The Riyal Peg Just Had Its Hardest Year. It Held.

It held, and the market is not pricing it to break. On 30 July 2026 the one-year dollar/riyal forward was quoted at 75 to 85 points — an implied rate of about 3.763 in twelve months against a peg of 3.75 [S6]. That is roughly a third of one percent of depreciation priced over a year, at the end of the hardest twelve months the arrangement has faced since it was created.

The saudi riyal peg 2026 test was not theoretical. The Strait of Hormuz has been closed or barely transiting since 28 February 2026, across two phases. Saudi crude output ran at 6.70 million barrels per day in the second quarter against an OPEC+ allocation of 10.291 million. GASTAT’s flash estimate published on 30 July 2026 put real GDP down 4.8% year on year, non-oil activity up just 0.6% against 4.9% for full-year 2025 [S20]. The 2025 deficit came in at SAR277 billion against a SAR245 billion projection; the first quarter of 2026 alone produced SAR125.7 billion, 76% of the year’s forecast shortfall in three months. Every one of those numbers historically precedes a currency crisis. None has shown up in the price of the currency.

This is a dated stress test, not a definition: for what the peg is and how the 3.75 rate works, see our reference page on the Saudi riyal and its dollar peg and the explainer on what is the Saudi riyal peg. It is financial information, not investment advice, and makes no directional call on the currency.

Last verified: 31 July 2026.

Will Saudi Arabia Devalue the Riyal?

No official signal exists, and no market price implies one. Those are separate claims and both are checkable.

SAMA’s most recent public statement on the exchange rate came from Governor Ayman Al-Sayari at the AlUla Conference for Emerging Market Economies on 9 February 2026: maintaining the peg, “backed by substantial foreign currency reserves — has helped preserve domestic price stability,” with average annual inflation below 3% over the previous five years [S11]. That was nineteen days before the war began, and there has been no equivalent statement since — a fact about the record, not evidence of a change.

The strongest argument against a devaluation undertaken for fiscal reasons comes from inside SAMA, and most coverage skips it. The intuition behind every “Saudi Arabia will devalue” argument is identical: oil sells in dollars, the state spends in riyals, so a cheaper riyal converts each dollar into more riyals and closes the budget gap. That intuition is wrong, and SAMA’s own officials published why in 2005. In a Bank for International Settlements paper, Muhammad Al-Jasser — then SAMA’s vice governor, later its governor — and Ahmed Banafe wrote that speculation rests on “a misconceived perception that a devaluation of the riyal would result in higher revenue (translation effect),” which “is offset by the transaction effect in Saudi Arabia’s open economy.” Any such gains, they concluded, “are rather illusory” [S7].

Saudi Arabia imports a very large share of what it consumes and builds. Devalue, and oil receipts translate into more riyals — but the riyal cost of construction inputs, machinery, food and the imported component of every giga-project rises in proportion. What is left is public payrolls and locally sourced goods: compressible, but only as a real wage cut delivered through the exchange rate. Goldman Sachs agreed from outside — economist Farouk Soussa, on 4 May 2020, argued any devaluation “would have to be very large in order to generate an income effect sufficient to reduce external imbalances” [S21].

For a state with Saudi Arabia’s balance sheet, then, a peg break is a policy choice rather than a market event. The BIS paper documents the decision chain: adjustments “are initiated by SAMA, coordinated with the Minister of Finance and endorsed by the Head of the Council of Ministers” [S7] — SAMA, the Ministry of Finance and the Council. No market forces that sequence while the reserves hold.

Why Is the Riyal Pegged to the Dollar?

Because Saudi Arabia earns its foreign exchange in dollars and the state is effectively the only earner. Al-Jasser and Banafe give the operational reality in one sentence: “As foreign exchange is predominantly earned by the government, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) provides the foreign exchange needs of the private sector by selling dollars against Riyals to the domestic banks” [S7]. That is the whole mechanism, and no large-scale market operation is required in normal conditions because the flow runs in SAMA’s favour whenever oil sells.

One structural feature makes it unusually robust and is almost never reported: the BIS paper describes “the mandatory 100% currency backing by foreign exchange reserves,” which “puts a ceiling on currency in circulation (it cannot exceed foreign exchange reserves)” [S7] — a constraint a currency board would recognise.

