PIF Made SAR65bn in 2025. Comprehensive Income Was a SAR45bn Loss

Last verified: 1 September 2026.

Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund reported a powerful 2025 income-statement result: consolidated revenue rose 9 per cent to approximately SAR450 billion and profit more than doubled to SAR65.2 billion. Its operating cash inflow increased to SAR75.5 billion. Assets under management were approximately SAR3.4 trillion, while the fund said its portfolio contributed 11 per cent of Saudi non-oil GDP during the year. [S1] [S2]

The same audited accounts contain the counterweight. Other comprehensive loss was SAR110.2 billion, turning the SAR65.2 billion profit into a SAR45.0 billion total comprehensive loss. Consolidated equity fell by SAR54.2 billion to SAR2.629 trillion. Loans and borrowings rose 27 per cent to SAR725.3 billion. And the disclosed AUM figure of about SAR3.4 trillion finished below PIF’s published 2021–25 target of more than SAR4 trillion. [S2] [S4]

These statements are not contradictory. They describe different layers of a complex consolidated group. Revenue is not investment return. Profit is not total comprehensive income. AUM is not consolidated assets. And cumulative economic contribution is not the same thing as the fund’s distributable cash.

The correct reading is neither that PIF had a uniformly triumphant year nor that a comprehensive loss erased its operating progress. It is that the fund expanded the activity of its controlled portfolio, generated more profit and cash, absorbed a large negative movement outside profit or loss, and ended its five-year strategy with a mixed target record.

Figures are rounded from PIF’s audited consolidated financial statements. Dashes indicate that the comparison is not necessary to the analysis, not that the prior-year figure is unavailable. [S2]

Revenue is the turnover of a consolidated group, not the fund’s investment return

The SAR450 billion revenue headline is easy to misread. PIF consolidates companies it controls across telecommunications, financial services, utilities, real estate, transport, entertainment and other sectors. Their customer revenue appears in the group income statement.

Telecommunications alone produced SAR76.8 billion of 2025 revenue, about 17 per cent of the total. That is operating turnover generated by a portfolio company. It is not equivalent to PIF earning a 17 per cent return, nor is the full SAR450 billion cash available for the shareholder to redeploy. Portfolio companies have their own employees, suppliers, operating costs, capital programmes, debt and minority investors. [S2]

The distinction changes how the 9 per cent increase should be judged. Rising consolidated revenue can indicate scale and commercial activity inside the portfolio. It does not, by itself, reveal whether PIF’s own capital allocation outperformed a benchmark. For that purpose, investors need return measures, cash distributions, changes in portfolio value and risk.

PIF reported an annualised total shareholder return of 5.8 per cent since 2017. That is a multi-year performance measure, not the return achieved in 2025 alone. It should not be presented as a one-year outcome. [S1]

Profit rose sharply, but shareholders’ comprehensive result was negative

PIF’s consolidated profit increased from SAR25.8 billion to SAR65.2 billion. Of the 2025 total, SAR46.4 billion was attributable to the fund’s owner and SAR18.8 billion to non-controlling interests. That allocation matters: the consolidated group includes businesses PIF does not own in full, so not every riyal of group profit belongs economically to PIF. [S2]

Profit is only one route through equity. International Financial Reporting Standards place specified market-value movements, currency effects, hedging changes and shares of investee movements in other comprehensive income rather than the income statement. PIF recorded SAR110.2 billion of other comprehensive loss in 2025. Combining it with profit produced a SAR45.0 billion total comprehensive loss.

The amount attributable to the owner was more severe: a SAR64.7 billion total comprehensive loss. Non-controlling interests recorded positive comprehensive income of SAR19.7 billion, partly offsetting the owner result at group level. [S2]

That does not mean SAR110 billion left PIF’s bank account. Other comprehensive income is substantially an accounting bridge for value changes and other specified items recognised outside profit. Some movements may reverse; some may be realised later; some reflect investments held for strategic reasons rather than near-term sale. But it is also not a footnote that can be excluded from performance analysis. It records a fall in recognised value within the reporting perimeter.

The hierarchy is therefore:

• SAR449.9 billion revenue: group operating and other revenue within the consolidated perimeter;
• SAR65.2 billion profit: income after recognised expenses and gains that pass through profit or loss;
• SAR(45.0) billion total comprehensive result: profit plus recognised items routed through other comprehensive income; and
• SAR2.629 trillion equity: the residual recognised interest after liabilities at year-end.

Each answers a different question. Selecting only the largest positive number produces publicity, not financial analysis.

Equity fell even as assets grew

PIF’s consolidated assets increased by approximately SAR220 billion to SAR4.541 trillion. Equity fell by SAR54.2 billion to SAR2.629 trillion. The balance-sheet expansion was therefore funded through liabilities and other movements rather than retained comprehensive gains alone. [S2] [S5]

The statement of changes in equity shows several moving parts. The owner contributed SAR54.2 billion during the year. Transactions with the owner reduced equity by SAR56.5 billion. Dividends to non-controlling interests reduced it by SAR17.0 billion. The comprehensive loss supplied the largest negative bridge.

