Saudi Arabia's Debt Is Rising Faster Than Anyone Forecast

SAR1,667.2 billion — $444.6 billion. That is where Saudi Arabia’s central government debt stood at 31 March 2026, after rising SAR148.2 billion in a single quarter [S1][S2]. It is the starting point for any serious estimate of Saudi Arabia’s debt to GDP in 2030, and it is already 68% of the entire SAR217 billion the Kingdom told markets it would raise across the whole of 2026.

Say the reassuring part first, because it is true and most commentary gets the register wrong. At roughly 32% of GDP, Saudi Arabia’s debt burden is lower than the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Oman, a fraction of Bahrain’s, and less than a third of the United States’, Italy’s or Japan’s [S3]. There is no solvency question here, and nothing in the data suggests one is coming.

The story is the rate of change and what is funding it. The ratio moved roughly six percentage points in 2025 alone. The National Debt Management Center, whose founding chief now runs the investment ministry, planned to raise SAR139 billion that year and raised SAR401 billion — 2.9 times its own plan [S4][S5]. In the first half of 2026 the deficit reached SAR160 billion against a full-year projection of SAR165 billion [S6][S7]. Every published trajectory for this decade was drawn before those numbers existed.

Last verified: 31 July 2026.

This piece covers the forward trajectory: the issuance calendar, the maturity wall, the deficit run-rate and what they imply for 2030. For the standing definition of Saudi sovereign debt, its instruments and its institutional history, see our reference page on Saudi Arabia’s sovereign debt; that page owns the explainer and the stock figure, and this one does not re-argue them.

What Happened: A Borrowing Plan Missed by 2.9 Times

Saudi Arabia publishes an Annual Borrowing Plan each January. Few emerging sovereigns disclose this much. The 2026 edition was approved by Finance Minister Mohammed Al-Jadaan, who chairs the NDMC board, and released on 3 January 2026 [S8].

The 2025 plan set projected funding needs at SAR139 billion ($37.1 billion): a SAR101 billion deficit plus SAR38 billion of maturing principal [S4]. By year-end the NDMC had raised SAR401 billion ($106.9 billion) [S5] — 2.9 times its own plan, in a year with no downgrade, no market closure and no announced change of fiscal strategy.

The arithmetic reconciles exactly, which is how we know the figures describe the same universe of debt:

The composition of that SAR401 billion is the more interesting disclosure. SAR119 billion came from domestic sukuk, of which SAR60 billion was liability management rather than new money; SAR75 billion from international markets; and SAR207 billion — 52% of the total — from private markets: export credit agency financing, syndicated facilities and private placements [S5].

More than half of Saudi Arabia’s 2025 borrowing therefore never touched a public order book. The NDMC is explicit about why: the approach let it raise the amounts required “without placing pressure on public debt markets, thereby preserving orderly market functioning, supporting pricing stability, and ensuring adequate absorption capacity for public issuances” [S5]. That is a candid statement that public markets could not have absorbed the full requirement at the price the Kingdom wanted to pay.

The 2026 plan repeats the structure: 20-30% domestic sukuk, 25-30% international, up to 50% private markets [S5]. Anyone tracking Saudi borrowing through bond screens is watching half of it at most.

What is Saudi Arabia’s debt-to-GDP ratio?

33.0% at the end of 2025 on the NDMC’s own published measure, up from 25.9% a year earlier [S5]. That single-year move of 7.1 percentage points is the largest since 2020.

There is a figure conflict worth resolving in one place, because it explains why credible sources quote different numbers for the same country in the same month.

The numerator is identical in all three: SAR1,519 billion. The entire 1.3-point spread is the denominator. The NDMC ran its ratio against the Ministry of Finance’s December 2025 nominal GDP estimate of SAR4,600 billion; GASTAT subsequently reported 2025 nominal GDP of SAR4,789 billion on 4.5% real growth [S9]. Divide the same debt by the larger number and you get Fitch’s 31.8% [S10]. Nobody is wrong; they are dividing by different things, and no competing page states this.

For the stock and the instrument mix, see the Saudi Arabia sovereign debt reference page and the Saudi sukuk market explainer. The rest of this analysis is about where the ratio goes next.