The 1986 Move Was Itself a Devaluation

The 3.75 rate is not as old as it looks, and it was created by a devaluation — a fact almost no coverage mentions. The official selling rate moved fourteen times between 1960 and 1986, from SAR4.50 down to 3.65 [S7]. Then, with oil prices falling, budget imbalances widening and reserves draining, Al-Jasser and Banafe record that “Saudi Arabia devalued the riyal in June 1986 from 3.65 to 3.75 to the Dollar. The small devaluation of the riyal by 2.7% against the dollar was meant to signal to the market that balance of payments considerations warranted devaluation” [S7].

So the correct statement is not that Saudi Arabia never devalues. It devalued once, by 2.7%, forty years ago, under conditions it judged to warrant it — then formalised the rate on 1 January 2003 and held it through the 2014–16 crash, 2020 and the present war. Anyone calling the peg immovable in principle overstates the record. Anyone calling it fragile has to explain forty years of it not moving.

What the Peg Costs: Monetary Policy Made in Washington

The price is paid in interest rates, and in July 2026 it is unusually visible. SAMA’s repo rate has been 4.25% and its reverse repo 3.75% since 10 December 2025, when it cut both by 25 basis points immediately after the Federal Reserve lowered its target range to 3.50–3.75% [S12]. On 29 July 2026 the Federal Open Market Committee held that range for a fifth consecutive meeting on a 9–3 vote, three regional presidents dissenting in favour of higher rates because US inflation has run above target for more than five years [S13].

Set that against the domestic picture: real GDP down 4.8% year on year in the second quarter, non-oil growth at 0.6% [S20], and inflation below 3% [S11]. An independent central bank facing that combination would be cutting aggressively.

SAMA cannot. Its policy rate is set by the requirement that riyal deposits pay enough relative to dollar deposits to remove the incentive to convert, so when the Fed holds to fight its own inflation problem, Saudi Arabia holds too, whatever its output gap says. That is the cost of the peg, and in mid-2026 it is being paid at close to its maximum — a debate about growth, not solvency. For how SAMA’s decisions transmit domestically, see our reference on interest rates in Saudi Arabia.

How Much Are SAMA’s Reserves?

SAR1.85 trillion — about $494.55 billion — at the end of June 2026. This is the most important number in any saudi riyal peg 2026 assessment, and it moved in the opposite direction to almost everything else in the Saudi economy this year.

It comes from SAMA’s own monthly release, International_Reserves_Jun_2026.xlsx, last updated 7 July 2026 [S1]. That spreadsheet blocks automated retrieval, so the figures below are as read by Arab News on 8 July 2026 [S2] and corroborated by Argaam and Saudi Gazette [S4][S5].

Foreign currency and deposits account for SAR1.76 trillion of that, up 8.7% year on year; monetary gold was unchanged at SAR1.62 billion, in a year when central banks globally bought 244 tonnes in the first quarter alone [S2].

Reserves rose by roughly SAR70 billion between January and June 2026 — the window containing the first Hormuz closure phase, 28 February to the partial reopening on 18 June. The single monthly decline, SAR24.8 billion in May, was more than reversed in June. Any account of 2026 that describes Saudi reserves being drained to defend the currency is describing something the published series does not show.

On the narrower measure, Abdullah Almeer, assistant professor of economics at King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals, told Asharq Al-Awsat on 31 July 2026 that “the Saudi Central Bank’s net foreign assets exceed $488 billion, enough to cover 14 months of imports” [S14]. The IMF’s 2026 Article IV projections put reserves at 13.9 months of imports and call them “comfortable” [S10].

Two Import-Cover Numbers, and Which One to Use

On 9 April 2026 Arab News reported Al-Eqtisadiah analysis finding reserves “sufficient to cover imports for about 22 months, roughly three times the global average of around six months,” ranking Saudi Arabia first in the G20 [S18]. The IMF and Almeer say roughly 14. Both can be correct on the same reserve stock, because cover depends entirely on the denominator: goods-only runs far longer than goods-and-services, and Saudi services imports tied to the transformation programme are unusually large. Use the IMF’s 13.9 months as the conservative figure.

The Test That Actually Bounds the Question

Import cover measures the ability to keep paying for goods. The test for a peg is different: could SAMA honour conversion if domestic holders of riyals wanted dollars? Saudi narrow money (M1) stood at SAR1.736 trillion in February 2026 [S22]; broad money (M3) reached SAR3.307 trillion — $882 billion — at end-March, an all-time high [S19].

