Saudi Arabia’s H1 Trade Surplus Rose 53% — While National Non-Oil Exports Fell

Last verified: 1 September 2026. Saudi Arabia’s merchandise trade surplus reached SAR154.72 billion in the first half of 2026, 53.17 per cent above the same period of 2025. Over those six months, however, national non-oil goods exports excluding re-exports fell 8.83 per cent to SAR95.74 billion. Both figures are true. They measure different parts of the trade account. [S1]

The larger surplus came from higher oil exports and lower imports, supported by growing re-exports. It did not come from more Saudi-produced non-oil merchandise sold abroad. In June alone, national non-oil exports fell 11.4 per cent year on year and oil’s share of total exports rose from 70.4 to 72.0 per cent. [S2]

All values are recalculated from GASTAT’s June workbook using unrounded monthly and quarterly data. Data for 2026 are preliminary. [S1]

Oil explains more than the entire increase in exports

Total exports rose by SAR41.28 billion between the two half-years. Oil exports rose by SAR41.77 billion. National non-oil exports fell by SAR9.27 billion, while re-exports rose by SAR8.78 billion. The three components reconcile to the total increase after rounding.

That decomposition is more revealing than the surplus growth rate. Oil contributed slightly more than 100 per cent of the gross export gain because the net non-oil contribution was negative. Lower imports added another SAR12.43 billion to the balance improvement.

The algebra is simple:

• change in exports: +SAR41.28bn;
• change in imports: −SAR12.43bn; therefore
• change in surplus: SAR41.28bn − (−SAR12.43bn) = +SAR53.71bn.

The surplus is economically useful. It supports foreign-exchange receipts and the external account. It is not, by itself, a production-diversification score.

Of the SAR53.71-billion improvement in the balance, 76.9 per cent came arithmetically from higher exports and 23.1 per cent from lower imports. But even that split can mislead if it is labelled “export-led” without opening the export basket. Oil’s SAR41.77-billion increase was equivalent to 77.8 per cent of the entire balance improvement. The fall in national non-oil exports moved the balance in the opposite direction.

Another way to test the quality of the improvement is to remove oil. Combined national non-oil exports and re-exports totalled SAR169.24 billion in H1 2026, only SAR0.50 billion above the prior year. Imports fell SAR12.43 billion. On those merchandise components, nearly all improvement in the non-oil goods balance came from buying fewer foreign goods, not selling materially more non-oil goods abroad. This is not a full non-oil external balance because services are absent, but it prevents the oil surplus from being mistaken for manufacturing momentum.

The composition moved towards oil. In H1 2025, oil represented 69.82 per cent of merchandise exports, national non-oil goods 18.67 per cent and re-exports 11.51 per cent. In H1 2026, the respective shares were 71.96, 15.86 and 12.18 per cent.

March alone generated 36.5 per cent of the six-month surplus. Its SAR56.49-billion balance combined the half-year’s highest oil exports with its lowest monthly imports. Excluding March, the H1 surplus was SAR98.23 billion—still above the comparable SAR83.00 billion excluding March 2025, but by 18.3 rather than 53.2 per cent.

This is why a half-year growth rate should not be read as an evenly distributed structural shift.

Concentration also changes the risk reading. March’s surplus was 3.3 times the monthly H1 average excluding March. If an analyst annualised the half-year mechanically, one exceptional month would carry disproportionate weight into the full-year estimate. A stronger procedure is to report rolling twelve-month values, the median monthly balance and category contributions alongside the cumulative total. None removes volatility, but together they show whether the improvement is broad or event-driven.

“Non-oil exports” contains two different economic activities

GASTAT’s headline non-oil measure includes national exports and re-exports. National non-oil exports are goods of Saudi origin other than oil-classified goods. Re-exports are foreign goods exported again after entering the Kingdom, generally without substantive domestic transformation.

Both matter to Vision 2030. National exports test domestic manufacturing and tradable production. Re-exports test ports, airports, warehousing, customs, distribution and the Kingdom’s role as a logistics hub. But they should not be added together and described as Saudi-made output.

In H1 2026, national non-oil exports were SAR95.74 billion and re-exports SAR73.51 billion. Re-exports equalled 43.4 per cent of the combined SAR169.24-billion non-oil export measure, up from 38.1 per cent in H1 2025.

The combined measure rose only modestly—by SAR0.50 billion, or 0.30 per cent—even though re-exports grew 13.6 per cent. The logistics gain almost exactly offset the decline in national goods.

This distinction also changes the June headline. Combined non-oil exports fell 9.7 per cent year on year. Within that, national exports fell 11.4 per cent and re-exports 6.7 per cent. [S2]

The June production weakness was broad enough to matter

June total exports fell 4.5 per cent from a year earlier, oil exports fell 2.3 per cent and imports fell 3.0 per cent. The trade surplus consequently declined 10.0 per cent to SAR17.31 billion. [S2]

GASTAT identifies plastics, rubber and their articles as 20.7 per cent of June non-oil exports; their value fell 12.8 per cent year on year. Chemical products represented 19.2 per cent and fell 30.4 per cent. Together, those two categories formed 39.9 per cent of the non-oil total and both contracted. [S2]

The re-export decline also had a concentrated driver. Machinery, electrical equipment and parts represented 36.1 per cent of re-exports and fell 41.7 per cent year on year. This shows why re-export growth can be volatile: high-value equipment flows and timing can move monthly totals substantially.