This is precisely why one cannot infer the fund’s fiscal relationship with the state from profit alone. Capital contributions, asset transfers, owner transactions, dividends and valuation movements all affect the balance sheet through different routes.

PIF also reported SAR1.944 trillion of assets measured at fair value on a recurring basis. Approximately SAR500.9 billion sat in Level 3, where valuations rely materially on unobservable inputs rather than quoted market prices. Level 3 does not mean unreliable; private assets and unique projects often require models. It does mean that valuation governance, assumptions and sensitivity are central to the quality of the balance sheet. [S2]

The auditor identified the classification and valuation of direct investments as a key audit matter. PIF held 225 direct investments at year-end. The scale and diversity of that portfolio create judgement over control, significant influence, consolidation and fair value — judgements that can materially change how performance appears.

Borrowings rose faster than assets

Loans and borrowings increased from SAR570.4 billion to SAR725.3 billion, a rise of SAR154.8 billion or 27.1 per cent. About SAR392.3 billion related to banking operations and SAR333.0 billion to non-banking operations. Customer deposits were SAR734.4 billion, up from SAR646.0 billion, reflecting the consolidation of financial institutions. [S2]

This perimeter point prevents two opposite mistakes. It would be wrong to treat the full SAR725.3 billion as debt borrowed directly by the sovereign wealth fund’s parent for megaprojects. It would also be wrong to dismiss the number because part of it sits in regulated banking subsidiaries. Consolidated leverage remains a claim within the group and influences risk, interest expense and capital resilience.

Finance costs were SAR18.7 billion in 2025. The accounts do not justify a single debt-sustainability verdict from the gross borrowing figure. A proper assessment needs maturity profiles, currency, fixed-versus-floating rates, project-level recourse, subsidiary capital rules, liquidity and the cash generation of the assets funded.

What can be said is narrower: borrowing expanded much faster than consolidated assets, raising the importance of financing discipline and project cash flow.

Cash generation strengthened, but investment demands remain larger

Net cash generated from operating activities increased to SAR75.5 billion from SAR50.4 billion. This is a constructive signal because it moves the analysis beyond non-cash valuation changes. Operating cash gives the group greater capacity to service obligations and finance activity internally. [S2]

It is not the same as free cash flow. The group has capital-intensive subsidiaries and development companies. Property, plant and equipment reached SAR429.6 billion, and portfolio companies continue to require construction and acquisition capital. Free cash flow would need to account for those investments, disposals, financing and distributions.

PIF’s stated cumulative domestic investment was SAR750 billion between 2021 and 2025. Its press release also placed cumulative contribution to real non-oil GDP at SAR1.286 trillion over the period. These are impact measures, not line items that reconcile directly to parent-level cash flow. [S1]

AUM and consolidated assets are different numbers by design

PIF reported AUM of approximately SAR3.4 trillion, while consolidated assets were SAR4.541 trillion. The SAR1.1 trillion gap is not evidence that one of the numbers is false.

Consolidated assets follow accounting control rules: the group recognises 100 per cent of a controlled subsidiary’s assets and separately recognises liabilities and non-controlling interests. AUM is a management measure of assets managed by the fund and is constructed under PIF’s methodology. It may include interests measured on an attributable basis and exclude liabilities or consolidated amounts that sit inside controlled operating companies.

The two metrics should be reconciled conceptually, not subtracted as if they describe the same perimeter. PIF’s annual report is the appropriate place to explain its AUM methodology; the audited financial statements provide the IFRS perimeter.

The sharper issue is the five-year target. When PIF launched its 2021–25 strategy, it set an objective of growing AUM to more than SAR4 trillion by the end of 2025. The disclosed outcome of approximately SAR3.4 trillion is roughly SAR600 billion, or 15 per cent, below SAR4 trillion — and further below the stated “more than” threshold. On the published headline measure, that target was not achieved. [S4]

That miss deserves disclosure without drama. PIF still increased AUM markedly from the roughly SAR2 trillion base cited around the start of the strategy. A target can be missed while the underlying scale grows substantially.

The 2021–25 scorecard is mixed, not binary

PIF’s five-year strategy provided several measurable targets. The public 2025 results permit a clear conclusion on some and only a partial conclusion on others.

The holds are deliberate. They do not claim the targets were missed. They prevent a conclusion where the August headline release does not provide a target-to-outcome bridge and where differing definitions could produce a false comparison. The annual report should be the controlling source for any later update.

Economic contribution needs a methodology bridge

PIF’s statement that its portfolio contributed 11 per cent of Saudi non-oil GDP in 2025 is one of the most important figures in the report. It is also a different species of number from audited revenue or profit. Economic-impact analysis can include value added generated directly inside portfolio companies, activity in their supply chains and consumption supported by associated employment. The exact boundary determines what “11 per cent” means.

The cumulative figures illustrate why definitions matter. PIF reports SAR750 billion of domestic investment and SAR1.286 trillion of cumulative contribution to real non-oil GDP from 2021 to 2025. The contribution is about 1.71 times the investment amount. That relationship is not inherently implausible: capital can support repeated production flows, supplier activity and induced demand. It is not a financial return multiple, and it should not be described as PIF “making” SAR1.286 trillion.