SAMA’s SAR1.85 trillion of reserve assets therefore exceeds the entire stock of Saudi narrow money by roughly SAR114 billion, and covers about 56% of broad money. Every riyal held as cash or in a current account could be presented for conversion at 3.75 and SAMA could meet all of it with reserves left over. That is the condition under which a speculative attack on a pegged currency does not work, and what Goldman’s 2020 analysis was testing for [S21]. Where those deposits sit is covered in our analysis of the Saudi banking sector past SAR3 trillion.

What the Forward Market Says About the Saudi Riyal Peg 2026

The forward market prices devaluation probability directly, and on 30 July 2026 it was pricing almost none. Retrieved quotes follow; spot at the time was 3.7551 [S6].

Forward points are in units of 0.0001, a scale independently confirmed by the January 2016 episode, where a reported 1,020 points corresponded to a quoted outright of 3.85 [S8].

First, the level. The one-year mid of 80 points implies an outright of 3.7631 — 0.35% above the 3.75 peg over twelve months. In January 2016 the same instrument reached 1,020 points, an implied 2.7% devaluation [S8]. Today’s reading is under 8% of that peak; even the intraday high of 147.4 points was under 15% of the 2016 record.

Second, the shape, which matters more than the level and which nobody reports. A market pricing a discrete devaluation produces a curve that steepens sharply — in the 1993 and 1998 episodes, SAMA’s own charts show twelve-month swap points spiking to roughly 475 and 790 while one-month points barely moved [S7]. Event risk concentrates where the event is expected. The 30 July curve does the opposite: annualised carry sits in a narrow 76-to-96-point band from one month out to two years — what a pure interest-rate differential looks like with no event priced on top.

Third, the calibration exists in print. Al-Jasser and Banafe recorded that SAMA intervened in 1993 and 1998 “when the dollar/riyal interest rate differential ranged between 1 and 2%, as opposed to ¼ to ½% in normal times” [S7]. The one-year forward implies about 0.21% — below the bottom of the range two SAMA officials defined as normal. By the central bank’s own published benchmark, the forward market in July 2026 is not merely un-stressed. It is quieter than routine.

What This Evidence Cannot Carry

Three limits, stated rather than buried. These are indicative contributed quotes from a commercial market-data platform, not an official fixing, and the platform’s own disclaimer says so. USD/SAR forwards are thin, with wide spreads — the five-year bid-ask of 239 to 340 is a 100-point gap on a 290-point mid.

More importantly, the market is administratively constrained. In June 2016 SAMA banned banks from using options and other derivatives to speculate against the riyal [S9], removing the cheapest instruments for expressing a devaluation view. A calm price in a market where they have been withdrawn is weaker evidence than a calm price in a free one. It remains evidence — the trade can be expressed offshore in non-deliverable form — but it is not a clean referendum. And forwards price the next twelve months; they say nothing about 2030.

The 2015–16 Precedent Almost Nobody Cites

The best guide to how this ends is the last time it looked like this, and it is missing from nearly all current coverage.

By January 2016 conditions were worse than today on the measures that matter most: Brent below $30, a 2015 deficit close to 15% of GDP, and reserves down well over $150 billion from their August 2014 peak above $730 billion. Bets against the riyal, by Reuters’ account, reached their highest in almost two decades [S8]. One-year forwards hit 1,020 points. SAMA convened domestic banks in Riyadh on 18 January 2016 and told them to stop offering options contracts on riyal forwards; forwards fell to 690 points by 20 January [S8], and in June the ban was formalised [S9].

Then nothing happened. The peg did not move. Saudi Arabia issued its first international bond instead, cut subsidies, introduced VAT and absorbed the shock fiscally — the adjustment path both Goldman [S21] and the translation-effect argument [S7] predict a rational government would choose. That episode is the reason to be careful in both directions: the 2016 spike was real and it was wrong, a 2.7% implied devaluation that never arrived. A calm forward market is not a guarantee, but a panicked one has already been tested against this currency and found to be a poor predictor.

What Would Break the Riyal Peg?

The most rigorous available answer is the list SAMA’s own officials published, ranked “in order of importance and interconnections” [S7], tested against July 2026:

Two of six are present, one of which is the argument’s own echo. The two that historically did the damage — falling reserves and a severe external deficit — are absent.

