia, lead refining and energy analyst at Kpler, warned the effect would extend beyond affected cargoes “by reducing effective tanker availability and supporting freight markets more broadly” [S3].

The $11 Price Cut Was Set Two Weeks Before the Blockade

Two facts about July 2026 look contradictory and are not. Saudi Arabia cut its August selling price to Asia by a record $11 a barrel on the grounds that Hormuz was normalising and the market was oversupplied — then, two weeks later, lost its Asian route entirely. The sequence makes them compatible. The pricing decision itself is covered in Aramco’s August OSP cut, the biggest since 2003; what follows here is only the chronology that reconciles it with the blockade.

The August price was set into a world that ceased to exist 19 days later. It could not price a naval blockade of the alternative route, an insurance exclusion, or a missile strike on the loading complex. Anyone reading the $11 cut as evidence that Riyadh saw the Yanbu crisis coming has the causation backwards.

The informative number is the September official selling price, due around 5 August 2026 — the first pricing decision taken with the blockade, the exclusion and the strike all known. A second deep cut signals a fight for market share on price; a sharp increase signals Aramco pricing scarcity of delivery rather than of barrels. Either beats the August number, now a historical artefact. The same logic governs how the oil price feeds through to the Saudi economy: this quarter the transmission runs through freight and insurance, not the wellhead.

What Happens If Yanbu Is Attacked?

Production would continue; exports would not. That is the asymmetry that makes this a single point of failure rather than merely a concentrated risk.

Saudi reserves and upstream capacity are unaffected by anything that happened in July. The Petroline is buried, spread across 1,200 kilometres and hard to disable durably. The vulnerable element is the last few hundred metres: seven berths, their loading arms and the tank farm behind them. Berth damage would not be repaired in days.

The immediate effect would be a build-up in the system — storage filling, the pipeline throttling back, wellhead production cut to match, as happens when downstream refining capacity is lost. The second-order effect lands on buyers, concentrated in Asia. Kpler’s exposure mapping shows how much of each importer’s crude routes through Bab al-Mandeb [S3]:

Roughly 6 million barrels per day of crude normally moves through Bab al-Mandeb towards Asia, about 1.9 million of it Russian [S3]. Mannat Jaspal, director and fellow of climate and energy at Observer Research Foundation Middle East, said a dual closure of both chokepoints would “send energy markets into a severe tailspin” [S1].

Analysts have been careful not to overstate what has happened so far. Salih Yilmaz, senior energy analyst at Bloomberg Intelligence, argued it is “safer to view this as a serious escalation in risk rather than a confirmed large-scale supply outage” [S9]. Neil Quilliam of Chatham House noted that damage at Jazan “could affect refined-product availability and regional supply even without materially reducing Saudi crude production” [S9]. Both describe the position as of 31 July 2026, not a ceiling on it.

Cyril Widdershoven of Blue Water Strategy identified the pattern that should concern Riyadh most: the Houthis appear to be “targeting infrastructure specifically being used to circumvent the Hormuz disruption” [S9]. If that holds, the adversary is not attacking Saudi oil at random. It is attacking the workaround.

Why This Matters for Vision 2030

Vision 2030’s economic logic assumes hydrocarbon revenue is the reliable variable that funds the unreliable one — the diversification programme. July 2026 inverted that assumption.

The Kingdom’s oil dependency paradox has always been framed as a price problem: too much of the budget rests on a barrel price nobody controls. The July data reframe it as a logistics problem. Saudi Arabia can pump and holds spare capacity; what it cannot currently do is guarantee delivery. A state whose fiscal base depends on physically handing barrels to Asian refiners has discovered that both of its sea routes to Asia run past territory contested with an armed movement on its southern border.

That lands on the fiscal picture directly. Aramco’s Q1 2026 free cash flow of $18.6 billion was already below the $21.9 billion base dividend, as covered in our analysis of Aramco’s war-quarter dividend. Adding roughly $2 million of freight per Asian cargo, an insurance market that will not cover Saudi touchpoints and a record price cut tightens the transfer to the state — the transfer behind the fiscal sustainability outlook and the spending plans in our coverage of the 2026 budget. Accelerating non-oil revenue is no longer a talking point; it is a cash-flow requirement.

There is a second cost. Vision 2030 markets Saudi Arabia as a logistics hub bridging three continents — the ambition behind investment in ports and maritime infrastructure. A hub is a place cargo passes through by choice. In July 2026 cargo owners were paying to avoid the Saudi Red Sea coast and underwriters were refusing to insure vessels that had called there: the precise inverse of a hub, and a reputational cost that outlasts any ceasefire.