The denominator is now the volatile part

Debt-to-GDP is a ratio, and in 2026 both halves are moving.

GASTAT’s second-quarter flash estimate, published 30 July 2026, showed real GDP contracting 4.8% year on year, with oil activities down 24.7% and non-oil activities growing just 0.6% [S11][S12]. The deceleration sequence — 4.9% for full-year 2025, 2.9% in the first quarter, 0.6% in the second — is set out in our analysis of the 2026 GDP forecaster split.

A shrinking real economy mechanically raises the debt ratio. But the denominator is nominal GDP, and there the picture is genuinely ambiguous: second-quarter oil revenue rose 22% year on year despite lower volumes, because the price went up [S7]. Higher prices on fewer barrels can leave nominal output flat while real output falls.

The honest statement is therefore not “the denominator is shrinking” but something sharper: the denominator has become a function of the oil price rather than of Saudi output. Hold the March 2026 debt stock fixed and vary nominal GDP alone:

Without borrowing another riyal, a 19% smaller nominal economy moves the ratio 7.6 points. If Hormuz normalises, Brent falls back and volumes stay capped, the deficit widens and the denominator falls together. That correlation, not the level, is the risk worth modelling.

Saudi Arabia Debt to GDP 2030: Three Scenarios

No single forecast is defensible here, so this section publishes three, with the inputs stated so a reader can argue with the assumptions rather than the output.

Assumptions applied to all three scenarios

• Base: central government direct debt of SAR1,519bn at 31 December 2025 (NDMC).
• Net new debt each year equals that year’s deficit; maturing principal is refinanced in full. This is conservative: in Q1 2026 the stock rose SAR148.2 billion against a SAR125.7 billion deficit, so the government borrowed SAR22.5 billion more than it needed and banked the difference.
• Central government only. PIF borrowing, government-related entity debt and guarantees are excluded, as they are from the NDMC series. This understates the consolidated position.
• The riyal peg holds, so dollar debt carries no translation effect in riyal terms. Euro debt is 1.6% of the portfolio [S5].
• No asset sales, no reserve drawdown, no change in the Aramco dividend.

Scenario A uses the Ministry of Finance’s own medium-term deficit path — SAR165bn, SAR120bn, SAR125bn — and the government’s own nominal GDP projections of SAR4,965bn, SAR5,258bn and SAR5,643bn, extended at 5% a year [S5]. It is what the budget documents describe. Scenario B uses Riyad Capital’s SAR228 billion deficit forecast for 2026 and SAR189 billion for 2027, then a glide toward the government’s stated direction of travel, on nominal GDP flat at SAR4,789bn in 2026 and growing 4% a year after. Scenario C assumes the conflict premium persists, deficits run near SAR300 billion and nominal GDP grows 3% a year from a lower base.

Two independent published anchors sit almost exactly on Scenario B. Fitch projects 41.3% of GDP by end-2028 [S10]; Scenario B produces 40.7%. The IMF’s 2025 Article IV projected 40.6% by 2030 [S13]; Scenario B produces 43.1%. Neither institution has published a 2030 number postdating the second-quarter flash.

Note how little separates the scenarios in level and how much in direction. Even Scenario C leaves Saudi Arabia below the United Kingdom. What changes is whether the Kingdom reaches 2030 with a stable ratio or one still climbing — a materially different position with rating agencies and creditors.

When does Saudi Arabia’s debt mature?

SAR52 billion falls due in 2026, SAR448 billion across 2026 to 2030, and SAR1,080 billion — 71% of the entire portfolio — within ten years. The tail runs to 2061.

The NDMC discloses a full redemption profile as Figure 9 of its 2026 Annual Borrowing Plan, split between local and international obligations. No competing page has reproduced it. Values below are read from that figure; components may not sum exactly to totals because of label rounding.

Three things follow.

The wall is not in 2026 — it is in 2032. At SAR180 billion, 2032 is 3.5 times this year’s redemption load and the largest single-year obligation in the portfolio. Every year from 2028 to 2035 exceeds SAR100 billion. The comfortable 2026 number is comfortable precisely because the NDMC has spent two years pushing maturities out of it.

