PIF Reported a 152% Profit Rise. The Same Accounts Show a SAR64.7bn Comprehensive Loss.

On 30 June 2026, Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund published its audited consolidated financial statements for the year ended 31 December 2025. The headline was unambiguous and travelled fast: net profit had more than doubled, up about 152 per cent to roughly SAR65.2bn ($17.4bn) from SAR25.8bn [S1]. Within hours the figure was on Arab News, Al Arabiya, Asharq Al-Awsat, Economy Middle East and Investing.com, in near-identical language, alongside record revenue of SAR449.9bn ($119.7bn) and total assets of SAR4.54tn ($1.21tn) [S2][S10][S12].

Further down the same document sits a second number. Total comprehensive income attributable to the owner of the fund for 2025 was a loss of SAR64.7bn ($17.3bn) [S1]. Not a loss in a subsidiary, not a restatement, not an analyst’s adjustment. It is the bottom line of the second statement in PIF’s own accounts, signed off by the same auditors, published on the same day, in the same PDF.

Both numbers are correct. They are not in conflict, and neither is an error. They measure different things, and the distance between them — SAR130bn, about $35bn — is one of the most informative figures PIF disclosed all year. It is also, on the evidence of the coverage that followed, the least reported. We checked the Arab News account of the results line by line: it carries profit, revenue, operating profit, assets and cash, and contains no reference to comprehensive income, to other comprehensive income, to the fair-value loss, or to the fall in total equity [S2].

This piece explains what each number measures, why the accounting rules put the larger one where almost nobody looked, and what the rest of the statements say about how the fund is now being financed. One point should be made at the outset and not qualified afterwards: PIF has hidden nothing. Every figure below comes from the fund’s own published disclosure. The failure here belongs to the reporting, not to the disclosure.

Last verified: 31 July 2026.

What Happened

PIF’s 2025 results were the first full-year accounts published after the fund’s board, chaired by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, approved the 2026–30 strategy in April 2026 [S8]. That strategy reorganises the fund into three portfolios — Vision, Strategic and Financial — and shifts the stated emphasis from balance-sheet expansion to capital discipline and private-sector co-investment [S1][S8]; what happened to the fund’s sports properties in the same year is the most legible expression of that shift. The results explain why that shift was necessary.

The income statement is strong on almost every line. Revenue rose 8.8 per cent to SAR449.9bn, split between about SAR312bn of operating revenue and SAR137.9bn of income from investment activities [S1]. Operating profit more than doubled to SAR78bn from SAR34.7bn [S1][S3]. Cash and equivalents stood at SAR354.4bn ($94.5bn) [S3]. Mining revenue grew 19.3 per cent to SAR38.8bn and agricultural and livestock revenue tripled to SAR7.6bn [S1]. Consolidated profit came in at SAR65.2bn.

The balance sheet tells a different story. Total equity fell 2 per cent to SAR2.63tn ($701bn) from SAR2.68tn [S1]. Total liabilities rose 16.7 per cent to SAR1.91tn, and within that, loans and borrowings rose 27.2 per cent to SAR725.3bn from SAR570.4bn [S1][S4].

And the statement of comprehensive income records other comprehensive income of minus SAR113.3bn, driven by a SAR112.8bn fair-value loss on equity instruments measured at fair value through other comprehensive income [S1]. Subtract that from the profit attributable to the owner and you arrive at the comprehensive loss of SAR64.7bn.

A fund can grow its assets, double its profit and shrink its equity in the same twelve months. PIF did all three.

Did PIF Actually Make a Loss in 2025?

On the income statement, no: PIF made a profit. On the fuller measure that tracks the change in the owner’s wealth, yes — a loss of SAR64.7bn. Both figures come from the same audited statements. The confusion is not the reader’s fault. “Profit” is a word that appears to describe the whole of a year’s financial outcome, and in most ordinary businesses it very nearly does. For an investment institution holding an enormous portfolio of listed shares, it does not.

Why did PIF’s profit jump 152 per cent?

Because the income statement is only permitted to count part of the year. Operating profit more than doubled, dividends and interest arrived as income, and income from fair-value changes in financial instruments nearly doubled to SAR38.8bn in 2025 [S3] — an unrealised, mark-to-market gain on which nothing was sold. All of it flows straight into the SAR65.2bn headline. The far larger unrealised loss recorded in the same year does not.