Four things would actually change the picture: a sustained reserve decline of the order of $100 billion, running for several consecutive months rather than one; deposit dollarisation inside the Saudi banking system, where a domestic loss of confidence appears before any forward market moves; a structural shift making the 2026 output collapse permanent rather than a blockade effect, the chokepoint examined in our analysis of Yanbu as a single point of failure; or a deliberate policy decision routed through the three offices named above. None is visible on 31 July 2026, and the last is the only one that has ever happened.

Is the Saudi Riyal Peg Safe?

Given full weight, the case that it is rests on five things.

Reserves exceed the money that could run — SAR1.85 trillion against SAR1.736 trillion of narrow money is the condition under which a run cannot mathematically succeed at the current rate [S1][S22].

Borrowing capacity is large and demonstrably live. The IMF projects public debt at 32.1% of GDP in 2026 [S10]; the National Debt Management Center targets keeping it below 33% while raising SAR217 billion of gross financing against a SAR165 billion projected deficit [S15]. That is low internationally, and access is not theoretical: $11.5 billion raised in January 2026 against about $31 billion of orders, a 2.7-times cover [S16]; $2.81 billion of domestic sukuk in June [S23]; and a SAR17.2 billion ($4.59 billion) five-tranche sukuk in the week to 26 July 2026, paired with an SAR17.1 billion buyback [S17]. That last is liability management, extending maturities to 2041 — not emergency funding. Sovereigns under currency pressure do not term out debt at will during a blockade. See our page on Saudi sovereign debt.

The Aramco dividend is a hard-currency flow of exceptional size. The government holds 81.48% of Saudi Aramco directly, so on the $87.6 billion guided for 2026 its share is about $71.4 billion (SAR268 billion) — close to 23% of all projected 2026 budget revenue and 1.6 times the entire projected deficit. Our analysis of Aramco’s asset sales and dividend funding sets out how that payout is sustained.

The political cost of moving would be regional. The dirham, Qatari riyal, Bahraini dinar and Omani rial are all dollar-pegged, and a Saudi move would put every one under immediate examination — which is why the decision runs to the Council of Ministers [S7].

No institution with access to the books has signalled concern. The IMF Executive Board concluded the 2026 Article IV consultation on 22 July 2026: “Directors agreed that the currency peg to the U.S. dollar remains appropriate,” the Saudi Central Bank’s “foreign reserves remained comfortable,” and its liquidity management was “prudent.” The Fund projects a 2026 deficit of −3.7% of GDP against −5.8% in 2025 [S10].

Why This Matters for Vision 2030

The peg is load-bearing for the transformation in a way rarely stated. Vision 2030 is financed by foreign capital — project finance, infrastructure investment, sovereign and corporate issuance, and the foreign direct investment target at the centre of the programme’s KPIs — and every one of those flows is priced on the assumption that a riyal today is a riyal in five years. Remove it and foreign lenders to giga-projects would demand currency risk premia, while the Public Investment Fund, which borrows in dollars against riyal-denominated domestic assets, would carry an open mismatch.

The harder point sits underneath. The peg exports monetary policy to Washington precisely when the domestic economy most needs its own — and our analysis of the 2026 GDP forecast split shows the Q2 flash has made several 2026 projections arithmetically unreachable. A country running a 4.8% contraction with rates held at 4.25% because of another central bank’s inflation problem is paying a real growth cost for exchange-rate credibility, and the published performance examined in our piece on the Vision 2030 annual report’s 93% KPI claim has to be delivered under that constraint. The trade is coherent: certainty about the currency, bought with the loss of control over the interest rate. It is only obviously worth it while the certainty holds.

Risks, Contradictions and Open Questions

The forward market has been administratively shaped since 2016. SAMA’s derivative restrictions mean a calm price is less informative than it would be in an unconstrained market [S9]. This is the largest caveat on the central evidence here and it cannot be resolved from public data.

The reserve series and the fiscal series point in opposite directions. Reserves rose through the first half of 2026 while the deficit ran at 76% of its annual projection in the first quarter alone. The reconciliation is borrowing and asset monetisation rather than reserve drawdown, but SAMA does not break out the sources of monthly accumulation. Nor is the denominator behind either import-cover figure — 14 months or 22 — disclosed by any source [S10][S14][S18].

