Saudi Arabia's Executions Reached a Record in 2025 While Vision 2030 Sold Reform

At least 356. That is the number of people Saudi Arabia executed in 2025 on the count kept jointly by Reprieve and the European Saudi Organisation for Human Rights (ESOHR), published 6 January 2026 [S1]. Amnesty International reached the identical figure in its global death penalty report of 18 May 2026 [S3]. An AFP tally compiled independently from official Saudi announcements also reached 356 [S8]. Three counting operations, three methods, one number — and it is the highest annual total any of them has recorded for the Kingdom.

The 2026 figure is lower and running lower. ESOHR recorded at least 116 executions between 1 January and 27 July 2026, a count cited by Human Rights Watch on 28 July [S5]. Amnesty International separately recorded 96 executions between 1 January and 22 June 2026, of which 61 were for drug-related offences [S6]. Against Human Rights Watch’s tally of 241 executions by 5 August 2025 [S10], the 2026 pace is roughly half the 2025 pace. Saudi Arabia executions in 2026 are running well below the record year, and anyone citing the record as a description of the present is describing 2025.

Every number in this article is a minimum. Saudi Arabia publishes no annual execution statistic. Each execution is announced individually through Ministry of Interior statements carried by the Saudi Press Agency, naming the person, the nationality, the offence and the province [S24]. Those announcements are the raw material for all four counts below, which is why they converge closely and diverge in specific, explicable ways. ESOHR records that at least 51 executions over the past decade were carried out without any announcement at all [S9].

Sources: Reprieve and ESOHR, 6 January 2026 [S1]; Amnesty International, 18 May 2026 [S3] and June 2026 [S6]; AFP via France 24, 1 January 2025 [S7], and AFP, 1 January 2026 [S8]; Death Penalty Information Center, January 2026 [S16].

Last verified: 31 July 2026.

How Many People Has Saudi Arabia Executed in 2026?

At least 116, to 27 July. That is ESOHR’s count of Saudi Arabia executions in 2026, reported by Human Rights Watch the following day [S5]. It is the most recent figure available and it is a floor, not a total.

The composition of the 2026 count is documented in more detail than the headline. Amnesty International’s June release breaks its 96 executions to 22 June into 61 drug-related and 35 others; of the 61 drug cases, 39 were foreign nationals and 22 were Saudi citizens [S6]. The foreign nationals were seven Ethiopians, seven Pakistanis, five Sudanese, four Jordanians and three Syrians [S6].

Ethiopian nationals have been the most heavily documented group in 2026. Human Rights Watch records at least 17 Ethiopians executed for drug-related offences during the year, including five on 23 June and five more on 27 July, with at least 79 others at imminent risk on similar charges [S5]. Amnesty puts at least 63 Ethiopian nationals in the Khamis Mushait detention facility facing possible imminent execution for drug offences [S6]. Joey Shea, senior Saudi Arabia researcher at Human Rights Watch, said the men were executed “after court hearings that sometimes barely last a few minutes without a lawyer or a translator” [S5]. Ethiopia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said on 13 July 2026 that it “remains closely engaged with the relevant authorities of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia” [S5].

Is 2026 on track to break the 2025 record?

On the arithmetic available, no. 116 executions in the 208 days to 27 July is a rate of 0.56 a day, which annualises to about 204. Human Rights Watch’s 241 by 5 August 2025 is a rate of 1.11 a day, which annualised to roughly 405 — above the eventual 356, because the second half of 2025 was slower than the first. Execution rates are not evenly distributed through the year, so mid-year annualisation is a weak forecast in either direction. What can be said flatly is that the 2026 pace to 27 July is roughly half the 2025 pace to a comparable date, and that no monitoring organisation has described 2026 as a record year.

The Annual Series, and Why the Counts Diverge

The series below is Amnesty International’s, on a single consistent basis, because mixing bases is how most published accounts of Saudi executions go wrong.

The divergences are small and they are informative.

ESOHR’s 347 versus the joint 356 for 2025 is a calendar artefact, not a dispute. ESOHR published its annual report on 21 December 2025, headlined 347 executions [S2]. The remaining nine fell in the last ten days of the year. The joint Reprieve–ESOHR statement of 6 January 2026 gives the full-year figure of at least 356 [S1]. Anyone citing 347 as the 2025 total is citing a report that closed before the year did.