What it is permitted to count is definitional, not discretionary. Net profit — profit or loss for the period — captures the results of transactions and events that the accounting standards route through the income statement. For PIF that means the revenue of the operating companies it consolidates, such as stc, Ma’aden and Savvy Games; the costs of running them; dividends received from investments; interest; and fair-value movements on those financial instruments the standards require, or PIF has elected, to mark through profit.

What is the difference between net profit and comprehensive income?

Total comprehensive income is net profit plus other comprehensive income (OCI), and the entire difference between the two measures is what sits in OCI. That is the bucket for gains and losses the standards deliberately keep out of profit, usually because they are unrealised and considered too volatile to represent the period’s performance. Typical OCI items are foreign-currency translation differences on overseas subsidiaries, actuarial movements on pension obligations, and — the one that matters here — fair-value changes on equity investments an entity has elected to measure at fair value through other comprehensive income.

Total comprehensive income is the closer proxy for the change in the owner’s wealth over the year. And on that measure, PIF’s owner — the Saudi state — was SAR64.7bn poorer at the end of 2025 than at the start, before capital injections.

A third number: who the profit belongs to

There is a further distinction that the syndicated coverage collapsed entirely, and it materially changes the comparison. The SAR65.2bn is consolidated profit. It includes the share of profit belonging to minority shareholders in PIF’s partly owned subsidiaries — the other investors in stc, Ma’aden, the Saudi banks and the rest.

Profit attributable to the owner of the fund was SAR46.4bn, up from SAR1bn in 2024 [S1]. That is the figure that belongs to the Saudi state, and it is the correct one to set against the SAR64.7bn comprehensive loss, which is also stated on an attributable-to-owner basis.

Two things follow. The apples-to-apples gap between the headline and the reality is not SAR65.2bn versus minus SAR64.7bn but SAR46.4bn versus minus SAR64.7bn — a swing of SAR111bn. And PIF’s 2024 result, reported at the time as a profit, sat on top of an even larger comprehensive loss of SAR154.4bn [S1]. On the comprehensive measure, 2025 was a substantial improvement. That is the fairest available reading of these accounts, and it belongs in any honest account of them.

Why IFRS 9 Puts the Loss Where Nobody Looks

The mechanism is a specific and deliberate feature of IFRS 9, the standard governing financial instruments. It is worth understanding precisely, because it determines which of PIF’s numbers the world sees.

The irrevocable election

When an entity first recognises an investment in equity shares that it does not hold for trading, IFRS 9 offers a one-time, irrevocable choice. It can measure the investment at fair value through profit or loss (FVTPL), in which case every subsequent movement in the share price hits the income statement. Or it can elect to measure it at fair value through other comprehensive income (FVOCI), in which case every subsequent movement bypasses the income statement and is recorded directly in equity via OCI.

Long-horizon investors routinely choose FVOCI, and the logic is defensible. A sovereign fund holding strategic stakes for a decade does not want quarterly market noise dominating its reported earnings. The election insulates the income statement from volatility the institution has no intention of monetising.

PIF made that election across a large part of its listed portfolio. In 2025, those shares fell. The decline — SAR112.8bn — went to OCI exactly as the standard requires.

Will the SAR112.8bn loss ever appear in PIF’s profit?

No — not in a later year, not on impairment, and not even when the shares are finally sold. For equity instruments designated at FVOCI, IFRS 9 prohibits recycling: the cumulative gain or loss sitting in OCI is never reclassified into profit or loss. On disposal it is transferred within equity, typically to retained earnings, and the income statement never records it. That is what surprises people who assume the loss is merely deferred.

This is a genuine divergence from the treatment of debt instruments at FVOCI, where cumulative amounts are recycled to profit on derecognition. The equity carve-out is specific and intentional.

The consequence for PIF is stark. The SAR112.8bn will never appear in PIF’s profit line — in any year, under any circumstance. If those holdings recover, the recovery will likewise never appear in profit. The income statement has been permanently decoupled from a very large part of the fund’s economic performance.

The mirror image in the same accounts

The sharpest illustration sits within the 2025 statements themselves. PIF recognised SAR38.8bn of unrealised fair-value gains through profit and SAR112.8bn of unrealised fair-value losses through OCI [S1][S3]. Both are mark-to-market. Neither was realised in cash. The only thing separating them is which classification bucket the underlying instrument sits in.

