Three Institutions Forecast Saudi Growth in 2026. They Disagree by 2.5 Percentage Points.

Between 0.6 per cent and 3.1 per cent. That is the published range for the Saudi Arabia GDP forecast 2026, and the two ends come from institutions of comparable standing: Fitch Ratings at the bottom, the World Bank at the top, the International Monetary Fund at 1.7 per cent between them. Add S&P Global Ratings and the Saudi Ministry of Finance’s own budget assumption and the spread reaches four percentage points — the difference between a stalled economy and a booming one.

The gap is not a disagreement about Vision 2030, about diversification, or about whether the non-oil economy works. Set side by side with their underlying assumptions, the forecasts disagree about one thing: how many barrels of crude Saudi Arabia pumps between July and December 2026. Fitch assumes an annual average of 9.0 million barrels per day [S6]. S&P assumed 10.1 million bpd [S10]. On the arithmetic below, roughly 1.4 of the 2.5-point gap between Fitch and the World Bank is that assumption alone; almost all of the rest is a non-oil assumption that itself reflects each forecast’s cut-off date.

Every number here was published before 30 July 2026, when the General Authority for Statistics reported that Saudi real GDP fell 4.8 per cent year on year in the second quarter, with oil activities down 24.7 per cent [S1]. None of these institutions had seen that print. The IMF’s Article IV assessment was published the day before it [S5].

Last verified: 31 July 2026.

What Is the Saudi Arabia GDP Forecast for 2026?

The table below is the comparison no single outlet publishes: every major 2026 forecast with the publication carrying it, the date it was set, and — the columns that matter — what each institution assumes about oil price and oil volume.

Sources: [S6], [S20], [S4][S5], [S19], [S7], [S10], [S14], [S18]. Figures marked “implied” are reconstructed below from each institution’s own published components, with the method stated so it can be checked.

Two things stand out. The only institutions publishing an explicit oil-output assumption are the two at the extremes — Fitch at 9.0 million bpd, S&P at 10.1 million — and they are also furthest apart on the headline. And the ordering of the forecasts is almost exactly the ordering of their publication dates.

For the standing profile of Saudi GDP — size, composition, 2030 trajectory — see the GDP of Saudi Arabia reference page and the Saudi Arabia economic outlook to 2030. This piece does something narrower: it reconciles the 2026 forecasts against each other and against the data now available.

Is Saudi Arabia’s Economy Growing or Shrinking?

Both, in different parts of the accounts, and the distinction is the whole story.

Q1 2026 (GASTAT, published 9 June 2026): real GDP grew 3.0 per cent year on year — oil activities 2.9 per cent, non-oil activities 2.9 per cent, government 1.5 per cent. Seasonally adjusted, GDP fell 1.2 per cent on the quarter, driven by a 6.8 per cent quarterly drop in oil [S2][S24].

Q2 2026 (GASTAT flash, 30 July 2026): real GDP fell 4.8 per cent year on year. Oil activities fell 24.7 per cent, subtracting 5.4 percentage points from headline growth on their own. Non-oil activities grew 0.6 per cent and government 0.9 per cent. Seasonally adjusted, GDP fell 4.9 per cent on the quarter, with oil down 21.5 per cent and non-oil down 0.5 per cent [S1][S19].

Average the two and the first half of 2026 is running near minus 0.9 per cent year on year. That is the constraint every forecast in the table must now clear.

The non-oil series tells a quieter but equally important story. It has decelerated in three steps: 4.9 per cent across full-year 2025, 2.9 per cent in Q1 2026, 0.6 per cent in Q2 2026 [S3][S2][S1] — a halving, then a halving again, landing well below the 2.6 per cent the IMF assumes for the year. Fitch’s explanation is specific and credible: “non-oil growth was affected by disruptions to petrochemical exports” [S12], while consumer spending held up and business confidence began recovering.