AFP’s 338 versus 345 for 2024 is a threshold difference. AFP counts what official announcements state; ESOHR and Amnesty add cases they can corroborate through lawyers and families where no announcement was made [S1][S7]. The gap of seven is the approximate size of the unannounced tail in that year. For 2025 the two methods converged exactly, which suggests either fuller announcement or fuller corroboration — no source explains which.

A third divergence sits inside the offence data rather than the totals. AFP’s tally recorded 243 drug-related executions in 2025; Amnesty, Reprieve and ESOHR recorded 240 [S3][S8]. ESOHR states the drug share as 69% of its 347; Amnesty states 67% of its 356. Both are correct against their own denominators.

The 2020 figure deserves particular attention because it is the one year the Saudi state itself published a total. The Human Rights Commission reported 27 executions for 2020 [S22] — an 85% fall on 2019, attributed at the time partly to pandemic restrictions and partly to a policy decision described below. It is the strongest evidence in the whole series that the annual number is responsive to policy rather than fixed by law.

Does Saudi Arabia Execute People for Drug Offences?

Yes, and drug offences are now the largest single category. Amnesty International recorded 240 executions for drug-related offences in 2025 — 67% of the year’s total [S3]. Reprieve and ESOHR record that 98 people were executed in 2025 on charges relating solely to hashish, against 15 such cases in 2024 [S1][S2].

The step change between 2023 and 2024 is the single most consequential fact in the series, and it has a precise cause.

The moratorium and its end, dated

In January 2021, the Saudi Human Rights Commission announced a moratorium on executions for drug offences. Its then president, Awwad Al-Awwad, described the measure as intended to give offenders “a second chance” [S22]. Executions for drug offences stopped.

They resumed on 10 November 2022 [S13]. ALQST, which documented the resumption, recorded 20 men executed for drug and contraband offences in the following fortnight — eight Saudi citizens and 12 foreign nationals from Pakistan, Syria, Jordan and Nigeria [S13]. The UN human rights office called the resumption “deeply regrettable” in a press briefing note that month [S14][S23]. No official Saudi announcement marked either the beginning or the end of the moratorium; both were established from the pattern of announcements and from the Commission’s remarks.

The pause ran roughly 22 months from the Commission’s announcement to the first resumed execution. Organisations describe it as a 21-, 22- or 33-month moratorium depending on whether they date its start from the Commission’s statement or from the last drug execution preceding it. The two fixed points — January 2021 and 10 November 2022 — are not in dispute.

What followed is the arithmetic in the table above: two drug executions in 2023, 122 in 2024, 240 in 2025. Analysts quoted by AFP attribute the surge substantially to arrests made under a counter-narcotics campaign now reaching the end of their appeals [S8]. That is an explanation of timing, not of policy, and it is testable: if the 2024–25 surge is a cohort working through the courts, the 2026 slowdown is what the end of that cohort looks like.

What Crimes Carry the Death Penalty in Saudi Arabia?

Saudi criminal law divides capital offences into three categories, and the distinction explains most of the variance in the annual series.

Hudud are fixed penalties prescribed in scripture, applied to a short and closed list of offences. Qisas is retaliation for killing or bodily injury; the victim’s heirs may demand execution, accept compensation, or pardon. Neither category is within the government’s discretion to set aside, which is the substance of the position the crown prince has taken publicly.

Ta’zir is the discretionary category — punishments for offences not fixed by the other two, where the sentence rests with the judge or with statute. Drug trafficking, terrorism offences and offences under the 2017 counter-terrorism law all sit here. Human Rights Watch records that more than half of all Saudi death sentences are ta’zir [S9], and over the past decade ESOHR’s breakdown puts murder at about 43.9% of executions, non-lethal drug offences at about 35%, and political or expression-related charges at about 14% [S9].

That distribution is the whole argument. A government that wished to reduce executions without touching hudud or qisas could do so by policy alone, because the majority of the caseload is discretionary. It did exactly that between 2020 and 2022, and the annual number fell by 85%. The structure of Saudi law and the instruments that change it is the mechanism by which that choice is made.