The currency mix inverts around 2031. International obligations dominate 2027 and 2028 — SAR66 billion of the SAR105 billion due in 2028 — then fall away sharply as domestic sukuk take over. Refinancing risk in the late 2020s is dollar-market risk; in the 2030s it is Saudi bank and institutional balance-sheet risk, closely tied to domestic liquidity and the riyal peg — which came through 2026 with forwards priced well inside the 2016 stress. Different exposures, different failure modes.

The profile is being actively reshaped. The 2025 liability management transaction bought back more than SAR60 billion of securities maturing in 2025 through 2029 and reissued into tenors as long as 2040 [S5]. On 21 July 2026 the centre repeated the exercise: it redeemed SAR17.1 billion ($4.5 billion) of domestic sukuk originally maturing between 2026 and 2030 and issued SAR17.2 billion into 2031, 2033, 2036, 2039 and 2041 [S14]. Average time to maturity has held at 9.0 years, against 9.2 at end-2024, in a portfolio containing instruments of up to 36 years [S5].

One caveat applies to the whole table: Figure 9 is a snapshot of the end-2025 stock. The January 2026 bond added a $3.5 billion tranche maturing in 2056 that does not appear in it, and the July switch has already moved SAR17 billion out of the 2026-2030 band. The wall is a moving target, and it is moving outward.

How much debt has Saudi Arabia issued in 2026?

Through 31 July 2026 the sovereign has raised roughly SAR121 billion ($32.3 billion) across three identifiable public channels, before private-market activity that is never disclosed deal by deal.

The international print. On 6 January 2026 the NDMC completed a four-tranche dollar bond totalling $11.5 billion (SAR43.13 billion) [S15]:

Emirates NBD Research recorded books above $28.2 billion and a bid-to-cover of 2.45 times, against 2.54 times for the comparable $12 billion January 2025 issue; Arab News reported the order book near $31 billion and coverage at 2.7 times [S15][S16]. The gap is a books-versus-final-allocation distinction and neither figure is disputed. Emirates NBD put the deal at roughly 70% of the $14-18 billion it expected Saudi Arabia to raise internationally across the whole year [S16].

The domestic sukuk programme. The NDMC issues riyal sukuk monthly against a published calendar. The 2026 series to date:

The month-to-month swing is extreme — February was 248% above January, May 86% below April, July 49% below June [S17][S18][S19]. This is not a smooth funding programme but opportunistic execution against domestic bid: consistent with the NDMC’s stated approach, and inconsistent with the way most issuance calendars are read.

The liability management switch. The 21 July transaction moved SAR17.2 billion of maturities outward [S14]. It raised no net new money and should not be counted as funding, but it is the clearest evidence in the 2026 record that refinancing risk is being managed pre-emptively.

One correction to a claim that circulates: the euro-denominated green bond is a 2025 transaction, not a 2026 one. The NDMC issued EUR2.25 billion on 26 February 2025 — a EUR1.5 billion seven-year green tranche maturing 2032 and a EUR750 million twelve-year tranche maturing 2037, on books near EUR10 billion. It was the Kingdom’s first euro issue since 2021 and the Middle East’s first euro green bond [S20]. No euro deal has priced in 2026 [S5].

A separate figure needs care. Markaz reported Saudi Arabia raising $49.34 billion across 58 issuances in the first half of 2026, 48% of all GCC primary debt issuance [S21]. That covers all Saudi issuers — banks, corporates and the sovereign. GCC-wide sovereign issuance in the same period was $36.01 billion. Presenting the $49.34 billion as government borrowing, as some coverage has, overstates it substantially.

What does the debt actually cost?

3.79% at the end of 2025, on the NDMC’s own cash-basis measure — up from 2.03% in 2017 [S5]. The series is the quiet story in the borrowing plan.

Applied to the March 2026 stock of SAR1,667.2 billion, a 3.79% average cost implies roughly SAR63 billion of annual interest — about 5.5% of the SAR1,147 billion of revenue projected for 2026. That is derived, not disclosed, and it is rising on both terms: a larger stock at a higher average rate. It is also above the “under 5% of revenue” figure circulating in older summaries, including our own reference page.

