The UAE Left OPEC After 59 Years. Saudi Arabia Lost Its Swing-Producer Leverage.

28 April 2026, effective three days later. The United Arab Emirates left OPEC after 59 years, ending a membership that began in 1967, when the Emirate of Abu Dhabi joined the cartel four years before the federation itself existed [S1]. It is the largest producer ever to leave. Roughly 12% of OPEC’s crude output and about 14% of the group’s production capacity walked out with it [S2][S3]. OPEC went from twelve members to eleven; its share of world crude production fell from 35% to 31% on 2025 volumes, and the wider OPEC+ bloc dropped from 46% to 42% [S6].

The proximate cause was arithmetic. The UAE’s OPEC+ allocation stood at roughly 3.5 million barrels per day against a capacity Abu Dhabi had spent about $150 billion building toward 5 million bpd by 2027 [S1][S3][S16]. Every barrel of that gap was capital already sunk and revenue not collected. Energy Minister Suhail Mohamed Al Mazrouei called it “a policy decision… done after a careful look at current and future policies related to level of production,” and confirmed that the UAE consulted no one — not Saudi Arabia, not the OPEC Secretariat — before announcing [S12][S14].

The consequence is larger than the cause, and it lands on Riyadh rather than Vienna. Saudi Arabia has been the system’s swing producer for four decades: the member that absorbs cuts to defend a price, in exchange for the convening authority that comes with being the only producer whose restraint moves the market. That bargain assumed the second-largest holder of spare capacity stayed inside the tent. It no longer is. Every barrel Saudi Arabia now withholds to support price is a barrel of market share available to a competitor under no obligation to reciprocate.

The short version. The UAE left because its quota (3.5m bpd) had fallen roughly 30% below its capacity (4.2–4.85m bpd depending on whose assessment you take). It is the largest producer ever to exit, taking roughly 14% of OPEC’s production capacity and the only meaningful pool of unused capacity outside Saudi Arabia. Riyadh keeps the swing-producer job and loses the leverage that made it worth doing.

Last verified: 31 July 2026.

What Happened: The UAE’s OPEC Exit in Six Numbers

59 years. Abu Dhabi joined OPEC in 1967; the UAE was formed in 1971 and inherited the seat. Abu Dhabi holds roughly 95% of the federation’s oil reserves, so the emirate and the member state were always the same thing in production terms [S5].

3.5 million bpd. The quota at issue. The UAE’s OPEC baseline was raised from 3.168 million bpd to 3.5 million bpd from May 2022 after the 2021 confrontation, and that increase settled nothing [S3].

$150 billion. ADNOC’s capital investment plan for 2026–2030, on top of Dh200 billion ($55 billion) in project awards scheduled for 2026–2028 [S16]. The target attached to it: 5 million bpd of crude capacity by 2027, pulled forward from an earlier 2030 date [S5][S14].

188,000 bpd. The production increase announced by the seven remaining OPEC+ signatories at their first meeting without the UAE, held virtually on 3 May 2026 — Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Algeria and Oman [S9][S13]. Saudi Arabia and Russia took identical 62,000 bpd shares. Note that this was an increase, not a cut; several outlets have reported the identical 188,000 bpd figure for August as a reduction, and it was not [S10].

4.1 million bpd. UAE crude production in June 2026 on IEA estimates — an all-time record, above the 4.0 million bpd peak reached during the spring 2020 price war [S7][S22].

11. OPEC’s remaining membership: Algeria, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela.

For the architecture of Saudi Arabia’s own allocation — baselines, voluntary cuts, compliance and spare capacity — see Saudi Arabia’s OPEC quota, which owns that subject on this site. This piece covers the UAE’s departure and its consequences for the quota system as a whole. The sector-level view of Riyadh’s cartel management sits in Saudi OPEC strategy.

Why Did the UAE Leave OPEC?

Because the quota had drifted roughly 30% below the capacity. Every other explanation — the Iran war, the Yemen rift, Gulf realignment — is context for the timing. The mechanism is a gap between what Abu Dhabi could pump and what it was permitted to pump, and that gap was widening because the UAE kept investing while the quota stayed fixed.