The gains lifted the headline. The losses did not touch it. No rule was bent to achieve that outcome — it is simply what the classification framework produces. But it means that the single most-quoted figure about the largest sovereign fund in the region is, structurally, a partial view.

The dividend asymmetry

One mechanical detail closes the loop. Dividends received from FVOCI equity holdings are recognised in profit or loss. PIF books the cash income from those shares as profit while the change in the value of the same shares bypasses profit entirely.

Is PIF Borrowing More Than Its Portfolio Earns?

Yes, and the gap widened in 2025. Loans and borrowings rose 27.2 per cent over the year while dividend income — the recurring cash the portfolio throws off — fell 22 per cent. Set the accounting aside: two lines in the 2025 statements describe the fund’s cash position, and they move in opposite directions.

Debt up 27 per cent

Loans and borrowings rose to SAR725.3bn ($193bn) from SAR570.4bn, an increase of 27.2 per cent and roughly 16 per cent of total assets [S1][S4]. PIF stepped up issuance materially during the period, including its first murabaha credit facility and its first euro-denominated green bond [S1]. Total liabilities rose 16.7 per cent to SAR1.91tn ($509bn) — a faster rate than the 5.09 per cent growth in total assets, which is why the equity share of the balance sheet fell.

Dividend income down 22 per cent

Over the same year, dividend income fell to SAR65.3bn from SAR84bn [S3] — a decline of about SAR18.7bn, or 22 per cent. This is the recurring cash yield the portfolio throws off, and it is the least discretionary, most reliable component of the fund’s income. It shrank by more than a fifth.

The state stopped writing cheques

The third line completes the picture and was reported by AGBI but by very few others. Government capital contributions fell to SAR54bn in 2025 from SAR645bn in 2024, a decline of more than 90 per cent [S4].

The 2024 figure needs context, and the context is instructive. The bulk of it was not cash. In March 2024 the Saudi government transferred a further 8 per cent of Saudi Aramco’s equity to PIF, a stake valued at around SAR615bn ($164bn) at the time [S11]. That in-kind transfer is most of the SAR645bn. There was no equivalent event in 2025, so the line reverted to something closer to normal.

Read the three together and the funding model is visible without interpretation:

State equity has stopped arriving at scale, portfolio cash income is falling, and borrowing is filling the gap. Each of those facts is unremarkable in isolation. Together, in a single year, they describe a fund whose marginal funding source has changed. Our separate analysis of PIF’s debt and 2030 funding trajectory takes that trajectory forward; this piece establishes that 2025 is where the shift becomes visible in the audited accounts.

What is probably driving both

PIF does not disclose the FVOCI loss by individual holding, so what follows is inference rather than documented fact. But the fund holds 16 per cent of Aramco [S11], and Aramco is by a wide margin its largest single listed position. A year in which PIF’s dividend income falls by SAR18.7bn and its FVOCI equity portfolio falls by SAR112.8bn is very difficult to construct without Aramco contributing substantially to both, given lower oil prices and a reduced dividend. PIF has not confirmed this attribution, and it should not be reported as though it had.

The Returns Question

The comprehensive loss is a one-year figure and a volatile one. The more durable question is what the fund earns over time, and here the most rigorous available work is not PIF’s.

Tim Callen, a scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute and a former IMF mission chief for Saudi Arabia, examined PIF’s reported performance in August 2025. PIF disclosed that its total return to shareholders averaged 7.2 per cent a year from September 2017 to end-2024. Its 2023 annual report had put the same rolling measure at 8.7 per cent through end-2023. Callen’s conclusion from the arithmetic of that decline: “This drop in average return suggests that the rate of return in 2024 was close to zero” [S5].

The second half of his analysis matters as much. PIF’s assets under management grew by roughly $150bn, or 19 per cent, during 2024, reaching $913bn. But the 8 per cent Aramco stake the government transferred in March 2024 was worth about $140bn by year-end [S5]. Almost the entire year’s AUM growth was a transfer from one arm of the state to another, not investment performance.