Amnesty International’s report of 7 July 2025 also records that members of the Shia minority accounted for 42% of executions on “terrorism”-related charges over the previous decade [S11]. Cases of that kind reach this site’s coverage elsewhere: the death sentences handed to Howeitat tribe members who opposed eviction from the NEOM zone were brought under the counter-terrorism law, following the killing of Abdul Rahim al-Huwaiti in April 2020.

How Many Foreign Nationals Are Executed in Saudi Arabia?

A majority, in the record year. ESOHR recorded 202 foreign nationals among the 347 executions in its 2025 report — 57% of the total — and found 94% of them were executed for non-lethal drug offences [S2].

The nationality dimension is documented and under-reported. AFP’s tally for 2024 counted 129 foreign nationals among 338 executions, 38% of the total, comprising 25 Yemenis, 24 Pakistanis, 17 Egyptians, 16 Syrians, 14 Nigerians, 13 Jordanians and seven Ethiopians [S7]. Over a longer window, Amnesty’s decade study found that nearly 75% of those executed for drug offences between January 2014 and June 2025 were foreign nationals, drawn overwhelmingly from Pakistan (155), Syria (66), Jordan (50), Yemen (39), Egypt (33), Nigeria (32), Somalia (22) and Ethiopia (13) [S11][S12]. ESOHR’s decade count records 845 foreign nationals executed — about 42% of the total — across 34 nationalities [S9].

This is not a new asymmetry. Amnesty documented in August 2015 that 48.5% of the 2,208 people executed between January 1985 and June 2015 were foreign nationals, against a foreign share of the population then around a third [S17].

The connection to the labour economy is arithmetic rather than rhetorical. Foreign nationals make up roughly 78% of the Saudi workforce, recruited under the sponsorship arrangements examined in our analysis of the kafala system, and the group most exposed to capital drug charges is the low-wage migrant cohort Vision 2030’s build-out depends on. The same cohort appears in our work on migrant worker deaths and compensation and on labour conditions ahead of the 2034 World Cup. Amnesty’s central procedural finding — that defendants without money or counsel fare differently — gives its 2025 report its title [S11].

Has Saudi Arabia Reformed the Death Penalty?

Partially, on paper, in the discretionary category, and with documented exceptions.

Three instruments matter. The Juvenile Law, promulgated by royal decree in 2018, abolished discretionary ta’zir death sentences for offences committed by children and substituted a maximum of ten years’ detention [S9]. A royal decree issued on 24 March 2020, announced publicly on 26 April 2020 by the Human Rights Commission, extended the suspension of ta’zir death sentences to anyone under 18 at the time of the alleged offence, again with a ten-year maximum in a juvenile facility [S20]. The drug moratorium of January 2021 was the third, and it ended on 10 November 2022 [S13][S22].

The limits of the 2020 decree are the operative detail. ESOHR’s legal analysis of the 2018 law and the 2020 decree records that the decree’s sixth article excludes children facing execution under the counter-terrorism law and cases that do not fall under ta’zir provisions [S19]. In other words, the reform removed the discretionary route to a child execution while leaving the terrorism route and the hudud/qisas routes intact.

The record since is documented. ESOHR counts at least 17 people executed for offences committed as children over the past decade, of whom 13 were executed after the 2018 Juvenile Law took effect [S9]. Two were executed in 2025: Jalal al-Labbad on 21 August, who was 15 at the time of the alleged offences, and Abdullah al-Derazi on 20 October, who was 17 at the time of alleged offences in 2012 [S4][S15]. Both were convicted on terrorism charges connected to protest participation [S15].

The public commitments run alongside. In an interview with TIME published on 5 April 2018, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said Saudi Arabia had a plan to reduce the number of executions but would not limit them to murder convictions [S21]. In his March 2022 interview with The Atlantic he went further; Human Rights Watch renders his position as the death penalty being restricted to cases involving intentional killing, where the victim’s family may seek execution or grant pardon [S9]. Maya Foa, Reprieve’s director, put the gap between statement and outcome this way in January 2026: “Mohammed bin Salman has repeatedly told journalists he plans to reduce capital punishment, only to preside over a five-fold increase in executions” [S1].