It also exposes the defence-localisation gap. The battery that intercepted the missiles aimed near Yanbu is Greek — a NATO member’s personnel defending the infrastructure through which Yanbu oil exports fund the Saudi state [S13]. Against Vision 2030’s target of localising more than half of military spending by 2030, the most consequential air-defence engagement of this war was conducted by someone else’s crew.

Risks, Contradictions and Open Questions

The trackers do not agree, and we have not resolved them. Kpler’s 4.1 million barrels per day for Yanbu in June and Wood Mackenzie’s 2.39 million are both published, both credible and roughly 70% apart. Our reading is that Wood Mackenzie measures bypass volumes rather than gross terminal loadings, but neither firm published a methodology note. Treat any single-number claim about Yanbu’s June throughput — including ours — as tracker-dependent.

A widely circulated pair of figures could not be stood up. Reporting has described Saudi Bab al-Mandeb loadings falling 36% in a fortnight, from 9.5 million barrels per day on 29 June to 6.1 million on 13 July. We could not match that pair to a named tracker, and the magnitudes exceed total Saudi crude exports, which suggests it covers all petroleum through the strait rather than Saudi crude. We have not used it. The verified equivalents are The National’s Bab al-Mandeb totals — 9.3 million barrels per day in 2023, about 4.2 million in the first half of 2025, roughly 7.4 million in June 2026 [S1] — and the 56% fall in crossings between 20 and 27 July [S7].

Damage at Jazan and Yanbu is not officially confirmed. The Houthi claim is on the record; the Jazan fire is corroborated by satellite thermal detections and video; the Yanbu interceptions are confirmed by Greek defence authorities. Aramco and the Saudi authorities have issued no damage assessment. Reporting elsewhere suggests satellite imagery shows damage confined to storage tanks rather than processing units — the difference between a weeks-long and a months-long outage. Treat that as reported, not established.

Strike dating varies. Some outlets datelined the attacks 26 July. Contemporaneous reporting, including the timestamped 07:15 interception, supports 25 July 2026, with a possible second wave overnight. Saudi Arabia’s temporary halt of all Bab al-Mandeb shipments followed on 26 July.

Do not trust the recycled Nasser quote. A statement attributed to Amin Nasser referencing “no injuries” and no impact to supply, cited to a recent earnings call, is circulating in coverage of these strikes. Aramco held no earnings call in that window; H1 results are on 4 August 2026 [S16]. The language matches Aramco’s response to the March 2022 Jeddah attack.

Crude storage behind the Yanbu berths is not public, and that number decides whether a berth outage costs days or weeks of exports.

Whether the concentration is reversible is unknown. No public plan exists to expand Yanbu’s loading capacity, and berth construction runs to years. The 2019 Petroline expansion converted an existing parallel line — a one-off option already spent.

What to Watch Next

• 2 August 2026 — the next OPEC+ meeting. A quota decision taken while the member with the largest spare capacity cannot reliably load it.
• 4 August 2026 — Aramco H1 results, 10:00 Riyadh. The first scheduled opportunity to address the strikes, loading rates and rerouting costs. Watch gearing rather than headline profit: analysts flag above 10% as the level at which dividend coverage comes into question, against 4.8% in Q1 2026.
• Around 5 August 2026 — September official selling prices. The first pricing decision taken with the blockade, the insurance exclusion and the Yanbu strike all known. The single most informative forward marker on this page.
• Weekly Bab al-Mandeb loading data. The metric is not vessel counts but whether any Saudi crude loads for the southern route. It has been zero since 20 July.
• Lloyd’s market circulars on Saudi touchpoints. Reinstated cover would be the earliest credible sign of de-escalation; extending the exclusion to Saudi Gulf ports would be the opposite.
• Whether weekly Hormuz transits clear 174. That was the 6–12 July figure, itself far below the pre-war baseline. Until transits recover past it, “reopened” remains inaccurate.

Related Vision 2030 Context

• Saudi Arabia’s Hormuz bypass and Red Sea logistics strategy — the May 2026 pipeline-pivot analysis.
• Yanbu: the Red Sea industrial city and port complex — the entity page.
• Saudi Arabia’s oil exports — volumes, destinations, long-run structure.
• Saudi Aramco and the Aramco institutional profile — operator of the Petroline and the Yanbu terminals.
• Aramco’s war-quarter dividend and Vision 2030 oil dependency — the Q1 2026 cash-flow baseline.
• Saudi Arabia’s OPEC quota and OPEC — the entitlement a berth shortage renders notional.
• The Iran war and Saudi economic fragility — the macro backdrop.
• Ports and maritime infrastructure — the sector context.