The cost has been held down by portfolio management rather than market luck. Fixed-rate instruments rose from 59% of the portfolio in 2016 to 87% at end-2025, insulating the Kingdom from the rate cycle, while the domestic-international split has held near 62:38 since 2022 [S5].

Pricing in 2026 remains benign. The January spreads of 65 to 110 basis points over US Treasuries are unremarkable for this rating, and 2025 coupons ran from 4.25% on a five-year dollar sukuk to 5.63% on a ten-year dollar bond [S5]. Investors are not charging Saudi Arabia a war premium; they are charging a duration premium. For the mechanics, see our guide to investing in Saudi bonds.

What is Saudi Arabia’s credit rating?

A+ from S&P, A+ from Fitch and Aa3 from Moody’s, all with stable outlooks, all affirmed during 2026 while the Strait of Hormuz was disrupted.

The recent history matters. S&P upgraded Saudi Arabia from A to A+ in March 2025; Moody’s from A1 to Aa3 in November 2024; Fitch has held A+ since April 2023 [S5]. Three of the four most recent actions were upgrades, taken while the debt ratio was climbing — which tells you the agencies are rating the balance sheet, not the flow.

Their reasoning is consistent on that point. Fitch cited government debt and sovereign net foreign assets “considerably stronger than both the ‘A’ and ‘AA’ medians” [S10]. Moody’s stable outlook rested on the credit profile staying resilient to Hormuz disruption through 2026, noting the East-West pipeline carrying 7 million barrels per day and oil averaging $90-110 — leaving Saudi revenue above pre-conflict expectations [S22]. S&P cited the same pipeline optionality and forecast 4.4% real growth for 2026, a number the second-quarter contraction has made difficult to reach [S23].

That is the vulnerability in the ratings consensus rather than in the debt: two agencies affirmed on growth and price assumptions the July data have already undercut. Our Saudi Arabia credit rating page and the GCC credit ratings benchmark track the full history.

Is Saudi Arabia’s debt sustainable?

By level, comfortably. By trajectory, it is a legitimate question — and that distinction is the argument.

Figures are end-2025 general government debt on a single consistent basket [S3]. Two cautions. First, methodology moves these numbers more than most readers assume: the IMF’s April 2026 Fiscal Monitor puts Japan at 204% rather than 249%, having switched from unconsolidated market value to consolidated face value [S24]. Cross-country debt tables are only meaningful within one methodology. Second, the Saudi entry reconciles precisely to the primary data — SAR1,519 billion over GASTAT’s SAR4,789 billion — a useful check that the basket measures what it claims to.

On this comparison Saudi Arabia is the second-least indebted GCC sovereign and less indebted than every G7 member, and it holds substantial offsetting assets: Fitch’s affirmation rests explicitly on sovereign net foreign assets, and the Public Investment Fund sits outside these figures entirely. A gross debt number describes the Saudi balance sheet poorly.

Three things nonetheless make the trajectory question real.

The speed. A rise from 25.9% to 33.0% in one year is fast by any standard. Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE did not move comparably in 2025.

The composition. Half of 2025’s funding came through private channels, and the NDMC’s own explanation is that public markets could not absorb the volume without pricing consequences. Capacity, not cost, is the constraint being managed.

The revenue base underneath it. Non-oil revenue grew 3% year on year in the second quarter of 2026 while spending grew 11% [S7]. The argument that a rising debt ratio is safe because the non-oil economy will grow into it requires the non-oil economy to grow. At 0.6% real growth it is not currently doing so — a gap examined in our fiscal sustainability outlook and in the analysis of non-oil revenue.

What Breaks the Trajectory

Four variables would move the 2030 outcome more than any plausible change in debt management.

The oil price, in both directions. The 2026 budget is widely read as assuming roughly $72 per barrel at 10.1 million barrels per day. Tim Callen of the Arab Gulf States Institute, formerly the IMF’s Saudi mission chief, wrote that “the budget appears to take a relatively optimistic view on the oil market outlook” and modelled a SAR260 billion deficit at $65 with 4% spending overruns [S25]. The outturn has gone the other way: prices above budget partly rescued revenue while volumes collapsed. Both halves can reverse — see how oil prices reach the Saudi economy.