Note the discrepancy in that stake’s value across sources: Callen valued it at $164bn at the March 2024 transfer date [S11] and about $140bn at end-2024 [S5]. The roughly $24bn difference is not an inconsistency — it is the Aramco share price falling over nine months, which is the same phenomenon that produced the FVOCI loss discussed above.

The peer comparison

PIF’s own strategy documentation cites annualised total shareholder return “of more than 7 per cent” since 2017 [S1]. The most useful comparator is Abu Dhabi’s Mubadala, which reported five- and ten-year annualised rates of return of 10.7 per cent and 10.3 per cent for 2025, with AUM up 17 per cent to AED1.4tn ($385bn) [S7].

The measures are not identical — Mubadala publishes an internal rate of return, PIF a total shareholder return — so the comparison is directional rather than exact. But a three-percentage-point spread sustained over five years is not a measurement artefact. Compounded on a $900bn base, it is a very large amount of foregone wealth. Our GCC sovereign wealth benchmark and the broader Saudi–UAE comparison set out the structural reasons the two funds perform differently: Mubadala’s portfolio is weighted toward financial returns, while PIF carries a domestic development mandate that no purely commercial investor would accept.

That mandate is the honest defence of the return gap, and it is a real one. PIF is not trying to be Mubadala. It is capitalising giga-projects, building industrial capacity and absorbing development risk the private sector will not. Its own strategy cites more than $199bn of new project investment since 2021, $243bn contributed to real non-oil GDP and more than $157bn spent with the local private sector [S1]. Those are policy returns, and they do not appear in a shareholder-return calculation.

The defence has a limit. The development mandate explains a lower financial return. It does not explain away a shrinking equity base, because the development spending has to be funded from somewhere — and it is now being funded increasingly by debt.

Why This Matters for Vision 2030

PIF is the balance sheet of Vision 2030. It is the vehicle through which the state capitalises NEOM, the Red Sea developments, Qiddiya, Diriyah, HUMAIN and the rest, and its capacity to keep doing so is a function of its equity, not its revenue. Three consequences follow from the 2025 accounts.

First, the equity base is the constraint, and it went backwards. Total equity fell about SAR50bn to SAR2.63tn despite a SAR46.4bn attributable profit and SAR54bn of government contributions [S1][S4]. The dominant reason is the SAR113.3bn OCI charge. Reconciling the movement exactly would require the statement of changes in equity, including distributions to and transactions with non-controlling interests, so the arithmetic here is directional. The direction is not in doubt: equity fell while liabilities rose 16.7 per cent. Every unit of leverage capacity is a unit of future project funding, and 2025 consumed rather than created it.

Second, the funding mix has already changed, ahead of the strategy that describes the change. The 2026–30 strategy’s emphasis on private co-investment and capital discipline [S8] is usually read as a forward-looking choice. The 2025 accounts suggest it is also a response to conditions that already exist: state contributions down 92 per cent, dividend income down 22 per cent, borrowings up 27.2 per cent. Our analysis of the 2026–30 strategy and its capital allocation treats the strategy on its own terms; these results are the financial context it was written into.

Third, the giga-project reset is now two years old and still moving. PIF disclosed an approximately $8bn writedown on giga-project assets in its 2024 statements, published in August 2025, and the giga-project share of total assets fell from 8 per cent to 6 per cent [S6]. We covered that disclosure in detail in PIF’s $8 billion writedown, and the underlying delivery questions in NEOM’s technical feasibility and financial viability. What the 2025 accounts add is that the repricing was not confined to the unlisted development portfolio. The listed portfolio repriced too — by an order of magnitude more — and that repricing never touched the profit line.

Risks, Contradictions and Open Questions

We could not read the primary PDF. PIF’s investor and financial-statement pages [S9] returned HTTP 403 to automated retrieval throughout this analysis. Every figure above is therefore sourced to outlets that did read the statements — MEED and Enterprise carry the most granular line-item detail [S1][S3] — not to our own reading of the document. Where those outlets disagree, we have said so. A reader with access to the PDF should treat it as authoritative over anything here.

Sources disagree on several figures, all by rounding. Net profit is reported as SAR65.1bn by Arab News, Al Arabiya and Economy Middle East [S2][S10][S12] and SAR65.2bn by MEED and Enterprise [S1][S3], consistent with an underlying figure near SAR65.15bn. Operating profit appears as SAR77.9bn [S2] and SAR78bn [S1][S3]; the 2024 comparative as SAR34.6bn and SAR34.7bn. Revenue growth is given as 8.8 per cent [S1] and 9 per cent [S2]. None of these changes any conclusion, but a financial page should not paper over them.