The IMF’s 1.7% growth projection predates the Q2 flash by eight days. GASTAT’s −4.8% print [S20] postdates the Board’s 22 July conclusion [S10], so the fiscal path underlying the −3.7% deficit projection is already stale, even if the reserve assessment is not. The near-term budget picture is examined in the 2026 budget analysis.

There has been no wartime statement on the exchange rate from SAMA. The Governor’s last public remarks were on 9 February 2026, before the conflict [S11]. Silence signals nothing either way, but the official record is thinner than it looks.

Net foreign assets and reserve assets are different series and are routinely conflated. This page uses reserve assets for the trend and Almeer’s figure for the level [S1][S14]; circulating numbers in the $435–450 billion range belong to older vintages.

What to Watch Next

Dated, checkable markers for the saudi riyal peg 2026 outlook.

1. SAMA’s July 2026 reserves release, due in the first week of August. Two consecutive monthly falls would matter; one would not. The comparator is SAR1.85 trillion.
2. The one-year forward through August — 80 points on 30 July, roughly 100 as the top of SAMA’s own “normal” range, 1,020 as the 2016 record.
3. Aramco’s first-half 2026 results on 4 August 2026. Free cash flow against $43.8 billion of declared base dividend shows how much of the state’s largest hard-currency inflow is balance-sheet funded.
4. The Ministry of Finance’s Q2 2026 budget outturn, against SAR125.7 billion in Q1 and SAR165 billion projected for the year. Context in our Saudi budget reference and fiscal sustainability outlook.
5. The September FOMC meeting. Every Fed decision is a Saudi decision; three dissents in July argued for hikes, and a US hike into a Saudi contraction would sharpen the cost of the peg [S13].
6. Hormuz transit counts and the next OPEC+ decision — August’s move was an increase of 188,000 bpd, not a cut, as covered in our piece on the OPEC+ August 2026 output increase, though allocations mean little while output runs 3.6 million bpd below them.
7. Any SAMA statement on the exchange rate. The 2016 precedent is that SAMA acts first through the banks and speaks afterwards.

Related Vision 2030 Context

• The Saudi riyal, its dollar peg and SAMA policy — the standing reference for the currency and the 3.75 rate
• What is the Saudi riyal peg? — the short explainer for the definition
• Saudi Central Bank (SAMA) institutional profile — mandate, leadership and instruments
• Interest rates in Saudi Arabia — the SAMA repo rate and the Federal Reserve link
• Saudi sovereign debt — the borrowing capacity behind the peg
• Aramco’s asset sales and the dividend — the hard-currency flow that funds the budget
• The 2026 GDP forecast split — why the growth projections diverge so far
• The $113 paradox — the oil price Saudi Arabia needs to fund the plan
• Saudi Arabia’s fiscal sustainability outlook — the medium-term deficit path
• The Saudi banking sector past SAR3 trillion — where riyal deposits actually sit
• Ministry of Finance — one of the three offices in the exchange-rate decision chain
• Vision 2030 — the programme the peg underwrites