Hormuz normalisation. The counter-intuitive one. A reopening would restore volumes but remove the price premium currently holding revenue up, and Fitch expects recovery from 2027 on exactly that basis [S10]. Whether normalisation helps or hurts the fiscal balance depends entirely on where the price settles, and no published Saudi forecast separates the two effects.

Giga-project rescoping. Reducing forward commitments is the fastest way to shrink the deficit, and the evidence it is happening is now documented rather than rumoured — see the $16 billion NEOM contract cancellation cost, which also shows that exiting commitments is itself expensive. Those payments sit on PIF’s balance sheet, not in the Ministry of Finance deficit, so they appear nowhere in the debt series on this page.

Aramco’s dividend, the largest single sensitivity. The government’s direct 81.48% holding takes about $71.4 billion (SAR268 billion) of the $87.6 billion guided for 2026 — roughly 23% of all projected budget revenue and 1.6 times the entire projected deficit — before royalties or income tax [S26]. Aramco’s gearing was 4.8% at 31 March 2026, low but rising, and the company is monetising infrastructure to sustain the payout, as set out in Aramco is selling the company to pay the dividend. A 20% dividend cut would add roughly SAR54 billion to the annual deficit — Scenario B’s entire 2026 gap over the budget. Nothing else on the revenue side has that leverage.

Why This Matters for Vision 2030

Vision 2030 was financed on an implicit bargain: borrow modestly against a low debt base while non-oil revenue grows into the obligation. The first half is being executed at scale. The second half is not keeping pace.

The Kingdom’s own reporting sits awkwardly against this. Our analysis of the 93% KPI claim in the Vision 2030 annual report shows the headline achievement rate is a three-category figure whose met-or-exceeded component is closer to 79%. Meanwhile the sovereign fund meant to generate returns against the borrowing reported a SAR64.7 billion comprehensive loss attributable to the owner in 2025, analysed in PIF’s 2025 results, while government capital contributions to PIF collapsed from SAR645 billion to SAR54 billion, with debt replacing state equity on the fund’s own balance sheet — covered in PIF’s AUM target gap and funding sources.

The consolidated picture is therefore more leveraged than the 32% headline implies. Central government debt, PIF borrowing and government-related entity debt are three separate series, and only the first is in the NDMC’s numbers. There is no published consolidated figure. That absence, not the level of any one series, is the real gap in Saudi fiscal transparency.

The 2026 budget and the Saudi budget reference page cover the spending side, SAMA holds the reserves, and Saudi GDP supplies the denominator.

Risks, Contradictions and Open Questions

Nobody knows the 2026 gross funding number yet. The plan says SAR217 billion; the first quarter alone added SAR148.2 billion to the stock. If 2025’s outturn-to-plan ratio repeated, 2026 gross funding would approach SAR630 billion — but 2025 included SAR61 billion of pre-funding and a SAR60 billion switch, so the multiple is not cleanly comparable. Read the plan as a floor, not a forecast.

The private-market half is opaque. SAR207 billion of 2025 borrowing came through export credit agencies, syndications and private placements. Terms, tenors and pricing are not disclosed transaction by transaction. No external analyst can construct a complete cost-of-funding or maturity profile for the half of the portfolio that does not trade.

Contingent liabilities are unmeasured. The NDMC’s own objectives include “the monitoring of direct and indirect contingent liabilities within the public sector” [S5], but no such register is published. Giga-project guarantees, GRE obligations and PIF-level debt all sit outside the 33%.

Two agencies are rating on assumptions the data have overtaken. S&P’s 4.4% growth forecast and Moody’s $90-110 oil assumption both predate the 30 July flash showing a 4.8% contraction, and neither has revised — a statement about the vintage of the inputs, not a criticism of the ratings.

The deficit series has been revised twice. The 2025 deficit was budgeted at SAR101 billion, estimated at SAR245 billion that December, and reported at SAR276.6 billion in February 2026 [S6]. Forecast quality on this line is poor, and the SAR165 billion figure for 2026 is a pre-conflict number.

We could not verify any official Saudi statement of the debt ratio computed on GASTAT’s actual 2025 nominal GDP, a consolidated public-sector debt figure including PIF and GREs, or a disclosed 2026 interest-cost line. The SAR63 billion interest estimate is derived, not reported.