What the Saudi Government Has Said, and Has Not Said

No substantive Saudi response to the 2025 record or to the 2026 figures could be located, as of 31 July 2026. The Saudi Press Agency’s English service returns a JavaScript-rendered shell to automated retrieval rather than indexed text, and the Human Rights Commission’s own domain, hrc.gov.sa, did not respond to connection attempts on 31 July 2026; the announcements underlying every count in this article were read by the wire services and monitoring organisations cited here. No statement from the Human Rights Commission, the Ministry of Justice or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs addressing the 2025 total appears in the coverage reviewed for this piece, and none of the four monitoring organisations records one [S1][S3][S4][S5].

What does exist is a standing position on jurisdiction. On 31 December 2020, Abdulaziz Al Wasil, Saudi Arabia’s permanent representative to the UN in Geneva, told the Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights that the Kingdom “does not accept, in any way, any prejudice to the sovereignty of its judicial system” and “rejects any dictates or interference in its judicial affairs” [S18]. On the procedural question, the Ministry of Justice has previously stated that capital cases pass through an appeals court and the supreme court, with 13 judges reviewing a case before an execution is carried out [S18].

The Human Rights Commission’s own record is mixed rather than absent. It announced the January 2021 drug moratorium, it published the 27-execution total for 2020, and it stated in 2020 that no one in Saudi Arabia would be executed for a crime committed as a minor [S13][S22]. Each of those statements is now contradicted by the subsequent count. That is a matter of record, not of interpretation.

Why This Matters for Vision 2030

The juxtaposition is factual and it is not incidental to the transformation’s financing model.

Vision 2030 is, among other things, an international capital-raising and reputation programme. It requires foreign direct investment against a $100bn-a-year target, tracked at inbound FDI; it requires 70 million international visitors; it hosts Expo 2030 in Riyadh and the 2034 FIFA World Cup; and it has deployed the Public Investment Fund across global sport, documented in our sportswashing ledger and in the sports diplomacy file. The social-reform record that accompanies this — the driving ban lifted, cinemas opened, female labour participation taken past its 2030 target — is real, documented and separately measurable. Our page on human rights reform and international perception treats that record on its own terms; this article is narrower and quantitative, and covers only the execution count.

The two lines run in opposite directions over the same period. Between 2016, the year Vision 2030 was published, and 2025, recorded executions rose from 154 to at least 356. The years of the fastest social liberalisation, 2019 to 2025, contain both the lowest annual total in the modern series (27, in 2020) and the highest (356, in 2025).

Three transmission channels connect the count to the programme’s own targets. The first is investor screening: institutions with human-rights due-diligence mandates price this, and the Khashoggi litigation reopened in France demonstrates that legal exposure to reputational events is not purely theoretical. The second is trade instruments: the US Section 301 tariff on Saudi-origin goods, effective 24 July 2026, shows that labour and rights findings now attach to trade policy directly. The third is event risk, where the 2034 World Cup and Expo 2030 create recurring, scheduled moments at which the execution count becomes a headline attached to the Kingdom’s own showcase.

None of this establishes that the death penalty has cost Vision 2030 a measurable amount of capital. No published study quantifies it, and the broader question of what the programme has delivered turns on other variables. The defensible statement is narrower: the count is a published, externally verified number sitting inside the same period as the reform narrative, and it is not addressed in the annual report whose headline is 93% of KPIs met. That framework contains 390 indicators. None measures this.

Risks, Contradictions and Open Questions

The counts are floors, and nobody knows the ceiling. Every organisation cited here says so explicitly. ESOHR’s finding of at least 51 unannounced executions over the decade [S9] means the true totals are higher by an unknown margin, and there is no mechanism to establish it.

The 2026 slowdown has no published explanation. A halving of the execution rate is a large movement. It could be the end of the 2022–24 arrest cohort working through the courts, a deliberate policy adjustment, an administrative backlog, or a reporting artefact. No organisation has attributed it, and none should be assumed.

AFP’s 2026 tally has not been published. The wire publishes an annual figure in the first days of January. Until it appears, the 2026 count rests on ESOHR’s and Amnesty’s monitoring alone, without the cross-check that made 2025’s 356 unusually well corroborated.