Those capacity figures are not interchangeable and no competing account separates them. The EIA’s 4.2 million bpd is effective capacity — what can be produced within 30 days and sustained for 90 [S6]. The IEA’s ~4.4 million bpd is 2026 crude capacity, excluding roughly 1.1 million bpd of condensate and natural gas liquids [S16]. ADNOC’s 4.85 million bpd is the company’s own maximum sustainable figure. Read against the strictest of the three, the quota still idled around 700,000 bpd; read against ADNOC’s own number, closer to 1.35 million bpd.

Capacity grew nearly 40% in six years, from 3.1 million bpd in 2016 [S4][S16]. The quota did not. That is the whole dispute.

The friction was documented five years before the exit

The UAE and Saudi Arabia first split publicly on production at the OPEC+ summit of November 2020, and the rift became “openly visible” at the July 2021 meeting, when Abu Dhabi refused to extend the cut framework without a higher baseline [S2]. Saudi Arabia’s energy minister, Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman Al Saud, presided over both. His portfolio and its consolidation are covered separately in our profile of Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman and Saudi energy consolidation.

The economic logic diverged because the fiscal logic did. Wood Mackenzie notes that the UAE carries “much lower fiscal oil price breakevens relative to its peers” [S3]. Saudi Arabia’s breakeven has been pushed toward and past $90 per barrel by transformation spending — the structural problem described in our oil dependency paradox analysis. A state that needs $90 oil and a state that does not will eventually disagree about whether to sell more barrels cheaply. Abu Dhabi resolved the disagreement by leaving.

When Did the UAE Leave OPEC?

1 May 2026, announced on 28 April 2026. The sequence, dated:

Which Other Countries Have Left OPEC?

Five have left or suspended before. All of them were small. That is the single fact that makes 2026 structurally different from every precedent: earlier departures cost OPEC volume it could replace, whereas the UAE’s cost it the second-largest block of capacity in the group.

Note the pattern in the reasons. Gabon and Ecuador left over cost and fiscal stress. Indonesia left because it could not fill its quota. Qatar left because its future was gas. Angola and the UAE are the only two that left because the quota was smaller than what they could produce — and Angola, at 1.1 million bpd, was a rounding error against the UAE’s 3.4 million. For the comparative production and reserve base across the region, see the GCC oil and gas benchmark and the head-to-head Saudi Arabia vs UAE comparison.

How Much Oil Does the UAE Produce Now?

A record 4.1 million barrels per day in June 2026, on IEA estimates — the highest monthly figure in the country’s history, above the 4.0 million bpd reached in spring 2020 during the brief Saudi–Russian price war [S7][S22]. The 2025 average was about 3.4 million bpd [S6]. The IEA expects roughly 5.2 million bpd in 2027, a year-on-year increase of 730,000 bpd [S16].

That is the defensible statement. The reporting around it is a mess, and untangling it matters more than the headline.

Resolving the “80% surge”: three series, one month

Three institutions published a June 2026 UAE production figure. They do not agree, and the disagreement is almost entirely about May, not June.

Bloomberg’s Grant Smith reported the first row under the headline “UAE Tells OPEC Its Oil Production Surged by 80% Last Month” on 13 July 2026, and the arithmetic is correct: 3.8 million bpd against a May base of about 2.09 million [S8]. It is nonetheless the wrong number to quote for the effect of the OPEC exit, for one reason that no coverage stated plainly.

The May base was a war casualty, not a quota outcome. Wood Mackenzie assessed that close to 2 million bpd of UAE offshore production was shut in during the Strait of Hormuz disruption [S3]; the Foley & Lardner analysis put the conflict-period trough near 1.9 million bpd, a 44% decline [S14]. The IEA recorded the same recovery across the whole Gulf: global supply rebounded 4.1 mb/d to 98.8 mb/d in June as Hormuz flows resumed, with Gulf production up 3.5 mb/d but still 11.4 mb/d below pre-war levels [S7]. A very large share of the UAE’s June “surge” is the same barrels coming back that came back for everyone else.

So: the 80% figure is real, and it describes a recovery from a blockade rather than an expansion after an exit. Anyone citing it as evidence that leaving OPEC unleashed an 80% production increase is reading a war chart as a policy chart. The honest version is that the UAE ended June at a record level — 3.8 to 4.1 million bpd depending on the series — reached faster than it could have inside the quota system, in a month when every Gulf producer was recovering.