“Total assets” and “assets under management” are not the same number, and coverage conflates them. Total assets of SAR4.54tn is the audited balance-sheet figure. AUM, which PIF describes as more than $900bn [S1], is a differently constructed management metric. At least one outlet labelled the SAR4.54tn balance-sheet total as AUM. The two are roughly a trillion riyals apart and are not interchangeable.

The FVOCI loss is unrealised and could reverse. Mark-to-market losses on long-held strategic equity are not cash losses. If the underlying shares recover, the equity base recovers with them — though, as established above, the recovery would never pass through profit either. Anyone treating SAR112.8bn as destroyed value is overstating the case exactly as much as anyone ignoring it is understating it.

The 2024 comparative cuts in PIF’s favour. The comprehensive loss narrowed from SAR154.4bn to SAR64.7bn [S1]. On this measure 2025 was materially better than 2024. A piece that leads with the loss and omits the improvement would be as selective as the coverage it criticises.

The Aramco attribution is unproven. We have set out why Aramco is the probable driver of both the FVOCI loss and the dividend decline. PIF does not disclose the breakdown, and until it does this remains inference.

What we still do not know. PIF does not publish the FVOCI loss by holding, the split between domestic and international positions within it, the average cost of the SAR725.3bn debt stack or its maturity profile, or a reconciliation of AUM to total assets. Nor has it published a 2025 total-shareholder-return figure updating Callen’s 7.2 per cent; the strategy materials repeat “more than 7 per cent” [S1], which is not a data point. Each of those would be a routine disclosure for a listed institution of comparable size.

What to Watch Next

PIF’s 2026 half-year and full-year disclosure (H2 2026 into mid-2027). The single most informative line will be other comprehensive income. If the FVOCI charge narrows or reverses, 2025 was a mark-to-market year. If a third consecutive large negative OCI appears, it is a pattern in the portfolio, not a market cycle.

Total equity at the next balance-sheet date. SAR2.63tn is the number to track. A second consecutive annual decline, with liabilities still compounding at 16.7 per cent, would mark a genuine change in the fund’s capacity to underwrite Vision 2030 projects.

Dividend income. SAR65.3bn is the base. This is the cleanest available read on whether the portfolio is generating the cash to service a debt stack that grew 27.2 per cent.

Government capital contributions. SAR54bn in 2025 against SAR645bn in 2024. Whether the state returns to funding PIF with equity, in cash or in kind, is the clearest signal of how the fiscal authorities are weighing PIF’s needs against a budget already under pressure — a tension we traced in how the 2026 budget treated the megaprojects.

Issuance in the second half of 2026. Watch new bonds, sukuk and facilities, and the spread at which they price. Pricing is the market’s live verdict on the leverage trend described here.

Any updated total-shareholder-return figure. PIF has not published a rolling return through end-2025. Publishing one, particularly if it falls below 7 per cent, would be the most consequential single disclosure the fund could make. Its governance and disclosure practice is mapped in our PIF mandate and governance risk map, and the leadership context in our profile of Yasir Al-Rumayyan.

The AUM trajectory. We track the target and the gap separately on the PIF assets under management tracker.

The Reporting Failure Is the Story

Be precise about where the fault lies, because the temptation is to imply concealment and there is no evidence of any.

PIF prepared audited statements under IFRS and presented the statement of profit or loss and other comprehensive income in the required form. It disclosed the SAR112.8bn fair-value loss, the SAR113.3bn OCI total, the SAR64.7bn comprehensive loss, the borrowings increase, the dividend decline and the fall in equity. Everything in this analysis was published by PIF, on time, in the ordinary course.

What happened next is that a press release emphasising profit was distributed, and most outlets reported the press release. MEED, Enterprise and AGBI read further [S1][S3][S4]. The coverage that reached the largest audiences reproduced the headline.

That is not a scandal — press releases are free and audited statements are long. But it means the widely held understanding of how the region’s largest sovereign fund performed in 2025 is materially incomplete, and the correction is available to anyone willing to scroll to the second statement.