The offence categories are the state’s, not an independent classification. “Drug-related”, “terrorism” and “murder” are the labels attached in official announcements. Rights groups dispute the terrorism classification in specific cases. This article uses the announced categories because they are the only consistent series.

No Saudi official response exists to test. The absence recorded above is a finding, not a conclusion. It may reflect a decision not to engage, an inability to retrieve statements from unreachable official domains, or statements made in Arabic that did not reach English coverage. The distinction is not resolvable from outside.

The counter-argument deserves its own line. Saudi Arabia’s position, stated at the UN in 2020 and unchanged since, is that capital punishment is a matter of sovereign judicial jurisdiction and that capital cases receive multi-stage review [S18]. Qisas cases in particular involve a private right held by the victim’s family, which the state describes as beyond its power to extinguish. Nothing in the count above disproves that argument on its own terms. What the count establishes is that the discretionary category — which is not covered by that argument — is where the majority of executions occur.

What to Watch Next

• AFP’s annual tally for 2026, expected in the first week of January 2027. The independent cross-check on ESOHR’s and Amnesty’s counts, and the test of whether Saudi Arabia executions in 2026 finish near the 204 the current run-rate implies.
• ESOHR’s annual report, expected late December 2026. Note that its 2025 edition closed on 21 December and understated the full year by nine; read the December figure as a partial count.
• Amnesty International’s global death penalty report, expected around May 2027. The authoritative statement of the 2026 total on Amnesty’s basis.
• The Ethiopian cases. Human Rights Watch records at least 79 Ethiopian nationals at imminent risk and Amnesty at least 63 held at Khamis Mushait [S5][S6]. Whether those sentences are carried out, commuted or left pending is the single largest determinant of the 2026 nationality breakdown.
• Any Saudi Human Rights Commission publication of an annual execution figure. It has done so once, for 2020. A second would change what can be verified about this series.
• The Vision 2030 annual report for 2026, expected April 2027. Whether any indicator in the framework addresses capital punishment.

Related Vision 2030 Context

• Human rights reform and international perception — the qualitative reform record, as distinct from this count.
• The Howeitat death sentences — capital cases arising directly from a Vision 2030 giga-project.
• The human ledger at NEOM — the displacement record behind those prosecutions.
• The kafala machine — the sponsorship system governing the population most exposed to capital drug charges.
• Blood price and migrant worker deaths — compensation, and what the state records about foreign workers.
• Saudi Arabia’s legal system — the instruments through which sentencing policy changes.
• The Vision 2030 annual report’s 93% KPI claim — what the framework measures, and what it does not.
• US–Saudi relations — where the execution record enters the bilateral file.