A reproducible disclosure would identify the input-output model, price base, direct/indirect/induced categories, treatment of imports and displacement, time horizon, attribution rule and safeguards against double counting between portfolio companies. It would also reconcile the reported cumulative contribution with the 2025 share of non-oil GDP and identify any independent assurance.

Until such a bridge is presented alongside the headline, the figure should be treated as a management economic-impact estimate, not an audited national-accounts identity. That classification does not invalidate it. It tells readers what kind of evidence they are using and what would be required to reproduce it. [S1] [S3]

The strongest case for PIF’s 2025 performance

The strongest case begins with breadth. Revenue, profit, operating cash and total assets all increased. Cumulative real non-oil GDP contribution exceeded the five-year target. PIF says 11 per cent of Saudi non-oil GDP in 2025 was attributable to its portfolio activities, and cumulative domestic investment reached SAR750 billion. [S1]

The group is also building institutional capability rather than acting only as a capital allocator. PIF reported 100 technology applications and 43 artificial-intelligence solutions across its operations. A portfolio spanning infrastructure, telecoms, finance, mobility, entertainment and new industry can create coordination benefits and establish domestic markets that individual private investors would struggle to form alone.

The 5.8 per cent annualised shareholder return since 2017 indicates positive long-term value creation on PIF’s measure despite the valuation pressure visible in 2025 comprehensive income.

The countercase: scale can disguise capital efficiency

The countercase is that rapid balance-sheet growth is not itself success. Consolidated revenue can rise because controlled companies become larger, while the shareholder’s risk-adjusted return remains modest. AUM can increase through contributions and transfers as well as investment performance. Cumulative GDP and employment impact measures depend on models and should not be confused with audited profit.

The 2025 accounts strengthen this objection in three places. The owner’s total comprehensive result was negative. Borrowings grew faster than assets. And the 2025 AUM target was not met. The group’s Level 3 fair-value exposure makes model discipline particularly important.

None of those facts demonstrates capital destruction over the full strategy period. Together, they raise the standard for the 2026–30 strategy: future reporting should show the bridge between new capital, market movements, acquisitions, disposals and investment return; reconcile AUM with the accounting perimeter; and report project-level delivery against budget and schedule.

PIF’s dual mandate makes performance attribution essential

PIF is not simply one investor among many. It is a central transmission mechanism between sovereign capital and the industries intended to diversify Saudi Arabia. Its financial quality therefore influences the pace, cost and credibility of Vision 2030.

The relevant question is not whether PIF can fund another launch. It is whether completed assets and mature companies generate enough productivity, cash and private co-investment to reduce dependence on continued sovereign balance-sheet expansion.

Four measures should dominate the next phase:

1. cash conversion: operating and free cash generation relative to accounting profit;
2. capital efficiency: returns by portfolio and vintage relative to risk and cost of capital;
3. crowding-in: independently financed private investment created per riyal of PIF capital;
4. delivery: projects completed to scope, cost and schedule, then used at commercially credible rates.

PIF’s new 2026–30 strategy can improve the evidence base by publishing a compact annual bridge for these measures and a final reconciliation of the previous strategy’s objectives.

What would change this assessment

This reading should be updated if PIF publishes a like-for-like final scorecard showing outcomes for employment, local content and non-government investment; a fuller AUM bridge; or segment-level return and cash data. Large post-balance-sheet transfers, disposals or recapitalisations would also affect the risk analysis.

For now, the audited record supports a balanced conclusion. PIF’s consolidated businesses produced more revenue, profit and operating cash in 2025. The owner simultaneously absorbed a large comprehensive loss, leverage expanded and the headline AUM target was missed. Both sides belong in any serious account of the fund’s year.

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Sources

1. [S1] Public Investment Fund, “PIF delivers strong revenue and profit growth in 2025,” 25 August 2026. https://www.pif.gov.sa/en/news-and-insights/press-releases/2026/pif-delivers-strong-revenue-and-profit-growth-in-2025/
2. [S2] Public Investment Fund, audited consolidated financial statements for the year ended 31 December 2025. https://www.pif.gov.sa/-/media/project/pif-corporate/pif-corporate-site/our-financials/financial-statements/pdfs/consolidated-financial-statements-2025.pdf
3. [S3] Public Investment Fund, Annual Report 2025. https://www.pif.gov.sa/-/media/project/pif-corporate/pif-corporate-site/annual-reports/reports/pif-annual-report-2025-english-hyperlinked.pdf?sc_lang=en
4. [S4] Public Investment Fund, “PIF Strategy 2021–2025.” https://www.pif.gov.sa/-/media/project/pif-corporate/pif-corporate-site/strategy-and-impact/our-program/pdf/pif-strategy-2021-2025.pdf
5. [S5] Argaam, “PIF’s assets rise 5% to SAR 4.54T in 2025,” 25 August 2026. https://tools.argaam.com/en/article/articledetail/id/1916575