The non-oil economy kept growing while a fifth of GDP fell by a quarter, which is what a diversifying economy is supposed to do. It could not reach the 4 to 5 per cent Moody’s describes as the post-conflict norm for the non-hydrocarbon private sector [S18], because too much of it — petrochemicals, logistics, transport — sits downstream of the same shipping lanes. Track the trend on the non-oil GDP growth KPI rather than the headline; the real GDP growth tracker carries the aggregate.

The production series behind the oil collapse comes from the US Energy Information Administration. Saudi Arabia averaged 9.33 million bpd across 2025, rising from 8.94 million in Q1 to 9.75 million in Q4, then produced 9.17 million bpd in Q1 2026 and 6.70 million bpd in Q2 2026 [S8]. The correspondence with the national accounts is close enough to be useful: 9.17 against 8.94 is a 2.6 per cent rise and GASTAT recorded oil activities up 2.9 per cent; 6.70 against 9.21 is a 27.3 per cent fall and GASTAT recorded 24.7 per cent.

The cause is not OPEC+ policy. Saudi Arabia produced far below allocation because the Strait of Hormuz was effectively closed from late February 2026, leaving the East-West pipeline to the Red Sea carrying what it could. The IEA put Saudi output at 6.44 million bpd in May and 7.34 million in June against a June allocation near 10.291 million [S23]. Reading that shortfall as chosen restraint would be wrong: it is a war effect, and it is why Yanbu became a single point of failure for Saudi crude exports.

Why Do the IMF and Fitch Disagree?

Because Saudi real GDP is close to the sum of two series, and the two institutions differ on both — far more on the first.

GASTAT’s own decomposition gives the weights. In Q2 2026 oil activities fell 24.7 per cent and contributed minus 5.4 points, implying a weight of 21.9 per cent of real GDP. In Q4 2025 they grew 10.8 per cent and contributed 2.6 points, implying 24.1 per cent. Oil activities — crude, natural gas and refining — are therefore roughly 22 to 24 per cent of real GDP, and everything else roughly 76 to 78 per cent. Working at 22 per cent:

headline growth ≈ 0.22 × (oil-activity growth) + 0.78 × (non-oil growth, government included)

Fitch states its oil assumption directly: 9.0 million bpd annual average, “below the 2025 level” [S6][S13]. Against the EIA’s 9.33 million bpd for 2025 that is a 3.5 per cent contraction, subtracting 0.78 points. To land at 0.6 per cent overall, Fitch’s implied non-oil growth is about 1.8 per cent.

The IMF publishes the other side: 2.6 per cent non-oil growth against a 1.7 per cent headline [S5]. That implies an oil sector contracting about 1.5 per cent, or an annual average near 9.2 million bpd.

The 1.1-point gap between them therefore decomposes into roughly 0.45 points of oil assumption (9.0 against 9.2 million bpd) and roughly 0.65 points of non-oil assumption (1.8 against 2.6 per cent). Neither is wrong about the Saudi economy. They are making two different bets on the same war — a war that left the currency’s dollar peg tested but intact.

The World Bank publishes neither component for 2026, so its 3.1 per cent has to be bracketed. On the IMF’s 2.6 per cent non-oil, its implied oil-activity growth is plus 4.9 per cent, or 9.78 million bpd. On the 3.6 per cent non-oil average its Gulf Economic Update has used, the implied figure is plus 1.3 per cent, or 9.45 million bpd. Either way, the World Bank is the only one of the three whose 2026 oil sector grows.

How much of the 2.5-point gap is oil?

On the central case, about 1.4 points of the 2.5-point gap — roughly 55 to 60 per cent — is the oil-output assumption. The remaining 1.1 points is the non-oil assumption, and that difference is itself largely a vintage effect: Fitch set its non-oil number in July, when the disruption to petrochemical exports was visible; the World Bank set its in April.

That is what the headline numbers hide. These institutions are not disagreeing about whether Vision 2030’s non-oil economy is delivering. They broadly agree it is growing between 1.8 and 3.6 per cent. They disagree about barrels.