Sources

• [S1] The National, “Saudi Arabia Shifts to Suez as Houthis Drive Bab Al Mandeb Oil Exports to Near Zero”, news report, 26 July 2026. https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/energy/2026/07/26/saudi-arabia-shifts-to-suez-as-houthis-drive-bab-al-mandeb-oil-exports-to-near-zero/
• [S2] World Pipelines, “Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea Crude Bypass Peaks in March and Declines 41% by June, Wood Mackenzie Data Shows”, industry report, 24 July 2026. https://www.worldpipelines.com/special-reports/24072026/saudi-arabias-red-sea-crude-bypass-peaks-in-march-and-declines-41-by-june-wood-mackenzie-data-shows/
• [S3] Al Jazeera, “Can the Suez Save Asian Oil Consumers After Houthis Shut Bab al-Mandeb?”, analysis, 22 July 2026. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/22/can-the-suez-save-asian-oil-consumers-after-houthis-shut-bab-al-mandeb
• [S4] Al Jazeera, “Yemen’s Houthis Declare Naval Blockade of Saudi Arabia: What to Know”, news report, 20 July 2026. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/20/yemens-houthis-declare-naval-blockade-of-saudi-arabia-what-to-know
• [S5] Asharq Al-Awsat, “Crude Shipments from Saudi Arabia’s Yanbu Port Near Maximum Levels”, news report, July 2026, citing Kpler and Signal Ocean data. https://english.aawsat.com/business/5296203-crude-shipments-saudi-arabias-yanbu-port-near-maximum-levels
• [S6] Lloyd’s List Intelligence, “Strait of Hormuz Brief: 21 July 2026”, data brief, 21 July 2026. https://www.lloydslistintelligence.com/resources/blog/strait-of-hormuz-brief-21-july-2026
• [S7] The National, “Bab Al Mandeb Ship Traffic Slumps 56% Since Houthis’ Saudi Embargo”, news report, 27 July 2026. https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/energy/2026/07/27/bab-al-mandeb-ship-traffic-slumps-56-since-houthis-saudi-embargo/
• [S8] Reuters, “Saudi Arabia Cuts August Arab Light Asia OSP, Biggest Drop in Over Two Decades”, news report, 6 July 2026, republished by BOE Report. https://boereport.com/2026/07/06/saudi-arabia-cuts-august-arab-light-asia-osp-biggest-drop-in-over-two-decades/
• [S9] AGBI, “Yanbu Attacks Expose Saudi Oil Export Vulnerability”, analysis, 28 July 2026. https://www.agbi.com/analysis/oil-and-gas/2026/07/yanbu-attacks-expose-saudi-oil-export-vulnerability/
• [S10] Engineering News-Record, “Hormuz Bypass Infrastructure Was Sized for a Short Disruption. This Is Not That.”, analysis, July 2026. The publisher blocks automated retrieval; figures here are as carried in ENR’s published summary and matching trade coverage. https://www.enr.com/articles/62677-hormuz-bypass-infrastructure-was-sized-for-a-short-disruption-this-is-not-that
• [S11] US Energy Information Administration, “The Strait of Hormuz Is the World’s Most Important Oil Transit Chokepoint”, Today in Energy, 20 June 2019 (2018 data). https://www.eia.gov/todayinEnergy/detail.php?id=42338
• [S12] CNBC, “Iran’s Houthi Allies Declare Maritime Embargo Against Saudi Arabia, Escalating Threat to Oil Market”, news report, 20 July 2026. https://www.cnbc.com/2026/07/20/iran-houthi-yemen-saudi-arabia.html
• [S13] Euronews, “Greek Patriot Battery Intercepts Houthi Attacks on Saudi Arabia”, news report, 25 July 2026. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/07/25/greek-patriot-battery-intercepts-houthi-attacks-on-saudi-arabia
• [S14] Business Insurance, “Lloyd’s Insurers Pull Cover for Saudi-Linked Vessels”, news report, 24 July 2026, following Financial Times reporting. The publisher blocks automated retrieval; details here are as carried in the FT’s account and Business Insurance’s published summary. https://www.businessinsurance.com/lloyds-insurers-pull-cover-for-saudi-linked-vessels/
• [S15] The Times of Israel, “Yemen’s Houthis Say They Carried Out Operations Against Aramco Facilities in Saudi’s Jazan and Yanbu”, liveblog entry, 25 July 2026. https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/yemens-houthis-say-they-carried-out-operations-against-aramco-facilities-in-saudis-jizan-and-yanbu/
• [S16] Maaal, “Aramco: First Half Results to Be Announced August 4”, news report, July 2026. https://maaal.com/en/news/details/aramco-first-half-result/
• [S17] Hydrocarbon Engineering, “Wood Mackenzie: Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea Crude Bypass Peaks in March and Declines 41% by June”, industry report, 27 July 2026. https://www.hydrocarbonengineering.com/special-reports/27072026/wood-mackenzie-saudi-arabias-red-sea-crude-bypass-peaks-in-march-and-declines-41-by-june/