A separate figure of “+80,000 bpd” also circulates against these dates. It does not belong to June 2026: it traces to older Gulf News reporting from a period when UAE output ran near 2.6 million bpd, and search engines have been surfacing it alongside the 2026 story. It is not a competing estimate. It is a different decade.

Why Saudi Arabia’s Swing-Producer Role Is the Real Casualty

The UAE’s exit did not break OPEC’s ability to announce policy. It broke the mechanism by which that policy is made credible.

A production agreement is enforceable only if someone can punish defection, and punishment requires spare capacity — the ability to add barrels fast enough to make cheating unprofitable. Saudi Arabia holds the world’s largest such buffer, with the EIA putting effective Saudi capacity at 11.6 million bpd against 2025 production of 9.3 million bpd [S6]. The UAE held the second-largest, and it was the only member whose unused capacity was large enough to matter in a bargaining sense. Wood Mackenzie’s assessment is blunt: the exit “removes one of the few major swing producers from OPEC, weakening the organization’s ability to respond rapidly to changing market conditions” [S3].

Riyadh needs price. Abu Dhabi needs volume.

Dagim Yohannes, writing for Horn Review on 22 May 2026, framed the divergence precisely: Saudi Arabia’s strategy depends on “sustaining elevated oil prices to finance long-term domestic transformation,” while the UAE pursues “a volume-driven strategy that prioritizes market share expansion over price stabilization” [S15]. That is not a disagreement about tactics. It is two different national accounts — and energy is one column in a wider dated ledger of where Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have pulled apart, which runs from Yemen to chip access.

Two rows in that table do the analytical work. Saudi Arabia carries a 10.291 million bpd allocation it produced 7.34 million bpd against in June — a shortfall of roughly 3 million bpd. And the UAE, holding no allocation at all, produced at a record.

Be precise about the cause of that Saudi shortfall, because most commentary is not. In mid-2026 it is primarily a war effect, not voluntary restraint: Saudi output collapsed to 6.44 million bpd in May and recovered to 7.34 million in June as Hormuz partially reopened [S7]. The kingdom is below quota because it could not ship, not because it chose not to pump. The structural argument still holds, and Wood Mackenzie dates its onset: supply impacts from the UAE’s exit are “more likely in 2027 and beyond,” once the strait normalises and Abu Dhabi’s capacity programme delivers [S3]. The swing-producer bill arrives when the war stops masking it.

What the August OSP cut tells you

On 6 July 2026, Saudi Aramco set the August official selling price for Arab Light into Asia at $1.50 per barrel below the Oman/Dubai average — an $11 cut from July’s $9.50 premium, and the largest single-month reduction in Reuters records going back to 2003 [S11]. It was also the lowest OSP since June 2020. A Reuters survey in late June had expected a premium of $1.50 to $3.00.

Sequence this carefully, because the obvious causal story is wrong. The cut was set on 6 July, roughly two weeks before the Bab al-Mandeb blockade and the 25 July Yanbu strike. Traders at the time attributed it to Hormuz normalisation, recovering Gulf supply and the OPEC+ output increases taking effect in August [S11]. It is not a response to the late-July escalation, and it should not be written as one.

What it does show is a producer buying back volume in a market where it no longer sets the terms. Aramco cut Northwest Europe pricing by $15 and North American pricing by $8 in the same announcement [S11]. That is the behaviour of a seller defending share, not a swing producer defending price — which is precisely the role reversal the UAE’s exit forces. For the demand-side context, see our analysis of Asian energy markets and Saudi Arabia’s oil exports.

What Does the UAE Leaving OPEC Mean for Oil Prices?

Not much in 2026; potentially a great deal from 2027. The Strait of Hormuz disruption has been the dominant price variable all year, and it capped what any Gulf producer could physically deliver regardless of quota status. Brent traded around $90 per barrel on 30 July 2026 after a volatile year that included April peaks above $120.