What Oil Price Do Forecasters Assume for Saudi Arabia?

Between $82 and $94 a barrel for the 2026 Brent average — and, counter-intuitively, that spread explains almost none of the growth disagreement.

Sources: [S9], [S20], [S6], [S7].

Real GDP is a volume measure. A higher oil price adds no barrel to the oil-activity series; it adds riyals to the budget. That is why price assumptions and growth forecasts do not line up — the World Bank has both the highest price assumption and the highest growth forecast, but no causal link runs between them. What the price assumption governs is the fiscal picture, and there the effect is large and, at first glance, perverse.

Brent traded at $72.48 on 28 February 2026, peaked at $118.35 on 31 March, fell to $71.57 on 1 July after the 18 June US–Iran agreement, then climbed back above $100 intraday on 23 July, closing at $96.78 on 24 July [S25]. Fitch’s judgement is that “the fiscal deficit is projected to narrow in 2026 owing to higher oil revenues, as prices will offset lower volumes” [S6]. Saudi Arabia may therefore run a smaller deficit in the year its oil sector contracts by a quarter — the mechanism set out in the oil price impact on the Saudi economy explainer, and the same split that drove Aramco’s first-quarter war dividend.

It does not last. Fitch has the deficit widening to 4.7 per cent of GDP in 2027, consistent with a fiscal breakeven of $94 a barrel — against its own 2028 Brent assumption of $60. Government debt on that path reaches 41.3 per cent of GDP by end-2028, from 31.8 per cent at end-2025 [S13], a trajectory the Saudi sovereign debt page tracks.

The Arithmetic: What Each Forecast Now Requires

Here the forecasts become checkable rather than arguable. First-half production is known, so any 2026 annual average implies a specific second half: H2 = (4 × annual − 9.17 − 6.70) ÷ 2.

Saudi Arabia’s OPEC+ allocation stood near 10.291 million bpd in June 2026 and reaches roughly 10.4 million after the July and August increases, each adding 62,000 bpd to the Saudi share of a 188,000 bpd group rise. Aramco’s chief executive Amin Nasser said on 13 October 2025 that the company “can sustain crude oil production at 12 million barrels per day for a year without incurring additional costs” [S21] — the technical ceiling.

Three conclusions follow, none dependent on the GDP weight used. S&P’s March forecast is arithmetically out of reach: a 10.1 million bpd average now requires 12.27 million sustained across two quarters, above Aramco’s own maximum sustainable capacity. The Saudi budget’s 4.6 per cent is in the same position, requiring 11.45 million bpd for six months — roughly a million barrels a day above allocation, which would mean abandoning quota discipline while the group unwinds cuts in 188,000-barrel monthly steps. The World Bank’s 3.1 per cent requires 11 to 11.6 million bpd, 0.6 to 1.2 million above allocation: not impossible in engineering terms, but requiring both complete normalisation of Gulf shipping and a decision to produce well above quota. Fitch’s 0.6 per cent and the IMF’s 1.7 per cent are the only forecasts that fit inside Saudi Arabia’s own OPEC quota.

The reachability audit

The same test on headline GDP needs no assumption about sector weights at all. With Q1 measured at plus 3.0 per cent and Q2 at minus 4.8 per cent, every published full-year number implies an arithmetically fixed second half.

The second half of 2025 was itself strong — Q4 2025 grew 5.0 per cent year on year, the full year 4.5 per cent [S3] — so the base is unusually high, making large year-on-year gains harder rather than easier. Two forecasts fail outright on both the barrel test and the headline test; two more survive only if Gulf shipping normalises completely and immediately.

Dating the Vintages: Which Forecasts Saw the War

Forecasts published before, during and after the disruption are not comparable, and the sequence explains most of the ordering above.