Related Vision 2030 Context

• Public Investment Fund: institutional profile and mandate — the entity page covering PIF’s structure, governance and role.
• PIF’s $8 billion writedown — the 2024 giga-project impairment and what it covered.
• PIF AUM target gap: assets, debt and the 2030 funding path — the forward funding arithmetic.
• PIF 2026–2030 strategy and capital allocation — the three-portfolio reorganisation.
• PIF portfolio companies — the holdings behind the consolidated revenue.
• Saudi Aramco — the 16 per cent stake driving dividends and fair-value movements.
• Yasir Al-Rumayyan and PIF leadership — governance and board power.
• PIF mandate, governance and Vision 2030 risk map — disclosure practice and institutional risk.
• Sovereign wealth funds across the GCC — regional peer comparison.
• Saudi Arabia vs UAE — the strategic contrast behind the Mubadala return gap.
• PIF assets under management tracker — the maintained AUM series.
• Giga-projects: ambition vs reality — delivery against announcement.
• NEOM: technical feasibility and financial viability — the largest single call on PIF capital.
• The 2026 budget and the megaprojects — the fiscal backdrop to the funding shift.

Sources

• [S1] MEED, PIF’s 2025 Results Back 2026-30 Strategy Shift, analysis, July 2026. https://guest.meed.com/pifs-2025-results-back-2026-30-strategy-shift/
• [S2] Arab News, Saudi Arabia’s PIF Assets Rise 5% to $1.21tn, Net Profit More Than Doubles, news report, 30 June 2026. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2649080/business-economy
• [S3] Enterprise, PIF Bottom Line More Than Doubles in 2025, Clears AUM Target, news analysis, 1 July 2026. https://enterpriseam.com/ksa/2026/07/01/pif-bottom-line-more-than-doubles-in-2025-clears-aum-target/
• [S4] AGBI, PIF Reports Doubling in Profits and Slash in State Funding, news analysis, 30 June 2026. https://www.agbi.com/economy/2026/06/pif-reports-doubling-in-profits-and-slash-in-state-funding/
• [S5] Tim Callen, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, Financial Results Raise Questions About the PIF’s Investment Strategy, analysis, 18 August 2025. https://agsi.org/analysis/financial-results-raise-questions-about-the-pifs-investment-strategy/
• [S6] CNBC, Saudi Arabia PIF Fund Sees $8 Billion Writedown in Megaprojects, news report, 14 August 2025. https://www.cnbc.com/2025/08/14/saudi-arabia-pif-fund-sees-8-billion-writedown-in-megaprojects.html
• [S7] Mubadala Investment Company, Strong Performance by UAE Portfolio Drives Mubadala’s Growth in 2025, press release, April 2026. https://www.mubadala.com/en/news/strong-performance-by-uae-portfolio-drives-mubadalas-growth-in-2025
• [S8] Public Investment Fund, Chaired by HRH Crown Prince, PIF Board of Directors Approves PIF 2026-2030 Strategy, press release, April 2026. https://www.pif.gov.sa/en/news-and-insights/press-releases/2026/chaired-by-hrh-crown-prince-pif-board-of-directors-approves-pif-2026-2030-strategy/
• [S9] Public Investment Fund, Investors: Consolidated Financial Statements, primary financial disclosure. https://www.pif.gov.sa/en/investors/
• [S10] Al Arabiya English, Saudi Arabia’s PIF Net Profit More Than Doubles, Revenue Up 9 Pct, news report, 30 June 2026. https://english.alarabiya.net/News/saudi-arabia/2026/06/30/saudi-arabia-s-pif-net-profit-more-than-doubles-revenue-up-9-pct-
• [S11] Tim Callen, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, Aramco Equity Transfer Helps the Public Investment Fund, Hurts Saudi Government Budget, analysis, 8 March 2024. https://agsi.org/analysis/aramco-equity-transfer-helps-the-public-investment-fund-hurts-saudi-government-budget/
• [S12] Economy Middle East, Saudi PIF More Than Doubles 2025 Net Profit as Revenue Rises 9 Percent to $119.7 Billion, news report, 30 June 2026. https://economymiddleeast.com/news/saudi-pif-more-than-doubles-2025-net-profit-as-revenue-rises-9-percent-to-119-7-billion/