The medium-term risk is competitive rather than immediate. Wood Mackenzie’s warning is explicit: competition between the UAE and OPEC for market share, if it escalates, “could send medium-term oil prices sharply lower” [S3]. The mechanism is straightforward. Abu Dhabi adds roughly 730,000 bpd into 2027 [S16]. If OPEC responds by holding barrels back, the UAE takes the share and the price falls anyway once the withheld volume returns. If OPEC responds by matching, the price falls immediately. There is no configuration in which a producer with 700,000 to 1,300,000 bpd of idle capacity and no obligations is neutral for price.

Monica Malik, chief economist at Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, put the UAE’s calculation plainly: the move “opens the door for the UAE to gain global market share when the geopolitical situation normalises” [S17]. The conditional is the whole forecast.

The fiscal transmission into Riyadh is direct and is tracked across oil price impact on the Saudi economy and the fiscal sustainability outlook.

Beyond Oil: OAPEC, Murban and Gulf Convening Authority

Days after leaving OPEC, the UAE withdrew from the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries. The OAPEC General Secretariat confirmed receiving a letter from Al Mazrouei notifying it of an exit effective the same date, 1 May 2026 [S17]. OAPEC, founded in 1968, sets no quotas — it is a technical coordination body. Leaving it changes no volumes at all, which is exactly why it matters: it is a pure signal, and the signal is that Abu Dhabi intends to sit in no Arab energy institution it does not control.

The commercial counterpart is Murban. ADNOC listed Murban crude futures on ICE Futures Abu Dhabi in 2020 with destination restrictions removed, building an exchange-traded Gulf benchmark independent of Brent and assessment-based Dubai pricing. Murban represents more than half of UAE production, and an ADNOC outside OPEC+ has both the volume and the discretion to deepen that contract’s liquidity — which is how a producer stops being a price-taker inside someone else’s system and starts running its own.

Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, writing for Arab Center Washington DC on 1 May 2026, argued that for Abu Dhabi “there is no longer utility in belonging to an organization dominated by the interests of Saudi Arabia” [S5]. Yohannes reaches the same conclusion from the other side: the unilateral departure undermines Saudi Arabia’s “role as the central convening authority within energy governance” and moves the region “from a Gulf order organized around centralized leadership to one defined by distributed power and competitive autonomy” [S15]. The Middle East Council on Global Affairs reports a senior Emirati official saying Abu Dhabi would “scrutinize” its regional partnerships for reliability [S4]. Our standing coverage of that fracture sits in GCC unity and Saudi Arabia vs the UAE.

Why This Matters for Vision 2030

Vision 2030 is financed by an oil price, not an oil volume. That is the structural exposure the UAE’s exit sharpens.

Transformation spending has driven the IMF’s estimated fiscal breakeven toward and beyond $90 per barrel, against roughly $70 before giga-project outlays ramped, and oil still supplies around 62% of government revenue. PIF deployment, the giga-project pipeline and the National Development Fund all originate in hydrocarbon receipts, with Aramco’s dividend capacity as the transmission belt — see Aramco and the Aramco war dividend analysis for how that has already compressed.

Swing-producer status was the asset that made the price defensible. It let Riyadh convert spare capacity into policy: cut, hold the floor, collect. Removing the second-largest capacity holder from the agreement converts that asset into a liability, because restraint that once set a global price now transfers volume to a rival whose breakeven is lower and whose obligations are zero.

The 2026 budget already assumed an oil environment the year has not delivered. If the UAE’s 2027 expansion arrives into a market that has normalised, the pressure lands on the one line item Vision 2030 cannot compress: the capital programme. That is the connection between an announcement in Abu Dhabi and a construction schedule in Riyadh.

Risks, Contradictions and Open Questions

The war confounds everything. Every 2026 production comparison is contaminated by the Hormuz disruption. Attributing the UAE’s June record to the OPEC exit rather than to blockade recovery is the single most common error in the coverage, and this analysis cannot fully separate the two either. The clean test arrives only once Gulf shipping normalises.

No Saudi or OPEC response has been published. The OPEC Secretariat, under Secretary General Haitham Al Ghais, issued no public statement addressing the withdrawal in the days after 28 April that we could locate; the 3 May communiqué simply listed seven countries and omitted the eighth [S9]. Nor have we found an on-the-record response from Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman. Silence is not agreement, and it is not denial. It is unresolved, and we are not going to infer a position from it.