Three facts do most of the work. The World Bank’s number is an April number: its June Global Economic Prospects repeated the 3.1 per cent set in April, revising only 2027, from 4.4 to 4.9 per cent [S7][S17], and its $94 Brent assumption was explicitly conditioned on “the worst of the disruptions” easing by July. Fitch has moved furthest — 4.8 per cent in January to 0.6 in July is a 4.2-point cut in six months, the largest revision here, made while affirming the A+ rating with a stable outlook on the same day. It is not structurally more pessimistic than the World Bank; it is working from a later cut-off. And nobody had the Q2 data: GASTAT published on 30 July, the day after the IMF released its Article IV [S1][S5].

One assumption is doing enormous work. Aseel Al-Aranki, a market analyst at River Prime, told Arab News that the IMF’s July projections rest on “the assumption that the Strait of Hormuz will begin reopening in mid-July, with conditions gradually returning to their prewar state by March 2027” [S11]. That is a reported characterisation, not an IMF publication, but it matches the EIA’s own modelling: shut-ins falling from 8.3 million bpd in June to 1.4 million by the fourth quarter [S9]. The EIA completed that analysis on 1 July 2026 — before the Bab al-Mandeb disruption, before the 25 July strike on Yanbu, and before Brent went back above $100.

Which Saudi GDP Forecast Has Been Most Accurate?

The Saudi Ministry of Finance’s own. Its December 2025 budget estimated 2025 growth at 4.4 per cent; GASTAT’s outturn was 4.5 per cent [S15][S3]. That is the closest call on the board.

The IMF’s record on the same year is worse. Its April 2025 World Economic Outlook put Saudi 2025 growth at 3.0 per cent [S22]; the actual came in 1.5 points higher. By January 2026 the Fund had revised its 2025 estimate to 4.3 per cent — still 0.2 light — while raising 2026 from 4.0 to 4.5 per cent [S16]. The error ran the same way for most external forecasters: they underestimated how fast oil output would recover as OPEC+ unwound cuts, and underestimated non-oil momentum.

That matters for reading any Saudi Arabia GDP forecast 2026, because the error now runs the opposite way. In 2025 the surprise was oil volume to the upside; in 2026 it is oil volume to the downside, by a far larger margin. A model calibrated on quota policy will get 2026 wrong, because output is being set by shipping lanes, not by ministers — the dynamic that also reshaped the group after the UAE left OPEC on 1 May 2026.

The same pattern shows in the fiscal numbers. The 2026 budget projected a deficit of SAR165bn ($44bn), 3.3 per cent of GDP; the 2025 budget projected SAR245bn and the outturn was SAR277bn ($73.9bn), a 13 per cent overshoot [S15]. The IMF now projects a 2026 fiscal balance of −3.7 per cent of GDP and public debt at 32.1 per cent, rising to 34.4 per cent in 2027 [S5] — on the budget’s own nominal base roughly SAR185bn ($49bn), about SAR20bn wider than planned, my arithmetic rather than the Fund’s. Riyad Capital is further out at SAR228bn, or 4.4 per cent [S20]. The Saudi national budget page and the fiscal sustainability outlook track the divergence; how the 2026 budget quietly defunded megaprojects covers what the spending side gave up.

Why This Matters for Vision 2030

Vision 2030’s central economic claim is that the non-oil economy can carry growth when oil cannot. Q2 2026 is the most severe test that claim has faced, and the result is genuinely mixed.

Non-oil kept growing year on year while oil fell by a quarter — the diversification thesis working. But it grew at 0.6 per cent, not the 4 to 5 per cent both Moody’s and the Ministry of Finance treat as the run rate, and it shrank quarter on quarter. The economic diversification scorecard is measuring an economy less oil-dependent in its output mix than a decade ago but still heavily exposed through logistics, petrochemicals and the fiscal channel.

That fiscal channel is the sharper point. Because Brent averaged well above $90 through the disruption, oil revenue partly offset the volume collapse, and Fitch expects the 2026 deficit to narrow even so. Vision 2030 spending is being protected in 2026 by exactly the mechanism it exists to escape: a high oil price. That is what the Ministry of Finance must manage into 2027, when Fitch’s price path falls to $60 while its fiscal breakeven sits at $94.

