AlUla’s French Partnership Now Runs to 2035. Vision 2030 Was Never Its Finish Line.

Saudi Arabia and France have extended their AlUla partnership to 2035. The date is not a postponement of Vision 2030. It is an acknowledgement of the delivery horizon that AlUla has used for years.

The Journey Through Time masterplan has long proposed three phases ending in 2035, when AlUla is intended to have five destination districts, two million annual visitors and tens of thousands of new jobs. The new bilateral agreement aligns the state-to-state vehicle with that asset timeline. [S1] [S2]

The more consequential question is what the extension changes. The Élysée says the parties will work on an “evolved framework” reflecting the partnership’s maturity; it does not publish the amended agreement, work programme, funding, governance changes or new milestones. [S1]

AlUla is already an operating destination: RCU reports roughly 320,000 visitors in 2025, 1,000 hotel keys, 14 activated heritage sites and more than SAR10 billion of public infrastructure deployed. [S3] It is also far from its full build-out. The extension is best understood as institutional continuity through a long construction and market-development phase—not as evidence that every original milestone was achieved.

Last verified: 1 September 2026.

The partnership began in 2018, not 2026

Saudi Arabia and France signed the original intergovernmental agreement on 10 April 2018. France created the French Agency for AlUla Development, AFALULA, to work with the Royal Commission for AlUla in a co-construction model. A steering committee and high-level ministerial committee were established to direct the relationship. [S4]

The partnership covers more than tourism promotion. RCU describes French expertise across heritage conservation, archaeology, infrastructure, capacity building, sustainability and cultural institutions. The Centre Pompidou advises on the planned Perspectives Galleries, while Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University participates in archaeology education, training and research. [S4]

That architecture explains why 2035 matters. Museums, archaeological programmes, landscape rehabilitation and local skills institutions need continuity beyond an event cycle. A state framework can preserve institutional memory while individual design, research and construction contracts change.

The August 2026 joint statement calls the relationship “exceptional” and says the evolved framework will build on AlUla’s opportunities as a cultural and heritage destination. [S1] What it does not say is whether AFALULA’s mandate, decision rights, fees or delivery scope are being expanded. The extension secures duration; the operative amendment remains undisclosed.

French participation is mainly disclosed as Saudi procurement

RCU says that collaboration with AFALULA resulted in more than 170 contracts awarded to French companies since 2019, with combined value above $200 million. Seventy-two contracts worth $35.8 million were commissioned in 2022 alone. [S4]

Those figures demonstrate commercial depth, but they should be classified correctly. Contract awards to French companies are Saudi procurement of French services and expertise. They are not, without separate evidence, French capital invested in AlUla.

The disclosure lacks several details needed to calculate the partnership’s economic distribution:

• whether the $200 million is award value or expenditure paid;
• the period covered beyond “since 2019” and its latest update date;
• the share delivered by French staff versus Saudi operations and subcontractors;
• how much work was competitively tendered;
• the concentration among the largest suppliers; and
• Saudi jobs, training and intellectual property produced by the contracts.

The average implied contract value—just over $1.18 million if exactly 170 awards totalled exactly $200 million—is not meaningful because both numerator and denominator are lower bounds and the distribution may be highly concentrated. RCU should publish the ledger by sector, year, award value, paid value and local content.

France may also contribute investment, tourism demand and institutional resources outside this procurement total. Those flows need their own categories. Combining them would confuse buyer spending with investor risk capital.

The 2035 scorecard has moved

AlUla’s targets are not perfectly stable across official pages. That makes a dated baseline essential.

Sources: RCU’s current investment page, Journey Through Time materials and 2024 sustainability reporting. [S2] [S3] [S5]

The visitor arithmetic shows the commercial challenge. Growing from 320,000 in 2025 to two million in 2035 requires a 6.25-fold increase, equivalent to about 20.1% compound annual growth for ten consecutive years. RCU reports roughly 22% visitor CAGR from 2021 to 2025. [S3] Maintaining close to that rate as the base becomes much larger would be a considerable achievement.

Current quality indicators are encouraging: 94% visitor satisfaction, a 3.6-day average stay and 27% international visitors in 2025. [S3] They are self-reported and need definitions, sample sizes and time series, but they move the analysis beyond construction.

The jobs and GDP targets require reconciliation. The original masterplan uses 38,000 jobs and SAR120 billion of GDP contribution. RCU’s 2023 and 2024 annual-report pages display 40,500 jobs and SAR150 billion cumulative contribution. The current investor page combines 38,000 jobs with “SAR150bn+” in a separate statistics panel and still describes $32 billion, equivalent to roughly SAR120 billion, in prose. [S2] [S3] [S6]

This may reflect a revised economic model. It should be labelled as one, with methodology and base year.

The missing close-out is the 2023 first phase

Journey Through Time was launched in 2021 with three implementation phases through 2035. Its public FAQ said phase one was scheduled for completion in 2023. The phase was intended to create a continuous visitor experience through the Wadi of Hospitality and district-level projects, alongside public realm, agricultural rehabilitation, water management and an eventual 46-kilometre low-carbon tram. [S2]

Current RCU material still reproduces the statement that phase one was “scheduled” or “expected” to complete in 2023. It does not provide a phase-one close-out report listing delivered, rescheduled or descoped components. [S2]

This is not enough to conclude that the entire phase failed. Several foundational assets operate: Old Town and heritage sites receive visitors; hospitality is open; the airport has expanded to 700,000 annual passenger capacity; and substantial public infrastructure has been deployed. [S3]

It is enough to conclude that milestone accountability is incomplete. A masterplan phase contains a defined scope. If that scope changes, the public record should state which outputs were accepted, which migrated to later phases and why.