What to Watch Next

1. The Q3 2026 budget outturn, due late October. H1 ran at SAR160 billion; a third quarter above SAR60 billion puts the full year past SAR220 billion and inside Scenario B.
2. The NDMC’s debt stock at 30 June 2026. Q1 was SAR1,667.2 billion. Anything above SAR1,750 billion means the SAR217 billion plan was exhausted by mid-year.
3. Aramco’s H1 2026 results on 4 August 2026 — the base dividend and any guidance change. This is the largest single line in Saudi revenue.
4. The IMF’s 2026 Article IV staff report. The mission led by Azim Sadikov visited Riyadh from 28 April to 13 May and reported to the Board in July 2026 [S27]. It will carry the first post-conflict debt path from a body that shows its workings.
5. Monthly sukuk allocations from August. A sustained return to the March-April range of SAR15-17 billion would signal the private channel is being rationed.
6. Any second international bond of 2026. Emirates NBD expected $14-18 billion for the year against $11.5 billion printed in January; a large second print would break the NDMC’s stated intention to reduce net dollar supply.
7. The 2027 Annual Borrowing Plan in early January, and specifically its Figure 9. Comparing next year’s maturity profile against this one is the cleanest measure of whether the wall is genuinely flattening.
8. Any rating outlook change. All three agencies are stable; a first move to negative would signal trajectory has begun to outweigh level.

Related Vision 2030 Context

• Saudi Arabia sovereign debt — the reference explainer on instruments and stock
• Aramco is selling the company to pay the dividend — the revenue line funding 23% of the budget
• The 2026 GDP forecaster split — the denominator argument in full
• Saudi Arabia’s 2026 budget — the spending side
• Fiscal sustainability outlook — breakeven oil price and long-run balance
• GCC credit ratings benchmark and Saudi vs Gulf comparators — the regional benchmark set
• Saudi sukuk market — how the domestic instrument works
• PIF’s AUM target gap and debt trajectory — borrowing outside these figures