For sovereign risk the split has been inconsequential. Fitch affirmed A+ with a stable outlook while cutting growth to 0.6 per cent; S&P affirmed A+ in March; Moody’s affirmed Aa3 in May [S6][S10][S18]. The agencies are pricing balance-sheet strength, not one bad year — the position tracked on the Saudi credit rating page, the sovereign credit ratings KPI and against neighbours on GDP growth across the GCC.

Risks, Contradictions and Open Questions

The World Bank’s number is stale rather than wrong, and it is the one most likely to be quoted. It is the highest of the three, the most widely syndicated, and unrevised since April. Anyone citing a Saudi Arabia GDP forecast 2026 of “3.1 per cent, per the World Bank” in August is citing an April view of a war that has since changed twice.

The oil-activity weight is a real source of imprecision. GASTAT’s contributions imply 21.9 to 24.1 per cent depending on the quarter, and the Q1 2026 year-on-year decomposition implies more. The reconstructions above use 22 per cent. At 24 per cent the implied oil assumptions shift by about a tenth, changing no ranking but moving the second-half output requirements by 0.1 to 0.3 million bpd.

Forecasters do not define “non-oil” the same way, and three related series get conflated. GASTAT reports oil, government and non-oil as separate blocks; the IMF, World Bank and rating agencies use a two-way split in which government sits inside non-oil, so the IMF’s 2.6 per cent and GASTAT’s 0.6 per cent are not the same measure. Separately, the non-oil share of GDP and the private-sector share are different again — around 55 and 51 per cent respectively — and the 47 per cent still circulating is the 2024 private-sector figure. None of these is the growth-contribution weight used above.

The reopening assumption is load-bearing and contested. Brent has been back above $100 since the EIA’s 1 July cut-off. Treating the Strait of Hormuz as reopened rather than partially transiting is the assumption most likely to be revised, and every forecast above 1.7 per cent depends on it.

Two components are unpublished and reconstructed here. Fitch gives 0.6 per cent for 2026 and 2.9 per cent for 2028 but no explicit 2027 headline in the available coverage; the World Bank publishes no 2026 non-oil figure. Both are inferred from adjacent numbers and labelled as such.

Several institutional sites blocked automated retrieval, and the sourcing reflects that. The IMF, Fitch, S&P, Moody’s and the OECD all refused programmatic access. The Fitch action was read through Zawya’s syndication of the release, plus MEED and The National; the IMF Article IV projections through Mirage News’ reproduction of the Fund’s press release and Arab News’ reporting of the WEO Update; S&P’s production assumption through Arab News; Moody’s through Asharq Al-Awsat; Riyad Capital through IndexBox. GASTAT’s Q1 and Q2 releases and the EIA’s Short-Term Energy Outlook tables were read directly from the publishers’ own documents.

What to Watch Next

Mid-August 2026 — Aramco Q2 results. The first corporate read on what the volume collapse did to realised revenue. The August official selling price cut to Asia was set around 6 July, before the late-July escalation, and should be read in that sequence.

Early September 2026 — GASTAT Q2 detailed release. The flash will be revised: Q1’s went from 2.8 to 3.0 per cent, so a few tenths in either direction is expected and changes nothing structural.

Early September 2026 — the next OPEC+ decision. Whether 188,000 bpd monthly steps continue determines whether Saudi allocation reaches the 10.73 million bpd needed merely to hold oil GDP flat on 2025.

October 2026 — IMF World Economic Outlook. The first IMF forecast incorporating the Q2 outturn. Holding 1.7 per cent implies a very strong second half; cutting converges on Fitch.

Autumn 2026 — World Bank Gulf Economic Update. The Bank’s first chance to move a number frozen since April.

December 2026 — the FY2027 Budget Statement. Riyadh’s own growth assumption is the cleanest signal of what it believes about oil volumes, and its 2027 deficit projection will validate or contradict Fitch’s 4.7 per cent.