The low-carbon tram is now “anticipated” to be fully operational by the third quarter of 2030. [S3] That is a clear current date and should replace any impression that the original phase-one connector programme was wholly complete in 2023.

What has been delivered is substantial but uneven

The evidence supports three areas of realised progress.

Destination operations. AlUla received roughly 320,000 visitors in 2025, served by about 2,200 commercial flights. Fourteen heritage sites are activated, and 1,000 hotel keys are operating. [S3]

Infrastructure. RCU reports more than SAR10 billion deployed in public infrastructure. AlUla International Airport’s annual passenger capacity rose from 400,000 to 700,000. [S3] Capacity is not traffic, but it removes a near-term constraint.

Cultural and research institutions. Hegra’s UNESCO status predates the masterplan, while active archaeology, university links and museum planning show institutional depth. The French relationship is especially visible here.

The weaker area is comparable economic outcomes. RCU’s 2024 sustainability report says tourism generated 2,169 jobs that year. [S5] That is useful but not directly comparable with a 38,000 or 40,500 “new jobs” target unless it is clear whether the target is cumulative, direct, indirect or induced and whether the annual figure is stock or flow.

Similarly, infrastructure spending and contract awards are inputs. Visitor expenditure, private capital, operating cash generation, resident income and realised GDP contribution are outputs. The extension should mark a shift towards the latter.

The strongest case for extending to 2035

Heritage development benefits from patient governance. Archaeology cannot be compressed to meet a political date, and environmental constraints should slow designs when evidence requires it. A long bilateral framework gives French institutions confidence to train people, establish research programmes and support museums whose opening is years away.

AlUla also has evidence of demand. Visitor growth, high satisfaction and increasing airlift make it more than an untested plan. The next 5,000 hotel keys can be phased against observed demand rather than built only from a top-down target.

The relationship has survived long enough to produce a supplier and institutional network. More than 170 French contracts and multiple cultural partnerships give the extension an operating base.

Finally, 2030 was always an intermediate year in the masterplan. Extending state cooperation to the asset’s full horizon reduces artificial deadline pressure and signals that Vision 2030 institutions are intended to operate after the national programme’s named year.

The countercase: a longer horizon can defer accountability

An extension can protect continuity; it can also make old milestones disappear into a new end date. The unresolved 2023 phase-one close-out is the warning.

Target drift compounds that risk. If jobs move from 38,000 to 40,500 and GDP contribution from SAR120 billion to SAR150 billion without a bridge, later achievement becomes difficult to judge. Stronger targets are welcome only when their definitions and model revisions are disclosed.

The visitor plan also becomes more capital intensive as it scales. Adding at least 5,000 keys by 2030 ahead of a two-million-visitor destination requires careful phasing to avoid low occupancy or price distortion. Cultural sensitivity constrains mass-tourism models, which is appropriate but may limit volume.

French procurement creates capabilities only if Saudi staff, suppliers and institutions absorb them. Contract count alone can reward fragmentation rather than transfer.

The post-2030 reporting model AlUla needs

The amended framework should publish a joint programme annex with workstreams, responsible entities, budgets and milestones through 2035. French contracts should be reported with paid value and Saudi local content.

RCU should issue one stable annual scorecard covering visitors, spend per visitor, occupancy, room supply, private capital, direct jobs, resident jobs, local procurement, conservation condition, water, biodiversity and cumulative GDP methodology.

The 2023 phase should receive a retrospective close-out. Future phases should have baseline and acceptance criteria before dates are announced.

AlUla demonstrates the right lesson about Vision 2030: economic transformation does not expire in 2030. The harder lesson is that longer horizons demand better interim accounting, not less.

Related Vision 2030 Context

• The full Saudi-French Paris deal ledger
• AlUla development and investment
• Saudi tourism targets and delivery

Sources

1. [S1] Élysée, “Joint statement by France and Saudi Arabia”, 25 August 2026. https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2026/08/25/joint-statement-by-france-and-saudi-arabia-on-the-occasion-of-the-visit-of-his-royal-highness-prince-mohammed-bin-salman-bin-abdulaziz-al-saud-crown-prince-and-prime-minister-of-the-kingdom-of-saudi-arabia-to-the-french-republic
2. [S2] Royal Commission for AlUla, “Journey Through Time Masterplan”, accessed 31 August 2026. https://ucl.rcu.gov.sa/
3. [S3] Royal Commission for AlUla, “Investing in AlUla”, accessed 31 August 2026. https://www.rcu.gov.sa/en/business-in-alula/investing-in-alula
4. [S4] Royal Commission for AlUla, “French Partnership”, accessed 31 August 2026. https://www.rcu.gov.sa/en/partners/french-partnership
5. [S5] Royal Commission for AlUla, Annual Sustainability Report 2024. https://www.rcu.gov.sa/getmedia/7b770a2b-317f-4ece-b392-243d9788999e/RCU-Report-Full-report-V7-3-compressed-%281%29.pdf
6. [S6] Royal Commission for AlUla, Annual Report 2023. https://www.rcu.gov.sa/getmedia/946d2c9d-db17-4601-8957-c6858e2be866/w240703-rcu-annual-report-2023-en-public-v4_1.pdf