Capacity claims are unaudited. ADNOC’s 4.85 million bpd maximum sustainable figure is a company assertion, not an independently verified number, and it sits 650,000 bpd above the EIA’s effective-capacity assessment. Whether the 5 million bpd 2027 target is met is a question about drilling execution, not about OPEC membership. ADNOC Drilling has said it could go beyond 5 million if asked; that is a statement of willingness, not of delivered capacity.

The “80% surge” will keep circulating. It is arithmetically correct against the UAE’s own OPEC submission and analytically misleading, and it has already propagated into secondary coverage without its base. Treat any page that quotes it without the May figure as unreliable on this subject.

Contagion risk is unquantified. Iraq has overproduced against its OPEC quota for years, and Kazakhstan has been persistently non-compliant within OPEC+. If the largest defector leaves at no cost, the incentive structure for the eleven remaining members and their OPEC+ partners changes — but nobody has published a credible probability on a second departure, and we will not invent one.

Our own encyclopedia entry is now stale on one point. Saudi Arabia’s OPEC quota describes OPEC as a thirteen-member organisation. The correct figure after the UAE’s exit is eleven. That page is a live ranking surface and its correction is queued rather than silently applied.

What to Watch Next

Monthly, from 10 August 2026. The IEA Oil Market Report and OPEC’s Monthly Oil Market Report will now diverge structurally on the UAE, because OPEC has no reporting obligation from a non-member and the IEA does not depend on one. Watch whether OPEC continues to publish a UAE line from secondary sources, and how far it drifts from the IEA’s.

The next OPEC+ meeting. The seven remaining signatories have raised output for five consecutive months, most recently the 188,000 bpd increase for August agreed on 5 July [S10]. Whether a sixth increase follows, or whether the group reverts to defending price without the UAE inside it, is the first real test of post-exit cohesion.

September 2026 OSPs, published around 5 August. If Aramco extends deep discounts to Asia after the $11 August cut, the market-share reading is confirmed. If it restores a premium, the July cut was a Hormuz artefact.

ADNOC’s 2027 capacity milestone. The 5 million bpd target is the claim on which the entire strategic case rests. Watch project awards against the Dh200 billion ($55 billion) 2026–2028 schedule, and the West-East pipeline, roughly 50% complete and targeted for 2027 delivery, which would double export capacity through Fujairah and outside the Strait of Hormuz entirely [S16].

Murban’s share of Asian term pricing. The benchmark question resolves slowly and in public. If Asian refiners begin pricing term barrels off IFAD Murban rather than Platts Dubai, the UAE will have taken something from Riyadh that no quota agreement can return.

Related Vision 2030 Context

• Saudi Arabia’s OPEC quota — the allocation architecture, spare capacity and compliance record. That page owns the Saudi quota subject; this one owns the UAE exit.
• Saudi Arabia upstream production — fields, capacity and the 12 million bpd ceiling
• Saudi Arabia vs the UAE benchmark — the full bilateral economic comparison
• GCC oil and gas benchmark — regional production, reserves and revenue
• Oil weapon diplomacy — production policy as statecraft
• Vision 2030 — the programme all of this funds