Related Vision 2030 Context

• GDP of Saudi Arabia — the evergreen reference on GDP size, composition and the 2030 target. That page owns the “what is Saudi GDP” question; this one covers only the 2026 forecast disagreement and its arithmetic.
• Non-oil GDP in Saudi Arabia — how the non-oil aggregate is defined, including the government-services boundary that makes forecaster comparisons tricky.
• GASTAT — General Authority for Statistics — release calendar, flash-versus-detailed methodology and revision policy.
• Oil production in Saudi Arabia — the volume series the forecasts have to fit inside.
• The war economy — how six weeks of conflict restructured the Saudi economic model.
• Saudi Arabia’s Hormuz advantage — the export-routing constraint that set actual output.
• Real GDP growth tracker and non-oil GDP growth tracker — the maintained KPI series behind both halves of the split.
• Saudi Arabia economic outlook to 2030 — the longer-horizon view this piece deliberately does not duplicate.

The Honest Answer

Of the forecasts on the table, the IMF’s 1.7 per cent is the most defensible, and Fitch’s 0.6 per cent is the most likely to be right.

The IMF’s is the most defensible because it is the only forecast publishing both components, was set after the disruption was well understood, was reaffirmed by an Executive Board discussion on 22 July, and implies a second-half output path — around 10.45 million bpd — that sits inside Saudi Arabia’s own OPEC+ allocation. It needs no heroic assumption about producing above quota.

Fitch’s is the more likely because its second-half requirement of 10.07 million bpd leaves headroom, and because the risk to the reopening assumption is one-directional. Every forecast above 1.7 per cent needs Gulf shipping to normalise fully and stay normalised. As of 31 July 2026, with Brent near $97 after touching $100 on 23 July and transit volumes still well below pre-war levels, that has not happened.

The conditions are explicit. If the Strait of Hormuz is fully and durably open by early September and OPEC+ keeps unwinding, the IMF’s number is reachable and Fitch will look too cautious. If disruption persists into the fourth quarter, both are too high and the outturn lands closer to zero. What can already be said without conditions is narrower and firmer: S&P’s 4.4 per cent and the Saudi budget’s 4.6 per cent are no longer arithmetically reachable, because both require six months of production at or above Aramco’s maximum sustainable capacity. Those two numbers should stop being quoted as current.