Sources

• [S1] Reprieve, The Saudi Regime Executed at Least 356 People in 2025 — the Most Ever in the Modern Era, joint statement with the European Saudi Organisation for Human Rights, 6 January 2026. https://reprieve.org.uk/news/the-saudi-regime-executed-at-least-356-people-in-2025-the-most-ever-in-the-modern-era/
• [S2] European Saudi Organisation for Human Rights, Saudi Arabia Breaks Its Historic Killing Record — 347 Executions in 2025, annual report, 21 December 2025. https://www.esohr.org/en/
• [S3] Amnesty International, Death Penalty in 2025 — Facts and Figures, global report, 18 May 2026. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2026/05/death-penalty-in-2025-facts-and-figures/
• [S4] Human Rights Watch, Saudi Arabia — Record Number of Executions in 2025, news release, 13 January 2026. https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/01/13/saudi-arabia-record-number-of-executions-in-2025
• [S5] Human Rights Watch, Saudi Arabia — New Executions of Ethiopian Migrants, news release, 28 July 2026. https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/07/28/saudi-arabia-new-executions-of-ethiopian-migrants
• [S6] Amnesty International, Saudi Arabia — Almost 100 People Executed So Far This Year as Dozens More Remain on Death Row for Drug-Related Offences, news release, June 2026. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2026/06/saudi-arabia-almost-100-people-executed-this-year-for-drug-related-offences/
• [S7] Agence France-Presse via France 24, Saudi Executes at Least 338 People in 2024 — AFP Tally, wire report, 1 January 2025. https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250101-saudi-executes-at-least-338-people-in-2024-afp-tally
• [S8] Agence France-Presse via Malay Mail, Riyadh’s War on Drugs Drives Record 356 Executions in 2025, wire report, 1 January 2026. https://www.malaymail.com/news/world/2026/01/01/riyadhs-war-on-drugs-drives-record-356-executions-in-2025/203959 (the syndication blocked automated retrieval; figures above are taken from the wire copy as reproduced by other outlets carrying the same AFP report)
• [S9] Human Rights Watch, Saudi Arabia — Surge in Executions Over a Decade, joint statement with 35 organisations, 21 April 2026. https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/04/21/saudi-arabia-surge-in-executions-over-a-decade
• [S10] Human Rights Watch, Saudi Arabia — Executions Surge in 2025, news release, 11 August 2025. https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/08/11/saudi-arabia-executions-surge-in-2025
• [S11] Amnesty International, If We Had Money and a Lawyer, Maybe My Brother Would Be Alive — Saudi Arabia’s Execution Crisis, report MDE 23/9524/2025, 7 July 2025. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde23/9524/2025/en/
• [S12] Amnesty International, Saudi Arabia — Escalating Executions for Drug-Related Offences, news release, 7 July 2025. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/07/saudi-arabia-escalation-executions-foreign-nationals-drug-related-offences/
• [S13] ALQST for Human Rights, Drugs-Related Executions Make Sudden Comeback in Saudi Arabia Despite Claims of a Moratorium, report, 24 November 2022. https://alqst.org/en/post/drugs-related-executions-make-sudden-comeback-in-saudi-arabia-despite-claims-of-a-moratorium
• [S14] UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Saudi Arabia — Resumption of Executions for Drug-Related Offences, press briefing note, November 2022. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-briefing-notes/2022/11/saudi-arabia-resumption-executions-drug-related-offences (ohchr.org blocked automated retrieval; contents read via UN News reporting of the same briefing)
• [S15] Human Rights Watch, World Report 2026 — Saudi Arabia, country chapter, January 2026. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2026/country-chapters/saudi-arabia
• [S16] Death Penalty Information Center, Saudi Arabia Records Historic Number of Executions for the Second Consecutive Year, analysis, January 2026. https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/saudi-arabia-records-historic-number-of-executions-for-the-second-consecutive-year
• [S17] Amnesty International, Facts and Figures — The Death Penalty in Saudi Arabia, briefing, August 2015. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/08/facts-and-figures-the-death-penalty-in-saudi-arabia/
• [S18] Gulf News, Saudi Arabia Rejects Any Dictates or Interference in Its Judicial Affairs, news report on remarks by Abdulaziz Al Wasil, permanent representative to the UN in Geneva, 31 December 2020. https://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/saudi/saudi-arabia-rejects-any-dictates-or-interference-in-its-judicial-affairs-1.1609384427019
• [S19] European Saudi Organisation for Human Rights, The Legality of Child Executions in Saudi Arabia — Analysis of the 2018 Juvenile Law and 2020 Royal Decree, legal analysis, June 2022. https://www.esohr.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/The-Legality-of-Child-Executions-in-Saudi-Arabia-Analysis-of-the-2018-Juvenile-Law-and-2020-Royal-Decree.pdf
• [S20] Al Jazeera, Saudi Arabia — Executions Scrapped for Crimes Committed as Minors, news report, 26 April 2020. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/4/26/saudi-arabia-executions-scrapped-for-crimes-committed-as-minors
• [S21] TIME, Read the Full Transcript of TIME’s Interview With Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, interview transcript, 5 April 2018. https://time.com/5228006/mohammed-bin-salman-interview-transcript-full/
• [S22] BBC News, Saudi Arabia Executions — Drastic Reduction Reported in 2020, news report on the Human Rights Commission’s figures, January 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-55710005
• [S23] UN News, Saudi Arabia — Resumption of Executions for Drug Offences Deeply Regrettable, UN Rights Office Says, news report, November 2022. https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/11/1130917
• [S24] Saudi Press Agency, English service, official news agency of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia — the channel through which Ministry of Interior execution announcements are published. https://www.spa.gov.sa/en (returns a JavaScript-rendered shell to automated retrieval; the announcements underlying every count above were read by the wire services and monitoring organisations cited)