Sources

• [S1] Argaam, Saudi Budget Q1 2026: Revenues at SAR 261B, Expenditures at SAR 387B, budget report, May 2026. https://www.argaam.com/en/article/articledetail/id/1902512
• [S2] Argaam Plus, Saudi Arabia’s Public Debt Rises to Around SAR 1.66 Trillion in Q1 2026, data post, 2026. https://x.com/ArgaamPlus/status/2051660644592583029
• [S3] Trading Economics, Government Debt to GDP by Country, statistical series, December 2025. https://tradingeconomics.com/country-list/government-debt-to-gdp
• [S4] Saudi Gazette, Projected Funding Needs for 2025 Estimated at SR139 Billion as per Annual Borrowing Plan, borrowing plan report, 5 January 2025. https://www.saudigazette.com.sa/article/648381/SAUDI-ARABIA/Projected-funding-needs-for-2025-estimated-at-SR139-billion-as-per-annual-borrowing-plan
• [S5] National Debt Management Center, Annual Borrowing Plan Report 2026, official report, 31 December 2025. https://www.ndmc.gov.sa/en/IssuancePrograms/Documents/ABP%202026%20-%20English%20Final.pdf
• [S6] Saudi Gazette, Saudi Arabia Posts SR276.61 Billion Budget Deficit in 2025, budget outturn report, 23 February 2026. https://saudigazette.com.sa/article/659154
• [S7] Zawya, Saudi Arabia’s Budget Deficit Widened to $9.14bln Year-on-Year in Q2 2026, Ministry Says, budget report, July 2026. https://www.zawya.com/en/economy/saudi-arabias-budget-deficit-widened-to-9.14bln-year-on-year-in-q2-2026-ministry-says-415576
• [S8] Ministry of Finance, Saudi Minister of Finance Approves 2026 Annual Borrowing Plan, official release, 3 January 2026. https://www.mof.gov.sa/en/MediaCenter/news/Pages/News_03012026.aspx
• [S9] General Authority for Statistics, GASTAT: Saudi Economy Records 4.5% Growth in 2025, national accounts release, 2026. https://www.stats.gov.sa/en/w/news/171
• [S10] Arab News, Fitch Affirms Saudi Arabia’s ‘A+’ Rating with Stable Outlook, ratings report, 12 July 2026. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2650607/business-economy
• [S11] Al Arabiya English, Saudi Arabia’s Non-Oil Activities Grow 0.6 Pct in Q2, GDP flash report, 30 July 2026. https://english.alarabiya.net/News/saudi-arabia/2026/07/30/saudi-arabias-nonoil-activities-grow-06-pct-in-q2
• [S12] Saudi Gazette, Saudi GDP Reflects Lower Oil Activity as Non-Oil Sector Continues to Grow, GDP report, 30 July 2026. https://saudigazette.com.sa/article/663359/saudi-arabia/saudi-gdp-reflects-lower-oil-activity-as-non-oil-sector-continues-to-grow
• [S13] International Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Board Concludes 2025 Article IV Consultation with Saudi Arabia, press release, 3 August 2025. https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2025/08/03/pr25275-saudi-arabia-imf-executive-board-concludes-2025-article-iv-consultation
• [S14] Arab News, Saudi Arabia Redeems $4.5bn in Sukuk, Extends Debt Maturities with New Issuance, liability management report, 21 July 2026. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2651716/business-economy
• [S15] Arab News, Saudi NDMC Completes 1st International Dollar Bond Issuance of 2026, issuance report, 6 January 2026. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2628427/business-economy
• [S16] Emirates NBD Research, Saudi Arabia Kicks Off 2026 Borrowing, market economics note, 6 January 2026. https://www.emiratesnbdresearch.com/en/articles/market-economics-01062026
• [S17] Arab News, Saudi Arabia Raises Over $2bn in February Sukuk Sale: NDMC, sukuk report, 12 February 2026. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2632630
• [S18] Arab News, Saudi Arabia Raises $644m in May Sukuk Issuance: NDMC, sukuk report, May 2026. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2643416/business-economy
• [S19] Arab News, Saudi Arabia Raises $1.42bn Through July Sukuk Issuance, sukuk report, July 2026. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2651871
• [S20] Saudi Press Agency, NDMC Completes EUR2.25 Billion Euro-Denominated Bond Issuance with Debut Green Tranche, issuance announcement, 26 February 2025. https://spa.gov.sa/en/N2269965
• [S21] Arab News, Saudi Arabia Raises $49bn in H1 Debt Issuance, Leads GCC Market: Markaz, market report, July 2026. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2652343/business-economy
• [S22] Saudi Press Agency, Moody’s Affirms Its Credit Rating of Saudi Arabia at ‘Aa3’ with Stable Outlook, ratings announcement, 23 May 2026. https://spa.gov.sa/en/N2596198
• [S23] Saudi Press Agency, S&P Global Rating Affirms Credit Rating of Saudi Arabia at A+ with Stable Outlook, ratings announcement, 14 March 2026. https://spa.gov.sa/en/N2536329
• [S24] International Monetary Fund, Fiscal Monitor April 2026: Fiscal Policy under Pressure — High Debt, Rising Risks, statistical publication, 15 April 2026. https://www.imf.org/en/publications/fm/issues/2026/04/15/fiscal-monitor-april-2026
• [S25] Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, Putting the 2026 Saudi Budget Under the Microscope, analysis by Tim Callen, December 2025. https://agsi.org/analysis/putting-the-2026-saudi-budget-under-the-microscope/
• [S26] Aramco, Aramco Announces First Quarter 2026 Results, results release, 10 May 2026. https://www.aramco.com/en/news-media/news/2026/aramco-announces-first-quarter-2026-results
• [S27] International Monetary Fund, IMF Staff Completes 2026 Article IV Mission to Saudi Arabia, press release, 3 June 2026. https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2026/06/03/pr26181-saudi-arabia-imf-staff-completes-2026-article-iv-mission

The NDMC’s 2026 Annual Borrowing Plan is the primary source for the portfolio composition, cost of funding, maturity profile and 2025 funding record on this page. The document is published at ndmc.gov.sa, but that copy blocked automated retrieval; the report was read from the identical PDF mirrored by Argaam. Maturity-wall figures are read from data labels on its Figure 9 and may not sum exactly to totals. Riyal figures convert at the pegged SAR3.75 to the dollar.