National non-oil performance was not merely a June anomaly. On GASTAT’s quarterly series, the category fell 8.05 per cent year on year in Q1 and 9.60 per cent in Q2. February was the only H1 month to record a year-on-year increase. The deterioration was therefore sustained across the half, although product-level causes may differ by month.

The base effect does not explain the whole pattern. If June alone were removed, national non-oil exports for January to May would still be approximately SAR80.49 billion, about 8.3 per cent below the corresponding 2025 period reconstructed from the workbook. Removing March—the most unusual month for oil and imports—also leaves national non-oil exports down. The conclusion therefore does not depend on selecting one weak month, even though the exact half-year rate reflects every monthly comparison.

For policy, breadth matters alongside value. The ideal release would show how many product chapters and destination markets grew, the contribution of new exporters, and the share of sales made by SMEs. A higher total concentrated in one commodity or customer can be less resilient than slower growth spread across many products. The June bulletin identifies leading categories and partners, but it does not provide this exporter-level diversification test.

Imports fell, but the meaning depends on what fell

Import compression widens the trade surplus arithmetically. Economically, it can reflect weaker domestic demand, lower prices, supply disruption, inventory cycles or substitution by domestic production. The aggregate does not choose among them.

June imports of machinery, electrical equipment and parts—25.7 per cent of all imports—fell 20.4 per cent year on year. Chemical-product imports, 11.2 per cent of the total, rose 30.5 per cent. [S2] The mixture is inconsistent with a simple “imports down means local industry up” conclusion.

For an economy investing heavily in infrastructure and industrial capacity, capital-goods imports can support future production. A fall may improve the current balance while reducing imported investment inputs; alternatively, it may reflect completion of earlier projects or replacement by domestic supply. The trade bulletin alone cannot resolve that.

Volume and price decomposition is equally important for oil. GASTAT publishes trade values; a 10.6 per cent rise in oil-export receipts can result from prices, volumes or product mix. It is not a direct measure of additional physical oil output.

The same nominal-versus-real caution applies to chemicals and plastics. A fall in customs value may reflect lower unit prices, fewer tonnes, or both. Product-level quantity indices and unit values would distinguish lost market volume from a commodity-price cycle. Without them, the correct wording is that national non-oil export value fell—not that Saudi factories necessarily produced 8.8 per cent less or lost an identical share of foreign demand.

The Vision 2030 benchmark is broader than this customs ledger

Vision 2030’s original objective was to raise non-oil exports from 16 per cent to 50 per cent of non-oil GDP. [S3] The GASTAT table in this article cannot be divided mechanically by non-oil GDP to declare progress against that target.

The reasons are methodological. Merchandise statistics cover goods crossing customs boundaries; national accounts and balance-of-payments measures can include services, valuation and timing adjustments. “Non-oil exports” may also be defined differently across programme dashboards. Re-exports make Saudi Arabia a trading hub but do not carry the same domestic value added as manufactured exports.

A credible Vision tracker should publish a bridge with at least four layers:

1. national non-oil merchandise exports;
2. re-exported merchandise;
3. non-oil service exports, including tourism and transport; and
4. domestic value added embodied in exports.

It should then specify the non-oil GDP denominator, prices used and whether the target is nominal or real.

Countercase: diversification is not invalidated by six weak goods months

Saudi diversification spans services, digital activity, tourism, logistics, mining and downstream manufacturing. National non-oil merchandise is a crucial measure, not the entire non-oil economy. Re-export growth is also a legitimate result for a country investing in ports, airlines and logistics zones.

Monthly and half-year trade values are volatile. Commodity-linked chemicals and plastics can fall in price even if physical volumes hold up. Preliminary data may be revised. A stronger oil balance can finance domestic transformation rather than contradict it.

The narrower conclusion survives those points: the 53 per cent surplus rise is not evidence that Saudi-produced non-oil goods drove H1 export growth. The official decomposition shows the opposite.

What would falsify this assessment

GASTAT revisions that lift H1 national non-oil exports above their 2025 level would change the production signal. Volume indices showing strong quantity growth masked by lower prices would also qualify the value decline.

Sustained gains in national non-oil exports across multiple quarters, products and markets—alongside rising domestic value added—would establish a stronger diversification trend. Conversely, continued growth concentrated in oil and re-exports would keep the aggregate surplus and production story separate.

Saudi Arabia entered the second half of 2026 with a much larger trade cushion. The world-class policy test is whether that cushion is converted into competitive Saudi output that customers abroad buy without needing oil receipts or foreign goods to carry the headline.

Related Vision 2030 Context

• Jeddah Port’s July record was driven mainly by gateway cargo, not transshipment
• PIF’s 11% non-oil GDP claim needs a methodology bridge
• SALIC’s ecosystem supplied about a quarter of Saudi wheat demand

Sources

1. [S1] General Authority for Statistics, International Trade in Goods, June 2026, detailed workbook, preliminary data, 25 August 2026. https://www.stats.gov.sa/en/d/itr-jun-2026-2-xlsx
2. [S2] General Authority for Statistics, International Trade in Goods, June 2026, statistical bulletin, preliminary data, 25 August 2026. https://www.stats.gov.sa/en/d/itr-jun2026-en-1-pdf
3. [S3] Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Vision 2030, original objectives and commitments, 2016. https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/media/rc0b5oy1/saudi_vision203.pdf