Sources

• [S1] Enerdata, The UAE Announces Exit from OPEC Effective 1 May 2026 After 59 Years, news report, 30 April 2026. https://www.enerdata.net/publications/daily-energy-news/uae-announces-exit-opec-effective-1-may-2026-after-59-years.html
• [S2] Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, The Conversation, UAE’s OPEC Exit Has Been Long in the Works — And May Mark the Beginning of a Gulf Realignment, analysis, 29 April 2026. https://theconversation.com/uaes-opec-exit-has-been-long-in-the-works-and-may-mark-the-beginning-of-a-gulf-realignment-281699
• [S3] Simon Flowers, Alan Gelder, Douglas Thyne, Alexandre Araman, Dalia Salem and Hazel Seftor, Wood Mackenzie, UAE’s Exit Rattles OPEC’s Grip on the Oil Market, research note, 29 April 2026. https://www.woodmac.com/blogs/the-edge/uaes-exit-rattles-opecs-grip-on-the-oil-market/
• [S4] Middle East Council on Global Affairs, The UAE’s Exit from OPEC: When Politics and Oil Mix, policy paper, 17 June 2026. https://mecouncil.org/publication/the-uaes-exit-from-opec-when-politics-and-oil-mix/
• [S5] Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Arab Center Washington DC, Why the UAE’s OPEC Withdrawal Matters Beyond Oil, analysis, 1 May 2026. https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/why-the-uaes-opec-withdrawal-matters-beyond-oil/
• [S6] US Energy Information Administration, UAE’s Exit from OPEC+ Reduced the Group’s Share of Crude Oil Production and Capacity, Today in Energy, 23 June 2026. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=67804
• [S7] International Energy Agency, Oil Market Report — July 2026, monthly report, 10 July 2026. https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-july-2026
• [S8] Grant Smith, Bloomberg, UAE Tells OPEC Its Oil Production Surged by 80% Last Month, news report, 13 July 2026; read via Transport Topics’ and Rigzone’s syndications, Bloomberg having blocked automated retrieval. https://www.ttnews.com/articles/uae-oil-production-surge-june
• [S9] OPEC, Press Release, 3 May 2026. https://www.opec.org/pr-detail/602-3-may-2026.html
• [S10] OPEC, Press Release, 5 July 2026. https://www.opec.org/pr-detail/1835609-5-july-2026.html
• [S11] Reuters, Saudi Arabia Cuts August Arab Light Asia OSP, Biggest Drop in Over Two Decades, news report, 6 July 2026; read via BOE Report. https://boereport.com/2026/07/06/saudi-arabia-cuts-august-arab-light-asia-osp-biggest-drop-in-over-two-decades/
• [S12] Al Jazeera, UAE Leaves OPEC in Blow to Oil Cartel During War on Iran, news report, 28 April 2026. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/28/uae-leaves-opec-and-opec
• [S13] Al Jazeera, OPEC+ Announces Symbolic Oil Output Rise During Strait of Hormuz Closure, news report, 3 May 2026. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/3/opec-announces-symbolic-oil-output-rise-during-strait-of-hormuz-closure
• [S14] Scott D. Ellis, Foley & Lardner LLP, 59-Year Membership Ended in One Phone Call, legal analysis, 1 July 2026; published in the National Law Review, Volume XVI, Number 211. https://natlawreview.com/article/59-year-membership-ended-one-phone-call
• [S15] Dagim Yohannes, Horn Review, The UAE OPEC Exit and the New Dimension of the UAE–Saudi Rift, analysis, 22 May 2026. https://hornreview.org/2026/05/22/the-uae-opec-exit-and-the-new-dimension-of-the-uae-saudi-rift/
• [S16] Khaleej Times, UAE’s Post-OPEC Expansion to Lift Oil Output Over 5 Million bpd Next Year: IEA, news report, 17 June 2026. https://www.khaleejtimes.com/business/energy/uae-post-opec-expansion-oil-output-over-5-million-bpd-2027-iea
• [S17] OilPrice.com, UAE Withdraws From OAPEC, news report, 4 May 2026. https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/UAE-Withdraws-From-OAPEC.html
• [S18] Oil & Gas Journal, Gabon Protests OPEC Fee; Withdrawal Reported, news report, January 1995. https://www.ogj.com/home/article/17216979/gabon-protests-opec-fee-withdrawal-reported
• [S19] Center for Strategic and International Studies, Qatar Leaves OPEC, commentary, December 2018. https://www.csis.org/analysis/qatar-leaves-opec
• [S20] S&P Global Commodity Insights, OPEC Officially Acknowledges Ecuador Exit, news report, 5 March 2020. https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/oil/030520-opec-officially-acknowledges-ecuador-exit
• [S21] Journal of Petroleum Technology (SPE), Angola Exits OPEC After Production Quota Dispute, news report, January 2024. https://jpt.spe.org/angola-exits-opec-after-production-quota-dispute
• [S22] OilPrice.com, UAE Oil Output Hits All-Time High, Doubling Pre-Crisis Levels, news report, 10 July 2026. https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/UAE-Oil-Output-Hits-All-Time-High-Doubling-Pre-Crisis-Levels.html
• [S23] The Jakarta Post, RI Backs Out of OPEC Amid Production Cut, news report, 2 December 2016. https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/12/02/ri-backs-out-of-opec-amid-production-cut