Sources

• [S1] Saudi Central Bank (SAMA), Reserve Assets — International_Reserves_Jun_2026.xlsx, monthly statistical release, updated 7 July 2026. https://www.sama.gov.sa/en-US/Statistics/Indices/Pages/reserve_assets.aspx
• [S2] Arab News, Saudi Reserve Assets Rise 8% to $495bn as Foreign Holdings Increase, news report, 8 July 2026. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2650099/business-economy
• [S3] Arab News, Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Reserves Rise to a 6-Year High of $475bn, news report, 22 February 2026. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2634020/business-economy
• [S4] Argaam, Saudi Foreign Reserve Assets Fall to SAR1.83T in May, market report, June 2026. https://www.argaam.com/en/article/articledetail/id/1911989
• [S5] Saudi Gazette, SAMA’s Reserve Assets Surge to SR1.86 Trillion in March, Marking Highest Level in 6 Years, news report, April 2026. https://saudigazette.com.sa/article/661045/saudi-arabia/samas-reserve-assets-surge-to-sr186-trillion-in-march-marking-highest-level-in-6-years
• [S6] Investing.com, USD/SAR Forward Rates, market data, quotes timestamped 30 July 2026, retrieved 31 July 2026. https://www.investing.com/currencies/usd-sar-forward-rates
• [S7] Muhammad Al-Jasser and Ahmed Banafe, Foreign Exchange Intervention in Saudi Arabia, BIS Papers No 24, Bank for International Settlements, 2005. https://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap24v.pdf
• [S8] Gulf News (Reuters), Saudi Arabia Said to Order Halt of Riyal Forward Options, market report, January 2016. https://gulfnews.com/business/markets/saudi-arabia-said-to-order-halt-of-riyal-forward-options-1.1656953
• [S9] Gulf News (Reuters), Saudi Riyal Forwards Tumble After Regulator Bans Speculative Trades, market report, June 2016. https://gulfnews.com/business/markets/saudi-riyal-forwards-tumble-after-regulator-bans-speculative-trades-1.1841422
• [S10] International Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Board Concludes 2026 Article IV Consultation with Saudi Arabia, press release, 22 July 2026, as reproduced by Mirage News. https://www.miragenews.com/imf-wraps-up-2026-article-iv-talks-with-saudi-1718564/
• [S11] Argaam, SAR-USD Peg Preserves Domestic Price Stability: SAMA Governor, conference report, 9 February 2026. https://www.argaam.com/en/article/articledetail/id/1878958
• [S12] Argaam, SAMA Cuts Reverse Repo, Repo Rates by 25 bps, policy report, 10 December 2025. https://www.argaam.com/en/article/articledetail/id/1865280
• [S13] Federal Reserve Board, Implementation Note Issued July 29, 2026, FOMC statement, 29 July 2026. https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20260729a1.htm
• [S14] Asharq Al-Awsat, Analysts to Asharq Al-Awsat: Policy Flexibility Strengthens Saudi Arabia’s Ability to Withstand Shocks, analysis, 31 July 2026. https://english.aawsat.com/business/5301937-analysts-asharq-al-awsat-policy-flexibility-strengthens-saudi-arabia-ability
• [S15] Arab News, Saudi Arabia Approves Annual Borrowing Plan for 2026, policy report, 2026. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2628190/business-economy
• [S16] The National, Saudi Arabia Raises $11.5 Billion From Oversubscribed Bond Sale, market report, 6 January 2026. https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/economy/2026/01/06/saudi-arabia-raises-115-billion-from-oversubscribed-bond-sale/
• [S17] Arab News, Saudi Arabia Restructures Debt With $4.59bn Sukuk as Investor Demand Surges, market report, 26 July 2026. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2652372
• [S18] Arab News, Saudi Foreign Reserves Cover Imports for 2 Years, Exceeding Global Average, analysis citing Al-Eqtisadiah’s Financial Analysis Unit, 9 April 2026. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2639311/business-economy
• [S19] Asharq Al-Awsat, Saudi Arabia’s Money Supply Breaks $882 Billion Barrier for 1st Time in History, monetary report, 2026. https://english.aawsat.com/business/5270138-saudi-arabia-money-supply-breaks-882-billion-barrier-1st-time-history
• [S20] Al Arabiya English, Saudi Arabia’s Non-Oil Activities Grow 0.6 Pct in Q2, GDP flash report, 30 July 2026. https://english.alarabiya.net/News/saudi-arabia/2026/07/30/saudi-arabias-nonoil-activities-grow-06-pct-in-q2
• [S21] FXStreet, Currency Devaluation Would Be Too Costly for Saudi Arabia — Goldman Sachs, analyst note report, 4 May 2020. https://www.fxstreet.com/news/currency-devaluation-would-be-too-costly-for-saudi-arabia-goldman-sachs-202005040317
• [S22] Trading Economics, Saudi Arabia Money Supply M1 and Brent Crude Oil, market data series, retrieved 31 July 2026. https://tradingeconomics.com/saudi-arabia/money-supply-m1
• [S23] Economy Middle East, Saudi Arabia Raises $2.81 Billion in June 2026 Sukuk Issuance Across Six Tranches, market report, June 2026. https://economymiddleeast.com/news/saudi-arabia-raises-2-81-billion-in-june-2026-sukuk-issuance-across-six-tranches/

SAMA’s own reserves spreadsheet, the IMF’s press release and the Saudi Press Agency all blocked automated retrieval during research for this page. Where that occurred, figures are attributed to the outlets that read the primary documents — Arab News, Argaam, Saudi Gazette and Mirage News — and are cited as such. Forward quotes are indicative contributed prices from a commercial market-data platform, not an official fixing.