Sources

• [S1] General Authority for Statistics (GASTAT), Real Gross Domestic Product Second Quarter of 2026, flash estimate, 30 July 2026. https://www.stats.gov.sa/documents/20117/2435267/GDP+Flash+Q2.2026EN.pdf
• [S2] GASTAT, Gross Domestic Product Q1 of 2026, statistical release, 9 June 2026. https://www.stats.gov.sa/documents/20117/2435245/GDP+Q1+2026En+(1).pdf
• [S3] GASTAT, Saudi Economy Records 4.5% Growth in 2025, news release, 2026. https://www.stats.gov.sa/en/w/news/171
• [S4] International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Update, July 2026: Global Economy in Crosscurrents of War and Technology, 8 July 2026. https://www.imf.org/en/publications/weo/issues/2026/07/08/world-economic-outlook-update-july-2026
• [S5] IMF, Executive Board Concludes 2026 Article IV Consultation with Saudi Arabia, press release PR26/267, 29 July 2026 (Board discussion 22 July 2026). https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2026/07/29/pr26267-saudi-arabia-imf-concludes-2026-aiv — projections read via Mirage News’ reproduction of the release, https://www.miragenews.com/imf-wraps-up-2026-article-iv-talks-with-saudi-1718564/
• [S6] Fitch Ratings, Fitch Affirms Saudi Arabia at ‘A+’; Outlook Stable, rating action commentary, 10 July 2026, syndicated via Zawya. https://www.zawya.com/en/press-release/research-and-studies/fitch-affirms-saudi-arabia-at-a-outlook-stable-l9by83sj
• [S7] Argaam, Saudi Economy Expected to Grow 3.1% in 2026: World Bank, report on World Bank Global Economic Prospects, 12 June 2026. https://www.argaam.com/en/article/articledetail/id/1912219
• [S8] US Energy Information Administration, Short-Term Energy Outlook, Table 3d: World Crude Oil Production, 7 July 2026 (modelling completed 1 July 2026). https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/tables/pdf/3dtab.pdf
• [S9] US Energy Information Administration, Short-Term Energy Outlook: Global Oil Markets, 7 July 2026. https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/report/global_oil.php
• [S10] Arab News, S&P Affirms Saudi Arabia at A+ as Strong Buffers Offset Regional Risks, 15 March 2026. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2636469/business-economy
• [S11] Arab News, IMF Raises Saudi Arabia’s 2027 Growth Forecast to 5.5% on Resilience Outlook, 8 July 2026. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2650129/business-economy
• [S12] Arab News, Fitch Affirms Saudi Arabia’s ‘A+’ Rating with Stable Outlook, 12 July 2026. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2650607/business-economy
• [S13] MEED, Conflict Fails to Dent Saudi Arabia’s A+ Rating, 13 July 2026. https://guest.meed.com/conflict-fails-to-dent-saudi-arabias-a-rating/
• [S14] Saudi Ministry of Finance, Budget Statement FY2026, December 2025. https://www.mof.gov.sa/en/budget/2026/BudgetStatementDocs/Eng_2026.pdf
• [S15] AGBI, Saudi Arabia Records Largest Budget Deficit Since Covid, 24 February 2026. https://www.agbi.com/economy/2026/02/saudi-arabia-records-largest-budget-deficit-since-covid/
• [S16] AGBI, IMF Upgrades Its Growth Forecast for Saudi Arabia, 19 January 2026. https://www.agbi.com/economy/2026/01/imf-upgrades-its-growth-forecast-for-saudi-arabia/
• [S17] Asharq Al-Awsat, World Bank Slashes 2026 Middle East Growth Forecast, Saudi Arabia Absorbs Shock, 9 April 2026. https://english.aawsat.com/business/5260381-world-bank-slashes-2026-middle-east-growth-forecast-saudi-arabia-absorbs-shock
• [S18] Asharq Al-Awsat, Moody’s Affirms Its Credit Rating of Saudi Arabia at ‘Aa3’ with Stable Outlook, 23 May 2026. https://english.aawsat.com/business/5276315-moodys-affirms-its-credit-rating-saudi-arabia-aa3-stable-outlook
• [S19] Arab News, Saudi Non-Oil Activities Up 0.6% in Q2: GASTAT, 30 July 2026. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2652792/business-economy
• [S20] IndexBox, Saudi Arabia GDP Growth Forecast 2027: Riyad Capital Projects 6.8% Expansion, 10 June 2026, reporting Riyad Capital’s Q2 2026 Saudi Economic Chartbook. https://www.indexbox.io/blog/saudi-arabia-gdp-growth-forecast-to-surge-to-68-in-2027-after-subdued-2026-riyad-capital/
• [S21] Reuters via EnergyNow, Saudi Aramco Can Sustain 12 Million Bpd Maximum Oil Capacity for a Year, CEO Says, 13 October 2025. https://energynow.com/2025/10/saudi-aramco-can-sustain-12-million-bpd-maximum-oil-capacity-for-a-year-ceo-says/
• [S22] Arab News, IMF Projects 3% Growth for Saudi Economy in 2025, 22 April 2025. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2598015/business-economy
• [S23] International Energy Agency, Oil Market Report — July 2026, 11 July 2026. https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-july-2026
• [S24] Saudi Press Agency, GASTAT Reports 3% Growth in Saudi Economy in Q1 2026, 9 June 2026. https://www.spa.gov.sa/en/N2609038
• [S25] Wikipedia, Economic Impact of the 2026 Iran War, Brent crude price timeline, accessed 31 July 2026. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_impact_of_the_2026_Iran_war